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Foreword
The threat posed by climate change to our world is well understood. We know  
that sharp reductions in carbon emissions are needed if we are to achieve the goal  
of the Paris Agreement and keep global warming below the CO2 upper limit.  
This is a complex challenge for which there are no simple solutions.
The Paris Agreement was significant because 
it united countries in common cause and 
commitment to action. Only by working together 
can we face the threat that climate change poses to 
us all. Collective action only works if each of us are 
prepared to play our part.
Countries must reconsider their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and increase 
their ambition to reduce emissions. In February 
2021, a UN report concluded the latest pledges 
would reduce emissions by less than 1% by 2030 
compared to 2010. This falls well short of the 45% 
reduction the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) say is necessary to limit global 
warming to 1.5oC. We must do better.
Ambitious pledges must be backed up by action. 
We owe it future generations to be responsible 
guardians of the natural world, upon which 
our health and prosperity depend. There is 
also a moral obligation upon us to help those 
around the world who lack the means to address 
climate change but will nonetheless suffer the 
consequences. If the United Kingdom’s presidency 
of COP26 is to be considered a success, then we 
should demonstrate global leadership by getting 
our own house in order, while helping others 
to do the same.
Reaching net-zero will only be possible in 
partnership with the private sector. Business 
decarbonisation plans must therefore be 
supported by clear sector roadmaps and long-term 
policy support from government. Public 
investment in the green economy is vital to support 
jobs and leverage private sector funding. 
Universities have a distinctive role as civic 
institutions engaged in both teaching and research. 
We exist to extend the boundaries of knowledge 
and to share what we have learned for the common 
good. Contributing to public debates is therefore 
very much part of our mission and we hope this 
publication will help to make expert insight more 
accessible. 
But more than that, we want to inspire and give 
a platform to younger generations. We therefore 
launched a writing competition to give University 
of Birmingham students the opportunity to have 
their say on climate change. We are grateful to the 
judges – Dame Caroline Spelman, Professor Alice 
Roberts and Professor Hisham Mehanna – for 
selecting three worthy prize-winners and we  
are delighted to include these articles in  
this publication.
Climate change is, undeniably, a grave threat to 
our world. Yet if the history of human endeavour 
has taught us anything, it is that we can accomplish 
more than we believe possible if we come together, 
united in common purpose. Let us therefore use 
the opportunity presented by COP26 to reaffirm 
our commitment to action – and to one another. 
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Introduction
Much has changed since the University of Birmingham was established by Royal Charter 
from Queen Victoria in 1900. We were the very first civic university in the United 
Kingdom, built up in a city that helped pioneer the industrial revolution that shaped our 
modern world. While our understanding of the environmental consequences of development 
has moved on since then, the commitment to our civic responsibilities remains a core 
component of our identity at the University of Birmingham.
Sustainability is rapidly becoming a core 
responsibility and will be an increasingly 
important aspect of all our lives. The University 
of Birmingham recently signed up to the Race to 
Zero campaign, which aims to build momentum 
around the shift to a decarbonised economy.
In 2022, we will convene the Forum for Global 
Challenges bringing people together to find 
solutions within the broad areas of climate 
change and inequalities. We are also proud to 
be an official partner of the Birmingham 2022 
Commonwealth Games, which is aiming to be the 
most sustainable Commonwealth Games ever.
The challenges brought by climate change are 
closely linked to sustainability and are among 
the most pressing issues facing our world today. 
Addressing these effectively means that we must 
first understand the problems, before asking 
the difficult questions around how much we are 
willing to change our lives in response. Reaching 
net zero is achievable, but will involve many 
changes to how we live, including for resource and 
energy efficiency, technological shifts and societal 
choices, driven by well-designed policy. 
This report has been written to make expert 
insight and evidence accessible to those who 
are interested in climate change. We invited 
people from across the University of Birmingham 
community – and beyond – to write about topics 
relevant to the upcoming COP26 climate change 
summit. The opinions and conclusions expressed 
in these articles belong to their respective  
authors but, nonetheless, a few common themes 
did emerge.
We need to grow our understanding of the drivers 
of climate change, recognising that there are many 
complex and often interconnected issues at work. 
This will help us design better policy responses 
and technological innovations to mitigate climate 
change and help us adapt to a warmer planet. 
Global decision-makers must prioritise funding 
climate research and knowledge transfer activities.
Long-term planning and the development of a 
circular economy is essential. In the short-term 
national governments could incentivise sustainable 
behaviours and speed up the adoption of cleaner 
technologies through taxation and subsidies.
Climate change is not just a problem for the 
scientists and policy makers. Each of us has a 
responsibility to think about how our day-to-day 
lives can be made more sustainable. The role of 
the arts and humanities are often overlooked, 
but they can help win over hearts and minds, and 
inspire people to action. Though factual debate 
is essential, we should complement this with a 
narrative that inspires hope.
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Infectious diseases have been the most important cause of death in 
human history. Only since the late 19th century has our understanding 
of the microbial causes of infectious diseases led to the broad 
implementation of public health interventions to safely dispose of 
sewage and provide clean drinking water. From the 1950s onwards, the 
development of antimicrobial drugs and vaccines have been powerful 
additions to our arsenal against infectious diseases. 
Collectively, these interventions and therapies have led to a significant 
decrease in deaths caused by infections globally, particularly in high-
income countries. However, in the 21st century infectious diseases 
remain an important cause of death in the poorest countries in which 
the majority of the world’s population lives. Since late 2019, the 
dramatic events of the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted that 
infectious diseases still have the capacity to destructively affect even  
the world’s most advanced economies and cause widespread  
suffering and death. 
In this article, I will consider how climate change is already 
contributing to the global spread of infectious diseases. In addition,  
I will discuss whether new pathogenic microbes with pandemic 
potential are more likely to emerge and spread on a warming planet. 
Finally, I will outline potential interventions to rapidly detect and 
mitigate the spread of new and existing microbial threats.
An introduction to infectious diseases
Infectious diseases are caused by microbes, which include viruses, 
bacteria, fungi and parasites. The most important shared characteristic 
of all infectious diseases is that these microbes can spread between 
humans, thus causing the spread of the illness throughout populations. 
Sometimes this spread between two individuals can be direct and 
is described by the term ‘human-to-human’ transmission. Several 
important viral diseases, like measles and COVID-19, and the bacterial 
infection tuberculosis are important examples of illnesses that spread 
directly from human to human through the inhalation of droplets 
and/or aerosols that carry the infectious agents. 
Other infectious diseases need an animal intermediary (termed a 
vector) for transmission. Important vector-borne infectious diseases 
are malaria, which needs the Anopheles mosquito to transmit, and 
plague, which is caused by a bacterium that can be transmitted via fleas 
and their bites. The vast majority of infectious diseases are zoonotic, 
meaning that the infectious microbe has, at some point in its natural 
history, jumped from an animal host to humans. SARS-CoV-2, the 
virus that causes COVID-19, appears to be an example of a zoonotic 
virus as current evidence points towards it having been carried by bats 
before it made the host jump to humans in late 2019. Other pandemic 
viruses are also zoonotic. HIV, the virus that causes the disease AIDS, 
is thought to have crossed from chimpanzees to humans in the 1920s. 
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For influenza viruses, livestock and poultry are important hosts where 
new forms of the virus can emerge and subsequently spread to humans. 
In the vast majority of cases, the host jump of a virus to humans will not 
result in an infection that is characterised by sustained human-to-human 
transmission. However, the pandemics of the last century, including 
HIV, Zika, Ebola and COVID-19, have shown that novel viruses can still 
spread rapidly across human populations. The COVID-19 pandemic 
should thus not be seen as a unique ‘Black Swan event’, but rather as  
a warning to future generations that pandemics will always remain  
a threat to humanity. 
Climate change changes the geographic 
range of vectors of infectious diseases 1 
Global warming is changing the geographic range of mosquitoes and 
other insects that act as vectors for infectious diseases. This is now 
broadly recognised as a major threat to global public health. As an 
example, mosquitoes of the genus Aedes, particularly Aedes aegypti 
(the yellow fewer mosquito) and Aedes albopictus (the Asian tiger 
mosquito) are important vectors for viral infectious diseases including 
yellow fever, West Nile fever, Zika and Chikungunya. Since the 1960s, 
global trade in products like tyres and potted plants, which provide 
habitats for the development of larvae of A. aegypti and A. albopictus, 
has led to the introduction of these mosquitoes into North America and 
Europe. Winter temperature is likely to be the most important factor in 
determining how far these mosquitoes can spread to higher latitudes. 
With milder winters becoming more common on a warming planet, it 
is thus likely that these mosquitoes will spread further northwards in 
Europe and North America in the 21st century. In a worst-case ‘business-
as-usual’ scenario for climate change, nearly a billion individuals will 
be newly exposed to these Aedes mosquitoes and the viruses that they 
can transmit. Current scenarios do not foresee a spread to the United 
Kingdom, but the mosquitoes are likely to become endemic across 
popular southern European destinations for tourism, thus potentially 
leading to increasing numbers of travel-related infections across Europe.
1   For further reading on this topic see: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0007213; https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3614918/ and  
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41564-019-0376-y 
2  For further reading on this topic see: https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m3389; https://www.biorxiv.org 
content/10.1101/2020.01.24.918755v3.full and https://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/climatechangechap6.pdf 
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Ecosystem upheaval will increase 
human-animal interactions, facilitating  
virus-host jumps 2
An estimated 10,000 viruses that are currently circulating in wildlife are 
thought to be able to infect and spread among humans. These viruses 
are entirely unknown to science and humanity will probably only first 
know of them after they cross the species barrier to start causing disease 
in humans, similar to SARS-CoV-2 and HIV. On a warming planet, many 
of the ecosystems on our planet will undergo dramatic changes, which 
will lead to the movement of many animal species into new habitats. 
For example, the climatic changes in the 21st century are likely to 
contribute to increased droughts and larger, uncontrolled forest fires. 
These fires will not only directly affect the carbon balance on our 
planet, as tropical rainforests are among the most important carbon 
sinks on the planet, but will also lead to migration of animals from 
regions that are affected by fire. When animal populations move from 
their original habitats to new sites, there is an increased risk that they 
come into contact with humans, thereby increasing the risk of animal-to-
human transmission of the viruses they carry. This is particularly relevant 
for bats, who are broadly recognised as an important reservoir for novel 
viruses. The capacity of bats to fly allows them to travel hundreds of 
kilometres within their lifetime, thus potentially contributing to the 
dissemination of novel viruses on continental scales after their original 
habitats have been disrupted by climate change.
Climate change and antibiotic  
resistant bacteria 3
The previous sections have mostly focused on viral diseases. However, 
infections caused by bacteria remain an important cause of disease 
and death globally. Since the mid-20th century, bacterial infections 
have been treated with antibiotics. Worryingly, bacteria that have 
evolved resistance to these drugs have become increasingly widespread. 
Infections caused by these antibiotic-resistant bacteria are becoming 
increasingly difficult to treat due to a lack of development of novel 
antibiotics. Antibiotic resistance can be regarded as a ‘slow pandemic’ 
that takes decades to spread, but can result in 10 million deaths per year 
by the year 2050. It may make medical interventions that are currently 
considered routine very risky as we would no longer be able to rely on 
antibiotics to suppress and cure infections. 
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Whereas antibiotic usage in human and veterinary medicine is broadly 
recognised as the leading driver for the emergence and spread of 
antibiotic resistance, recent research has shown that increasing 
temperatures in Europe and North America are associated with higher 
levels of drug-resistant bacteria. The mechanisms that are driving 
increased levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria at higher ambient 
cultures are currently unknown. It is possible that the process of 
horizontal gene transfer, the exchange of DNA containing antibiotic 
resistance determinants between bacteria, is increased at higher 
temperatures. Global warming may thus directly contribute to  
the rapid spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria across the planet.
A global response to infectious diseases 
in the age of climate change
To mitigate the impact of climate change on the spread of 
infectious diseases, we can build on the experience of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which has made it abundantly clear 
humanity always needs to be prepared to go to battle with its 
microbial enemies. Rapid deployment of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions and the development of novel drugs and vaccines  
will remain cornerstones for an effective response to infectious 
diseases. In addition, global networks for surveillance and monitoring 
of infectious diseases, particularly in settings where humans and 
animals interact, e.g. in the vicinity of bat colonies, will need to be 
expanded to rapidly flag and identify new outbreaks of infections. 
Similar surveillance efforts are needed to map the spread of insect 
vectors of infectious diseases. These should be combined with public 
information campaigns to promote interventions to minimise insect 
bites and raise awareness when new infectious diseases are introduced 
through insects. Climate change is predicted to first affect the poorest 
nations on the planet. These countries generally already have high 
rates of infectious diseases and often harbour ecosystems that can be 
conducive to animal-to-human transmission events of pathogens.  
On a warming planet, a truly global effort is thus urgently needed to 
stem the emergence and spread of new and existing infectious diseases.
Addressing the climate challenge
Willem van Schaik 
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
1   For further reading on this topic see: https://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/160525_Final%20paper_
with%20cover.pdf; https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6201249/ and https://www.
eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.45.1900414 
Willem van Schaik Climate change, infectious diseases and pandemics
12 Addressing the climate challenge
The role of 
healthcare in 
carbon reduction
The impact of Covid-19 on the UK National Health Service (NHS) was 
dramatic and instantaneous, and while some changes were immediate 
and obvious, others will arguably take months and years to become 
evident. One area where short term responses could have longer term 
implications is around the environmental impact, or sustainability, of 
healthcare delivery. This article will explore the role that healthcare can 
play in contributing to carbon reduction and how the sector can move 
towards improved sustainability. We will consider how the pandemic 
accelerated imperatives in health service delivery towards carbon 
reduction, wittingly or otherwise, including the use of innovations or 
initiatives that were previously available but sometimes under-utilised 
(telehealth, e-consultations, the greater use of patient self-monitoring 
for instance). These adaptations have long existed or been possible, but 
the ‘forced innovation’ and wider adoption provides a timely impetus 
towards sustainability, with benefits arguably also relating to improved 
patient care and experience.
Healthcare and environmental 
sustainability 
The relationship between health, healthcare delivery and environmental 
impact is cyclical and symbiotic – ‘environment’, in its broadest sense, 
is a key determinant of health, and the resource-intensive delivery 
of healthcare in developed economies has a clear impact on the 
environment. To ensure a deeper understanding of how these factors 
interact, and how carbon reduction in healthcare is not only desirable 
but a plausible policy choice, it is worth exploring this relationship in 
more detail.
The links between climate change – the use of finite resources, the 
impact on the health of communities and populations, and the delivery 
of modern healthcare – has been the subject of study for many years. 
Even a brief review highlights some startling issues. As far back as 
2011, carbon emissions from the healthcare sector in the United States 
accounted for 10% of total US emissions; in 2012, the King’s Fund 
pointed out that “carbon dioxide emissions attributable to the NHS  
in England alone are greater than the total emissions from all passenger 
aircraft departing from Heathrow Airport”; and more recently,  
a paper in the Lancet explored the tension that “health-care services  
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are necessary for sustaining and improving human wellbeing, yet they 
have an environmental footprint that contributes to environment-
related threats to human health”. The NHS made a bold commitment 
to ‘net zero’ in October 2020, acknowledging as it did so that “we 
therefore make no apologies for pushing for progress in this area while 
still continuing to confront coronavirus”. Meanwhile, for practitioners, 
the Centre for Sustainable Healthcare contains a myriad of material “…
to engage healthcare professionals, patients and the wider community 
in understanding the connections between health and environment and 
reducing healthcare’s resource footprint”. This includes educational 
resources, analytical debate and practical toolkits. In some ways, 
therefore, the field around the environmental impact of healthcare 
commissioning and delivery, and thinking around sustainability, has 
never been richer, and the resources for policy-makers are wider than 
ever. The emergence of the coronavirus pandemic, however, pushed 
healthcare systems (such as the NHS) into a turbo-charged ‘adapt to 
survive’ crisis footing which, as we will turn to next, had significant 
implications for the use of scarce resources.
Covid-19 – the impetus for change
Much is written about how humankind will respond to climate change 
challenges, whether this will be through a carefully planned policy 
response with prospective adaptation, or reactive responses to various 
climate emergencies. Almost certainly, these two drivers will intertwine, 
each reinforcing the other in a feedback loop along with the occasional 
jolt from an external ‘shock’. The Covid-19 pandemic was just such 
an external shock, and it can be instructive to explore the response 
of health services through the lens of environmental impact – was 
this congruent with, or did it confound, the paradigm of the dual 
prospective and reactive response?
At an operational level, the impacts of the pandemic on health service 
delivery were immediate and obvious. Face to face consultations across 
all specialties were drastically reduced, and given that 90% of NHS 
interactions take place in primary care, this impact would have been 
highly noticeable to all users. What followed, not only in primary care 
but across all parts of the NHS, was remarkable.
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Adaptation and sustainability in health
The NHS Long Term Plan, published in January 2019 signalled a move 
to ‘digital first’ primary care well before the advent of Covid-19. The 
importance of investing in digital technology has been signalled for 
many years (e.g. the Wanless Report and the Topol Review), although 
progress has been inconsistent. What happened, as a result of the 
pandemic, laid bare the drivers and determinants of health, with digital 
poverty and inequality as real as any of the more traditional drivers.  
It is indisputable that the pandemic has significantly accelerated digital 
health beyond all expectations with more than 99% of GP practices  
now activating remote platforms to provide some form of e- 
consultation, but this could just as easily reinforce other inequalities, 
such as digital poverty. Whilst the impact of remote GP consultations 
carbon reduction has not been quantified, it is intuitively indicated, 
most obviously via, for example, transportation emissions. However  
this needs to be considered (especially from a policy perspective)  
on a broader landscape of what is a ‘good life’ and a ‘good society’.
In addition to e-consultations there has been a massive roll out of 
remote self-monitoring for patients with pre-existing conditions and 
for those testing positive for Covid-19. Known as ‘digital health’ these 
innovations are set to have long-lasting implications for sustainability. 
For those with pre-existing conditions, the challenge has been how to 
replicate the support which multi-disciplinary acute and/ or community 
health teams were providing pre-pandemic. The development of virtual 
wards has been scaled up, enabling patients with long term conditions 
to be cared for at home and reducing the need for outpatient 
attendances and other follow up, with clear implications in reduced 
travel to clinical sites. In some cases, such as remote monitoring pilots, 
these changes have built on work already underway with the pandemic 
giving it extra impetus. For example, the Joined-up Care Approach 
across Yorkshire includes a project originally focussed on primary and 
secondary care extended to children and young people with life-limiting 
illness who are looked after by the paediatric palliative care team or 
those with a chronic condition like Cystic Fibrosis under the care of 
the paediatric respiratory team. The pandemic shifted the focus to 
enabling remote home monitoring of these children and young people 
to reduce their need to visit hospital. In another project (in the North 
East of England), a remote ECG pathway to support patients and staff 
during the pandemic met with overwhelmingly positive evaluation from 
patients and staff and offered clear benefits in reducing the need to 
travel to hospital. The NHS Trust involved has now taken the decision 
to use these permanently, procuring and distributing over 100 devices 
across 100 community teams.
Learning from and promoting best practice and rolling it out at scale 
has been a feature of the NHS response to the pandemic, with the 
provision of home monitoring of oxygen saturation levels being a good 
example (other responses can be seen here). Home oximetry (using 
small, cheap oximeter devices enabling self or carer monitoring) has 
been one digital enabler of the development and expansion of Covid 
Virtual wards. These were set up to enable hospital patients to be 
discharged home earlier with ongoing monitoring in place, with  
obvious benefits to patients and reduced resource consumption.  
The unprecedented national roll out of oximeters to assist those who 
test positive for Covid-19 and/or are otherwise at risk of silent hypoxia, 
helping them determine when to contact NHS111 or when to go to 
A&E, has seen 300,000 home oximeters supplied to patients across 
England by January 2021, and similar partnerships are springing up 
across the country and bringing undoubted patient benefit.
These examples illustrate how necessity can drive innovation, but 
that this can play into patient empowerment and carbon reduction 
simultaneously. The concept posited earlier in this piece, of the 
intertwining feedback loops around innovation and change, appears 
sound, with an interdependence evident. Many virtual wards have 
been built on the earlier principles of rapid response teams which 
already existed in many community trusts. The story of adaptation is 
not a foregone conclusion of positive outcomes, however. For instance, 
elsewhere digital pilots have been seen as less successful, such as the 
provision of iPads into care homes which have focussed on the provision 
of digital kit and neglected the equally important aspects of clarity of 
the pathway, especially escalation, and the enablement, education and 
support of other patients, carers and other parts in the care system. The 
use of technology for the sake of it can result in a cul-de-sac. The longer-
term issue as we move into service resumption and recovery will be 
partly driven by ongoing financial viability in terms of the deployment 
and consumption of resources, and significantly driven by the ability  
to demonstrate transparent gains in terms of benefits to service  
users, their carers and families. 
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Policy implications
Any policy response to the environmental emergency facing the planet 
must be about leadership. A challenge for leaders is often framed as 
creating the conditions for change – articulating a vision, securing 
resources, understanding and nurturing motivation. At times such as 
these, in response to a massive external shock, that leadership challenge 
arguably morphs into riding the wave of change, securing the benefits 
and maintaining the impetus. Now, perhaps more than at any other 
time, the need for vision and the ability to develop strategic partnerships 
is more critical than ever. So, the role of the public sector leader also 
comes to the forefront; connecting and harnessing public good with 
real, operational change. Quite simply, healthcare consumes  
enormous amounts of resource, and so the potential impact  
of change is equally significant.
A policy response is as much a matter of an understanding – knowledge 
and attitude – as a set of ‘prescribed solutions’. Certainly, interested 
policy-makers can already access a range of resources that would surely 
find congruence in a range of contexts – in this area as much as any 
other, one size does not fit all, but that is not a reason for inaction. 
Sustainable healthcare is also a moral imperative, with clear congruence 
with other ethical dimensions of healthcare provision; ensuring that 
routes of access are as wide as possible, the efficient and equitable 
distribution and use of scare resources, patients and service users being 
completely clear about choices (and the limits of choice) and the 
implications of their choices. As trusted sources of health information, 
health workers can have a pivotal role in educating and informing 
colleagues and service users about the health effects of climate change 
and the need for an efficient use of resources from an environmental, 
not purely monetary, perspective. 
So, viewed through the lens of sustainable healthcare, the response  
to the pandemic was a classic combination of a reactive response,  
but prompting long-needed innovation and change. Necessity forced 
innovation, but innovation creates momentum, which leaders can both 
consolidate to ‘bank the gain’ but also use a platform for sustained 
policy change. It is often the case in healthcare that the evidence base 
is constructed iteratively, and this can apply to wider carbon reduction 
and sustainability polices too. Healthcare adapted to survive the 
pandemic, and sustainable healthcare is arguably a more realistic and 
achievable policy choice as a result. In any event, this might be less  
a choice than a necessity in itself; in all likelihood, it will not be the  
last time that health emergency and climate emergency meet.
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The functioning of society is dependent on reliable infrastructure. 
Any loss of essential services such as energy, water and mobility results 
in significant health, wellbeing and economic impacts. The day-to-day 
performance of our infrastructure, however, is impacted by the weather
Extreme weather events such as heatwaves and flooding highlight 
existing vulnerabilities in our infrastructure systems. These extreme 
events provide a window into what the future may hold in the face of 
climate change. 
The 2008 UK Climate Change Act was a world-leading piece of 
legislation. It brought a step-change in the way the UK tackled 
climate change. The act resulted in the independent Climate Change 
Committee and also mandated that a UK-wide Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA) be completed every five years. Taking a sector-by-
sector approach, the CCRA provides a regular stock-take to quantify  
the risks and opportunities associated with climate change, enabling  
the prioritisation of actions based upon urgency. Infrastructure is  
a key sector targeted by the CCRA.
The assessment of climate change impacts is crucial for long-term 
governmental planning. This is especially true in the infrastructure 
sector where adaptation planning is required on existing and, in 
many cases, ageing assets built to withstand a different climate to that 
experienced today (we still utilise some infrastructure dating from 
the Victorian era). It also means that any investment in new assets 
needs to consider a potential lifespan in excess of 50-100 years. Such 
‘lock-in’ underpins the need to build climate resilience into all new 
infrastructure projects to ensure the maximum return on investments.
Where are we now?
Since the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK has now completed two 
CCRAs and is into its third cycle (the third CCRA is slated to be brought 
before parliament in January 2022). The CCRA ultimately feeds into 
the latest iteration of the National Adaptation Programme (NAP) which 
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sets out where the government will target adaptation over the next five 
years. It also outlines the latest process for Adaptation Reporting Power 
(ARP) where the Secretary of State has the power to direct reporting 
bodies (i.e. infrastructure owners and operators) to detail their latest 
plans to adapt to climate change. ARP was a mandatory process for 
the first two iterations but has since changed to an optional return.
Underpinned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change National Adaptation Plans process, other countries throughout 
the world have adopted a similar approach. The majority of European 
countries have now completed a CCRA whereas the US has completed 
four National Climate Assessments. In all cases, there is clear evidence 
of economic flows into climate adaptation.
Despite this progress, adaptation continues to be too patchy and  
slow to make a significant difference on the ground. Each year  
brings new headlines of record-breaking weather impacting upon  
our infrastructure. Large scale flood events that damage property 
and isolate communities have almost become expected each winter. 
In contrast, record breaking temperatures wreak havoc on our rail 
networks during the summer. However, a challenge remains to directly 
attribute these individual events to climate change. Many extreme 
events remain within the boundaries of what is considered ‘normal’ 
for our weather – it is the frequency in which the events are happening 
that is increasingly not normal. The reality is that large quantities of 
infrastructure are not weather resilient, let alone climate resilient. 
Indeed, there is still plenty that needs to be done to understand the 
impacts of the current weather on infrastructure networks.
One of the biggest challenges that the infrastructure sector faces is the 
interconnected nature of its assets. For example, our mobility networks 
are becoming increasingly electrified meaning that a power outage 
will not only impact the electricity grid but also transport. Likewise, 
whereas the pandemic has brought into sharp focus our dependence 
on Information and Communications Technology (ICT), infrastructure 
too has become ever more reliant on the reliability of ICT networks 
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(e.g. smart grids for energy). The potential for such ‘cascade failures’ 
across infrastructure networks means that the current responsibilities 
and adaptation decisions made by individual infrastructure owners and 
operators extend beyond their own assets. It is no longer just about 
getting their own house in order – dedicated data needs to be collected, 
shared and analysed for the greater good.
The other side of the climate change adaptation coin is mitigation. 
This, if anything, is more crucial than adaptation as we need to limit 
the scale of climate change (keeping global temperature rises around 
1.5°C was the aim of the Paris Agreement). Prevention is better than 
cure after all! Announced in December 2020, the UK is aiming to 
reduce its emissions to net zero by 2050. This is ambitious, but in 2018, 
emissions were already 44% below 1990 levels – this is thanks in a large 
part to reductions in the energy sector. The drive to net zero has major 
implications for the infrastructure sector, even increasing exposure to 
the impacts of climate change in some cases. For example, a greater 
dependence on renewable energy may mean more offshore wind 
exposed to storm damage. A reliance on clean electricity for  
mobility will further compound risks from cascade failures.
Where are we heading?
The direction of travel is, unfortunately, clear. The UK is on its way to 
more extreme weather: warmer, drier, summers, and milder, wetter, 
winters. Not to mention the small matter of sea level rise which, left 
unchecked, will overwhelm some of our critical infrastructure on the 
coast. Taken together, all will have a significant impact on infrastructure 
with implications for mobility, energy generation and water resources – 
ultimately compromising the safe functioning of society. 
It is acknowledged that the infrastructure sector is playing its part. 
Many of the key infrastructure owners and operators now have clear 
adaptation plans (e.g. Network Rail’s Weather Resilience and Climate 
Change Adaptation plans) and investments are being made. However, 
there is a clear and pressing need to move away from any remaining 
‘siloed’ thinking which may result in an increased risk of cascading 
failure across the infrastructure system. The infrastructure sector is 
just one system among many and failure can cascade even further 
beyond. This can only be resolved by high level oversight and policy 
and knowledge exchange between infrastructure organisations to 
develop a shared understanding of cross-sector risks. Within the 
UK, the Infrastructure Operators Adaptation Forum (IOAF) brings 
together senior transport professionals, local and national government, 
independent bodies such as the Climate Change Committee and 
Environment Agency and academics to share and create best  
practice in weather resilience and climate adaptation. 
One of the biggest challenges for investments in adaptation are defined 
time periods. The CCRA and NAP operate over a five-year timescale 
(i.e. the length of a typical governmental term of office). Likewise, 
1. Longer term thinking is essential. Building cross-party consensus
for both climate change mitigation and adaptation is crucial to
overcome incremental adaptation.
2. ARP needs to once again be a mandatory process aligned to the
CCRA and NAP. Without this comprehensive input, it is almost
impossible to assess progress towards targets.
3. Encourage further high level oversight and investment to
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infrastructure owners and operators work to defined control periods.  
All contribute to short-term thinking in adaptation planning which is 
not conducive to truly tackling the impacts of climate change that will 
be felt over decades. The consequence is incremental adaptation when 
what is really required is transformative adaptation – the two do not 
need to be considered as different. There is scope to develop adaptation 
pathways which can evolve with the risk. Although more expensive in 
the long term, these reduce the scale of the investment in the short 
term. However, this approach is constrained by working to short time 
horizons and is no longer underpinned by mandatory reporting  
via ARP.
Conclusions 
The UK’s approach to climate resilience and adaptation has been 
world-leading and has served as the basis for similar approaches 
internationally. The statutory framework of rolling national risk 
assessments and adaptation programmes has helped to embed the 
adaptation process in government and non-government bodies and 
is starting to feed through into actions on the ground. However, 
the current siloed nature of adaptation, along with the political and 
institutional barriers to long-term planning mean that the truly radical 
and transformative changes that could build a climate resilient nation 
are arguably not being sufficiently nurtured. Therefore, based on these 
conclusions, the following recommendations can be made:
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On Earth Day 2021, the 22nd April, USA President Joe Biden hosted 
a virtual summit with 40 world leaders, announcing new pledges to 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions. These reductions are to meet the 
objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement; an international agreement to 
reduce global warming to well below 2 compared to pre-industrial levels. 
2 is considered the critical tipping point in global temperatures after 
which changes in the climate system may become irreversible. In some 
respects, the USA is catching up with the rest of the  
world – currently, 124 nations have pledged carbon neutrality.
The Climate Change Act 2008 mandates UK reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions; the first country in the world to do so. The revision of 
this Act in 2019 changed the target from an 80% reduction to 100% 
reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions, from a 1990 baseline by 
2050. In other words, by 2050, the UK should no longer be a net emitter 
of greenhouse gases, achieving “Net Zero”. There are also interim 
targets, 68% reduction by 2030 and 78% by 2035. However, in order 
to transition to Net Zero, the energy, water, transport and Information 
Communications Technology (ICT) sectors will need to modify or 
rebuild their infrastructure, or change the way they operate. The Net 
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Zero goal now means that the transitions need to be more ambitious, 
and possibly accelerated. The difference in the trajectories are shown 














































Despite the need to reduce emissions, there is no denying that changes 
in the climate are already taking place: 2020 was one of the warmest 
years on record, and 2011-2020 was the warmest decade on record. 
There is evidence that this warming has already led to observed  
changes in extreme weather, such as heat waves, drought and heavy 
rainfall events. Consequently, extreme weather affects infrastructure 
directly, for example:
• Flooded substations affecting electricity provision,
• Drought reducing water supply,
• Railway tracks buckle in a heat wave affecting service levels.
There are also indirect consequences of extreme weather on 
infrastructure, such as:
• Increased energy consumption during a heat wave to operate
more air conditioning units,
• Periods of drought increasing demand in water supplies,
• Loss of power to an electrified train service if a severe flood
damages its respective power supply elsewhere.
Therefore, any changes in the energy, water, transport and ICT sectors 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may need to take into account the 
expected impacts of climate change on their changing infrastructure 
so they can continue to operate. This complicated area is emerging 
in infrastructure risk assessments, as it will become imperative that 
infrastructure decisions on mitigating and adapting to climate change 
do not negatively affect each other. Here, we outline how Net Zero 
changes may affect infrastructure’s resilience, broken down by  
each sector. 
Figure 1. The difference in greenhouse gas emission trajectories over  
time based on the original Climate Change Act target (red) compared  
to the new Net Zero target (green). The black line is historic data.  
Source: Committee on Climate Change’s 2019 Progress report  
to Parliament.
Energy
The energy sector has a very large role to play in reaching UK’s 
the Net Zero goal. This includes the growth of renewable energy 
infrastructure such as solar, wind, hydro and tidal alongside biomass, 
nuclear, hydrogen and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. 
Increasing levels of intermittent, weather dependent generation 
presents challenges in managing the power network as outputs 
vary daily and seasonally across the UK. This could be particularly 
challenging when there are sharp peaks in diurnal demand that 
coincide with low renewable outputs e.g. cloudy, still days. 
On this basis, an array of supporting measures are included, including 
new nuclear and biomass with CCS, energy storage and various demand 
response solutions. Hydrogen generation is also emerging as both a 
medium of energy storage via electrolysers and a fuel for more energy 
intensive users such as HGVs and trains. Some estimates have a new 
hydrogen economy supplying comparable levels to the current gas-fired 
power station infrastructure. In addition, nuclear plants are likely to 
remain in place as a low carbon source of energy, although the level of 
deployment is uncertain as the growth of renewables expects to provide 
lower future costs. To reduce the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions to 
zero from these supporting measures, CCS is required. It is a process of 
capturing emissions at the source, transported via pipelines or shipping 
and stored back deep into the ground. It prevents carbon dioxide, 
the primary greenhouse gas, from entering the atmosphere in the  
first place. 
All of these changes in energy infrastructure: renewables, hydrogen, 
new nuclear and CCS are vulnerable to climate impacts, with their 
exposure dependent on their location. For renewables, the implications 
are variable. On one hand, wind speeds up to a cut-off point of 25m/s 
can increase output; and heavy rain can increase hydropower output. 
However, on the other hand, a period of drought could lead to crop 
damage and loss of biomass feedstock. A balance of technologies and 
their geographic spread are necessary to manage fluctuations in outputs 
especially as we may see increases in extreme weather events. This is 
why investing in demand side response and storage technologies are 
options to reduce the impacts of variable outputs from renewables. 
As for hydrogen and CCS, both are dependent on water availability. 
Infrastructure rollout is in early stages and sites have not yet been 
selected so the impacts are less clear. CCS infrastructure requires more 
water compared to traditional thermal generation, and hydrogen 
generation also requires water so there is as assumed risk to these 
processes during periods where water supply is low, or during 
a drought, or in water stressed areas, such as the southeast of England.  
As for hydrogen, if supply in the future uses the existing pipeline 
network used for gas, there are potentially similar risks to current 
levels of knowledge.
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Water
The water sector is responsible for providing water supplies to society 
but also for treating wastewater, which requires energy and produces 
greenhouse gas emissions. As climate projections for the UK anticipate 
warmer, wetter winters and hotter, drier summers, managing water 
resources year-round is necessary to meet Net Zero targets. 
As water supply and treatment infrastructure is located where waterways 
are, they are unlikely to change. However, a lot of the opportunity to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions is in electrifying processes instead 
of using fossil fuels: either through the national grid or additional 
decentralised infrastructure on-site. Compulsory metering of water for 
customers is a possible way of reducing water consumption, ultimately 
reducing the energy required at water treatment facilities. In addition, 
a recommendation to manage nationwide water supply is through 
creating a national water transfer network.
Sustainable drainage systems (SuDS) infrastructure has grown across 
the UK as a way of managing storm water locally. They mimic natural 
drainage and passively treat flood and pollution risks due to urban 
runoff. Examples include designing new swales, wetlands and reed 
beds, such as that in Figure 2. SuDS can reduce the amount of water 
entering combined sewers, also reducing the energy demand at water 
treatment facilities. It requires collaborative work with the water sector 
and bodies such as Local Authorities and the Environment Agency. This 
intervention provides additional climate adaptation benefits with studies 
indicating green (vegetation) and blue (water) infrastructure can 
reduce urban temperatures. 
Figure 2. Award-winning SuDS designed in the recently built residential 
area of St. Andrew’s Park in Uxbridge, the London Borough of Hillingdon. 
Source: Greater London Authority, Susdrain.
The climate change impact of the changes required for the water sector 
are not yet clear. An assumed risk may be related to the increased 
dependency on a changed energy supply for wastewater treatment. 
For example, if the energy sector cannot produce enough electricity, it 
affects the water sector’s ability to treat wastewater. A similar risk would 
also apply if the water sector supplier’s on-site renewable energy supply 
was insufficient, or without appropriate energy storage. For coastal 
infrastructure, this would also be a challenge regarding sea level rise. 
There may be increased stresses on treatment and pumping of seawater, 
as well as the threat of coastal erosion to the physical infrastructure. In 
addition, national water transfer infrastructure could increase risks such 
as higher energy demands and hastening the spread of invasive and/or 
non-native species through water. As for SuDS, future risk to them is also 
not clear. 
Transport
Road, rail and aviation infrastructure requires significant changes in 
order to meet Net Zero targets. Vehicle use is a major contributor to 
greenhouse gas emissions and a switch to electric vehicles and a phase-
out of petrol and diesel is critical. Electrification of rail infrastructure 
and hydrogen train trials are underway, as well as research into lower 
carbon intensive fuels for planes, such as using biomass. Changing 
modes of transport also helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions e.g., 
private car use replaced with public transport (bus and/or rail); shorter 
car journeys replaced with active travel modes (walking and cycling);  
air travel replaced with high-speed rail. 
The transport sector as a whole is very complex as there are many 
stakeholders and owners of the infrastructure across the UK. Therefore, 
changes to its infrastructure will require collaborative work between 
sectors, transport operators and government bodies at multiple levels. 
For example, the infrastructure required to support a growing fleet of 
electric vehicles (i.e. charging points) affects a range of stakeholders, 
through multiple national government schemes:
• Homecharge and Workplace Charging scheme (for residents
and businesses)
• On-street Residential Chargepoint scheme (for Local Authorities)
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 also makes provisions
about electric vehicles, including charging infrastructure, and gives the
government powers to ensure motorway services provide them.
The transition to Net Zero for the transport sector will have an 
increased dependency on electricity, particularly for road and rail due 
to electrification. Therefore, there is a greater risk if things go wrong in 
electricity supply, especially due to the transitions in the sector. Some 
other risks across the transport sector are specific to the mode, such as:
• Rail: Overhead lines (increased due to electrification) are more
susceptible to sag during high temperatures.
• Active travel: health related risks from heat exposure, or injury
from surface run-off due to extreme rainfall (although from a
public health perspective a modal shift to active travel will have
many benefits).
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Information Communications 
Technology
Our dependency on ICT has increased rapidly in recent years. This 
infrastructure was first made of copper cables, but the transition to Net 
Zero requires a transition to fibre optic cables. This is because not only 
do they provide better internet speeds, but also use less energy. The 
National Infrastructure Commission recommend that full nationwide 
coverage of fibre broadband is delivered by 2033, allowing for a copper 
infrastructure switch-off by 2025. This improved coverage could also 
support the growing demand for remote or home-based work, therefore 
reducing commuting trips and contributing further to Net Zero goals. 
However, as other sectors increase their use of smart technologies, 
reliance upon ICT increases with the potential for cascading failures 
cause by ICT outages. 
The ICT representative report to the Government’s Second Adaptation 
Reporting Power outlines some of the climate adaptation related 
risks to this transition. For instance, copper and fibre have different 
vulnerabilities. Due to the electronic circuitry, a fibre cabinet is more 
likely to suffer catastrophic damage if flooded compared to a copper 
cabinet. In addition, ICT infrastructure changes more rapidly than any 
other infrastructure sector, which may present more unknown risks and 
vulnerabilities in future.
Conclusion 
The infrastructure sectors in the UK are at different stages of their 
pathway to Net Zero, with differing risk profiles to climate change.  
In particular, there are growing interdependencies of water, transport 
and ICT on the energy sector. There are indications of increased 
electricity use for the Net Zero transition, which exposes other  
networks to the impacts on the energy sector through cascading  
failures. Similarly, there is an increasing reliance on ICT for the 
operation of the power network and other sectors using ‘smart’ grids 
and other ‘smart’ technologies. Therefore, it is extremely important to 
address this between the sectors in order to collaborate on solutions  
that protect against cascading failures. As Net Zero transition is 
necessary, adapting this changing infrastructure to the effects  






and Ruth Wood 
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
The implications of net zero ambitions for 
infrastructure resilience to climate change
21Addressing the climate challenge
Michael Angus, Gregor C. Leckebusch, Kelvin Ng, 
Lisa Degenhardt and Gabi Hegerl
The case for an International Climate Year
The case for an
International 
Climate Year
Climate Change is the overarching challenge for generations to come, 
but currently the world’s efforts are lacking impetus, steering and 
cohesion. Looking to the past for inspiration, our scientific ancestors 
brought together institutions from around the globe to address specific 
problems and achieve the cohesion we now need on  
numerous occasions.
One such example is the 1957/1958 International Geophysical Year. 
Together, they made significant breakthroughs in the fields of geology, 
oceanography and meteorology through a massive collaborative 
effort to improve observation networks and share data. Today, it is 
not a unified observation network we lack, but rather a unified sense 
of direction. In this spirit, we propose to proclaim and conduct an 
International Climate Year to foster international collaboration, further 
our understanding of the climate system, and perhaps most importantly, 
reframe climate change not as an inevitable disaster we cannot avoid, 
but rather as a challenge that humanity has accepted. 
In 1992, the World’s Scientists delivered a warning to humanity. If our 
behaviour did not change, we would put at risk our ability to sustain life 
in the manner that we know. Two years earlier, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change had delivered their first report, outlining 
the potential impacts of climate change on humanity and the natural 
world, and recommending a comprehensive global response. We have 
not merely procrastinated on addressing this problem, but far worsened 
it, as the Union of Concerned Scientists noted in the 25th anniversary 
of the first warning to humanity. With the exception of ozone depletion 
which was addressed through the banning of ozone detrimental 
substances, every environmental problem identified by the first warning 
has since been exacerbated. Since 1990, CO2 emissions have continued 
to increase and in response the global temperature has warmed by over 
half a degree Celsius. The impact of this warming has already been felt 
globally through increased frequency of heatwaves, decreased crop 
yields, ecosystem loss amongst many other devastating consequences. 
The 1992 warning to humanity has gone unheeded, leaving our home 
under serious threat.     
How did that last paragraph make you feel? Fearful for the future 
maybe? Worried about what we’re leaving for the next generation? 
Angry at the lack of Government co-ordination? Or guilty because you 
aren’t doing enough? Maybe you just have a sense of déjà vu, having 
read and heard it all before. I know this. We all know this. Or maybe it 
just left you feeling helpless. How many more times can we say “we must 
act now!” and then not act? Anyway, what can I do? Maybe it’s already 
too late. Maybe there’s no point doing anything. Maybe it won’t be  
that bad. 
It wouldn’t be surprising if you had any or all of those thoughts, because 
we know that doom-laden messaging often results in a lack of action 
or behavioural change as people switch off to avoid the associated 
negative feelings. This is particularly true for an issue 
like climate change, where both the problem 
itself and the solution feel f
difficult to conceive. In fact
to imagine a more difficult 
issue than climate change; 
impacts occur slowly over 
many years and it can only 
be resolved through global
co-ordination. Doing your 
part will not isolate you 
from the consequences. 
Perhaps this explains 
why the environment 
lags behind issues such 
as immigration, the 
economy and regional 
issues (e.g., Brexit) 
in the UK’s public 
concerns. The urgency 
of the warnings has not 
inspired a similar urgency 
in the general public, at lea
compared to the issues whi
feel more local and immed
ar away and 
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As an alternative to doom-laden messaging, evoking hope is most 
associated with supportive attitudes and policy advocacy. It is not 
enough to simply list all the problems we face with climate change, 
scare people, and then tell them they must act now. Continuing to do 
so will lead only to avoidance, feelings of anger and helplessness. What 
we need is a focussed solution that an individual can act upon, with 
leadership, direction and a message of success. What we need is an 
International Climate Year.  
An International Climate Year would evoke hope rather than despair 
for a number of reasons. First, it provides a sense of immediacy by 
removing the issue of “some time in the future” that is predominant 
in the current climate change discussion. It is not a target of what 
we can do by 2035 or 2050, but rather “what can we achieve now?”. 
Second, it reframes climate change as a challenge humanity is seeking 
to resolve, rather than as an impending crisis. Finally, by evoking the 
achievements of the past, it offers a tangible example of what can be 
achieved through a spirit of global co-operation in science. In making 
the case for the International Climate Year, we must first make the case 
for the importance of the International Geophysical Year, the historical 
collaboration of scientists which began the Space Race and changed the 
way we see the Earth forever. 
Running from July 1st 1957 to December 31st 1958, the International 
Geophysical Year included scientists and observations from every 
continent and 67 countries. Conceived by leading geophysicists Sydney 
Chapman and Lloyd Berkner, it was, at the time, the largest set of 
coordinated experiments and field expeditions ever undertaken.  
Even the United States and the Soviet Union shared data, with  
weather and seismology stations all reporting to central data bodies  
in a successful effort to create global data networks for the first time.
Although tensions remained between scientists of the two superpowers, 
particularly over data from the first artificial satellite launches (the 
Soviet Sputnik 1 in October 1957, and the American Explorer 1 in 
January 1958), the overall mood of global scientific collaboration  
held. The Antarctic Treaty, signed to protect resources and to  
promote research in the region, was a substantial achievement  
of the International Geophysical Year and still holds to this day.
Some examples from the many scientific advancements include:
• The discovery of Mid-ocean ridges through echo sounding from
American and Soviet Research vessels, providing supporting evidence
for the theory of continental drift for the first time.
• The discovery of the Van Allen belts, zones of high solar radiation
surrounding the Earth. A hazard to humans passing through them,
this was an essential piece of information for future space missions.
• The first record of CO2 levels in the atmosphere at the Mauna
Loa Observatory in Hawaii, which still records to this day as
a key component of the climate observing system.
However, the International Geophysical Year was important not only 
because of the scientific achievements. It proved scientists could cross 
political boundaries and work together for the shared benefit of all. 
This is all the more impressive for having occurred during the Cold War. 
The weapons of war were turned instead to science: rockets were used 
to observe stratospheric temperatures by recording the fluctuations in 
sound made when grenades, fired from the rocket mid-flight, exploded 
at high altitudes. Nuclear weapons were also used to test the seismology 
network, both for improvements in earthquake measurements and 
so that seismologists could monitor nuclear tests around the world 
in future. Even Walter Sullivan’s first-hand account documenting the 
achievements was entitled “Assault on the Unknown”. The International 
Geophysical Year is pockmarked with the violence and problems of its 
time, yet brightened by scientists’ attempt to solve them.
The challenges we face now are not the same as those early geoscientists, 
of course. However, to combat climate change we require the same spirit 
of global co-ordination and unity of purpose. Evoking the spirit of that 
time is a fine start, but what activities would an International Climate 
Year actually involve? We discuss here three broad categories within  
the scope of the hope themed message: Public encouragement,  
Public engagement, and Public advocacy. 
To encourage the public that climate change is being addressed, we 
would promote a wide range of international projects on the theme 
of tackling climate change from the world’s scientists. This would 
include researching new energy technologies, applying mitigation and 
adaption proposals, geoengineering projects and further research into 
key climate uncertainties. By bringing together these currently ongoing 
research activities, we present the public with a united message whilst 
furthering research in these key areas. 
To engage the public with climate change research, we propose a range 
of citizen science projects dedicated to bringing the public together 
to participate in science directly. This was also an essential element 
of the International Geophysical Year, with initial tracking of artificial 
satellites performed by volunteer astronomers engaging in Operation 
Moonwatch. Projects like Zooniverse offer that opportunity today, 
furthering research goals through volunteer contributions that allows 
everyone to contribute to tackling climate change. Similar messaging 
has been employed recently during the COVID pandemic, where the 
UK Government encouraged us to #DoYourBit to protect the NHS. 
To promote public advocacy for climate change, we would encourage 
the International Climate Year as a year to change behaviour, both at 
a personal and government scale. Research projects that study gaps in 
the current understanding and discussion would be encouraged, with a 
focus on more transparency in the process of policy mechanisms such 
as the IPCC and UN Climate Change Conference. The public must feel 
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engaged in the policy discussion, so that the solution does not feel like 
something foisted onto us undemocratically. Education is also vital, with 
science communication activities that go beyond the “knowledge deficit 
model”, educating climate scientists and the public alike so that we can 
better communicate with one another. 
None of these proposed activities involve radical change, and a large 
number of them are happening already. An International Climate 
Year would simply provide a focal point for these activities, while 
simultaneously providing an example from history of scientists  
coming together to address a major issue of their time.  
The success of the International Climate Year would be measured 
by its legacy. The legacy of the International Geophysical Year is vast 
and undeniable; a new way of perceiving the Earth through global 
observations, better understanding of the physical processes that  
shaped the land beneath our feet and global policies which are still  
in place today. If we are to strive to match that level of achievement,  
the International Climate Year will require real commitment from 
scientific institutes and governments, and be international in more  
than just its name. Yet, we must think on this scale if we are to make  
real progress on climate change. 
While climate change may be an invisible problem, the impact on our 
environment is not. The global nature of the issue provides a unique 
opportunity for engagement at local level everywhere, with direct access 
to climate change projects, adaption and mitigation strategies making 
climate science directly applicable to people’s lives. We hope to get 
the public excited about climate science by demonstrating that this is 
something we can participate in together while achieving something 
truly great.   
Ultimately, the International Climate Year will be a success if the global 
perception of the climate change problem can be permanently altered. 
For at least thirty years, the message of climate change has been one of 
fear and helplessness. The global community, both politically through 
events like COP26 and scientifically through organisations such as the 
IPCC, can address this issue by inspiring hope and encouragement  
while engaging the public. We here propose the International Climate 
Year as a means to achieve this and announce to the world that from  
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Universities are often lauded as key stakeholders in addressing global 
challenges, such as COVID-19 and those outlined in the Sustainable 
Development Goals. However, the focus usually remains on the research 
conducted by these institutions, rather than their potential contribution 
as sites of education and the subsequent impact of their graduates. This 
is a missed opportunity given the large numbers of students attending 
universities worldwide. A recent report by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development estimated that the number 
of graduates among 25 to 34 year-olds worldwide will more than double 
to 300 million by 2030. With such a scale of influence, we believe that 
universities have a unique role to play in ensuring that our populations 
have the skills, knowledge and attitudes to make the world a  
better place. 
Historically, universities were “ivory towers”, educating a minority of 
privileged people in traditional academic subjects; indeed, in some 
areas of the world, notably in lower income countries, this is still largely 
the case. More recently, many countries have moved to a different, 
but similarly individualistic model, in which the primary motives for 
degree-level education are the prospect of stable and well-paid graduate 
employment and a positive student experience. While this change has 
increased access to higher education and a subsequent increase in the 
average income of graduates, it has also led to (and indeed is caused by) 
increased marketisation and privatisation. This fundamentally changes 
the nature of the interaction between student and university. As students 
are often seen to have “paid” for an education in a transactional way, 
achieving the necessary grade to enter a particular career or profession 
may be prioritised over the development of knowledge and skills.
In this article, we propose that we need to move to a “third way” in 
which a university education is considered to be an opportunity to 
develop individuals who can effect positive change in the world.  
As such, the actual learning outcomes of the degree, both in terms  
of the knowledge learned and the skills developed, becomes more 
important than achieving a threshold grade, because these attributes 
enable graduates to make a difference. This is not a new concept; 
universities have for decades provided a platform for societal 
transformation, including the civil rights movement, feminism, and  
gay liberation. Our proposals build on the work of Marginson (2011) 
who considers the role of universities in terms of the ‘public good”.  
He argued that universities operate like Habermas’ Public Sphere:  
a site somewhat between the state and civil society. They provide  
a space for discussion, debate and criticism, often directed at the  
state and which constantly generates new ideas and strategic  
directions for states and governments to consider, contributing  
to the renewal and reform of society. However, traditionally, these 
have usually arisen through informal networks and actions pursued 
outside the main curriculum, rather than as a core raison d’être of the 
experience. 
We believe that the collective benefit of higher education itself  
surpasses the individual. There is a ‘public good’ which has political  
and socio-cultural dimensions and which reflects our vision for our 
world. The UN Sustainable Development Goals provide a timely 
opportunity for a renewed focus on higher education to promote  
social and values-based education. 
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Our proposal is that Universities educate students to be future thought 
leaders and agents of change for a sustainable world. We believe 
that there are three broad categories of change needed in tertiary 
education to promote this agenda. Firstly, in addition to their specialist 
professional knowledge and skills, students need to be educated 
to have influence and impact. Students need evidence-based, and 
culturally-informed knowledge of the social and environmental threats 
to our world and the skills to diminish these threats. It is important to 
note that these skills also promote employability, which is repeatedly 
identified as a key driver for university attendance. Employers have been 
calling for graduates who are creative and innovative with transferable 
skills for collaborative problem solving in complex and shifting contexts. 
Focusing on these skills will educate graduates for career excellence and 
a global contribution. Secondly, students need to understand systems 
and structures that are the root causes of social and environmental 
damage. They need the capacity to operate upstream, preventing issues, 
rather than working downstream on problems, once damage has been 
done. Preventing social and environmental damage is as important as 
learning how to mitigate established concerns. Finally, education needs 
to explicitly encourage students’ civic skills, global citizenship and 
leadership, supporting their identity as political beings with stewardship 
for social, environmental and economic protection. It is essential 
that graduates recognise that they have the expertise to be effective 
advocates and influencers for change, both within their professions  
and social communities. With informed ethical leadership graduates  
can intentionally influence the global agenda and have meaningful  
and profound impact for a healthier earth.
It is important to emphasise that all academic disciplines have the 
potential to positively impact global challenges and social development. 
For too long, the focus has been on science, technology, engineering, 
mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) subjects. While many solutions 
for key issues will inevitably be driven by technological innovation, 
the role of arts, humanities and social sciences should not be 
underestimated. History, theology, and social policy help us understand 
how communities behave and likely consequences of these responses;  
in turn, literature, art, and music help us navigate the human condition, 
enhancing well-being and creating social change. We believe that the 
real power is at the intersection between subjects; for example, a project 
at the University of Birmingham that brings together the arts and 
nursing to explore loss, grief and bereavement. Similarly, COVID-19 
has demonstrated that it is impossible to separate the influences of 
health, the environment, and economic policy and that to have true 
impact, we must understand, and be able to work at, this nexus. 
A further way in which higher education can enable us to address 
global challenges is through the opportunity to develop intercultural 
understanding and collaboration. Cultural diversity within the 
classroom and university community is now the norm rather than the 
exception in modern universities. At an individual level, this gives the 
potential for students and graduates to develop global perspectives and 
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intercultural competency that prepare them to work in and influence 
the modern global and interconnected world. Strategies to promote 
internationalisation in higher education have focused on increasing 
numbers of international students and building opportunities for 
international mobility. While these are examples of mechanisms of 
internationalisation, they do not in isolation guarantee that students 
develop an understanding of the dynamics and power interactions 
of multicultural settings nor how they can modify their own beliefs 
and behaviours to function as responsible professionals in a global 
workplace. Instead, higher education institutions must develop 
strategies to promote purposeful and inclusive integration of students 
from all backgrounds, to enable the development of true intercultural 
competence and understanding. 
Universities are also institutions grounded in their local area, acting 
as anchor institutions for their communities. Too often, the emphasis 
of discussion around global challenges, and in particular inequality, 
is portrayed as a discrepancy between high income and lower income 
countries, yet inequality is a local issue everywhere. The historical 
cultural assumption that inequality does not exist within our own 
communities is too often impeding progress by allowing ignorance 
surrounding an issue to continue. Encouraging our students to 
engage with their local communities, and indeed question their own 
personal opinions and bias can be where conversations about global 
inequity start. In examples provided by the students from around the 
world who helped author this piece, this could involve students at 
Mexican universities discussing the LGBT rights movement or gender 
representation in their area; or those from Glasgow exploring why  
there is one of the largest life expectancy discrepancies within a city  
and why health inequalities are rising; or those studying in 
Johannesburg considering why there is such high unemployment 
among highly qualified young people. Increasing students’ awareness  
of local social and economic issues can be the catalyst for change. We 
hope to demonstrate to students, and in turn graduates, that anybody 
can be a social agent of change. We want our students (and indeed 
our staff) to understand that whilst one person cannot do everything, 
everybody can do something if they take the time to listen, learn and 
apply their skills collaboratively. 
To enable such a change in the focus of higher education, we must start 
at primary and secondary education and support children to change 
the way that they decide whether to attend university and, if so, which 
subjects they study. At present, students typically choose subjects that 
they enjoy and that they are good at, with some consideration of what 
job they might like to do afterwards; the balance of emphasis here may 
of course vary and to some extent be culturally driven, but it is largely 
influenced by the beliefs of parents and teachers. We propose working 
to change this narrative and instead encouraging young people to 
consider what change they want to see and recognise what part they can 
play in the development of a sustainable world. University then becomes 
a route to manifesting that change and young people would choose 
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subjects that would enable them to effect this change. A cultural shift  
of this magnitude requires strong role models who can change attitudes 
locally. Educating prospective university students about sustainability 
and the benefits of social capital rather than individual earnings before 
they apply to higher education is important. Given the number of 
university students around the world such a change in attitude, even  
in only a fraction of the students, would have a significant impact.  
We need to start marketing higher education in terms of sustainability 
and to make sustainability something that counts. 
One challenge in such an ambitious proposal is how to implement 
this level of change. It is clear, however, that external drivers can 
promote university action for positive change. When the United 
Nations introduced the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, 
they noted that universities had an important role in achieving the 
goals. In 2019, the Times Higher Education (THE) Impact Ranking 
of universities was launched specifically to encourage universities to 
take action to achieve the 17 goals as well as measuring their progress 
towards this. Consistent with our recommendations, THE specifically 
called for education to support students to learn how to deliver and 
embed the SDGs in their future careers, clearly articulating that 
universities must educate for change. This ranking system has proved 
popular with 450, 768, and 1,115 universities respectively seeking 
assessment over the three years, demonstrating a rapidly increasing 
number of universities choosing to be involved with the ranking. While 
this league table has been criticised as driving competition between 
universities and having some methodological limitations, it does provide 
incentive for action. It articulates indicators of how universities can 
powerfully contribute to the social, environmental and economic 
protection of all life on the planet. It allows universities to compare 
their performance and encourages innovation and better practice to 
improve scores over time. It now operates as a globally recognized guide 
and measure of the societal contribution of universities. With annual 
reporting of outcomes, universities can be motivated to take purposeful 
action with greater accountability within the public domain. Visible 
global benchmarking activities acknowledge and reinforce that 
universities must be ethical and responsible corporate citizens, leaders 
and actors for positive change. However, given that there are an 
estimated 18,000 higher education institutions worldwide, a 
considerable shift in thinking is required to ensure that all are placing 
sustainability at their core. Furthermore, future iterations of the rankings 
should more explicitly include curricula content and also encourage more 
collaborative partnerships between institutions.
We recognise that our proposal represents a sharp change in direction 
from the way universities and other higher education institutions 
tend to operate at present. To facilitate this move, faculty training and 
recognition needs to align with an aspiration to develop the social 
capital of communities. Lecturers and researchers currently focus 
on specialist or measurable outputs (research articles, percentage of 
students finding employment, student satisfaction rates) motivated 
by the need to generate individual human capital. Similarly, faculty 
are recognised and promoted based on individual achievements 
(publications, positions of esteem, teaching awards). Researchers and 
lecturers receive increasing, but still minimal, pedagogic training and 
the training provided is focussed on delivering specialist knowledge and 
skills and promoting “student engagement” with the discipline itself. 
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Without prior experience of developing a social rather than human capital, 
faculty need to develop their teaching to incorporate the development of 
these skills and attitudes in their courses. They must be encouraged and 
enabled to explicitly discuss and model societal investments of their time 
and effort. To encourage faculty to take part in such a sharp departure 
from their normal activities, reward and recognition systems need to be 
updated. In the same way that the introduction in some countries of a 
mandatory requirement to hold AthenaSWAN status to obtain research 
funding led to nationwide improvements in gender equality, 
policymakers need to encourage institutions to develop cultures which 
encourage the development of social capital. This would drive a 
change in promotion criteria, create recognition for good practice, 
and lead to much needed funding for such initiatives.
To conclude, we believe that universities are unique institutions, full of 
able and motivated students who have the potential to lead us in the 
future to a better world. We need to ensure that the higher education 
sector, potential students, and society more generally, recognise the 
opportunity that higher education provides to develop communities of 
skilled, thoughtful  and inclusive citizens, and that we structure our 
programmes to  ensure that sustainability, in its widest sense, is at the 
heart of our purpose. 
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One enormous area of oversight when addressing the climate challenge 
problem is the vast contribution of national militaries to pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions, especially in western democracies. It has been 
estimated that 20% of all environmental degradation globally is due 
to military-related activities (Angus, 2016). A 2020 report by Scientists 
for Global Responsibility (SGR) and Declassified UK found that the 
UK military-industrial sector produced the equivalent of 6.5 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide, which was greater than the CO2 emissions of 
60 other countries (Parkinson, 2020). Meanwhile, the United States’ 
Department of Defense (DOD) is the world’s largest institutional 
consumer of petroleum and the world’s largest institutional producer of 
greenhouse gases (GHG), producing over 3,685 million metric tonnes 
of CO2 between 1975 and 2018 (Crawford, 2019). In a similar fashion 
to the UK, US military emissions alone are consistently larger than 
the entire output of other industrialised nations, with the Pentagon’s 
greenhouse gas emissions outweighing that of Sweden, Denmark and 
Portugal and GHG emissions from the DOD are also greater than all 
CO2 emissions from US production of iron and steel (Crawford, 2019). 
Largescale military emissions are also not limited to the Anglosphere, 
with another SGR report suggesting that the combined militaries of the 
world contribute to 6% of the global carbon footprint total, with China, 
Saudi Arabia, Russia and India being likely large contributors, but are 
much less transparent on their statistics (Parkinson, 2020).
Causes of emissions
Thus, one must ask, how did such a costly situation arise? Perhaps the 
most obvious reason is what Joshua Reno in his book ‘Military Waste’ 
called “permanent war-readiness” (Reno, 2020), with a heightened 
international climate in the wake of 9/11, the US military produces 
a sizeable amount of GHG emissions just from the maintenance of 
its forces. Indeed, operational energy, or what the DOD defines as 
“energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces 
and weapons platforms for military operations” (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Sustainment, 2018) accounts for 70% of total US military 
energy consumption (Crawford, 2019). The constant demand for 
sustaining a worldwide military presence not only impacts the climate 
in terms of greenhouse emissions, but the human health cost of these 
military operations are also considerable. Studies conducted near 
the Basra military base in Iraq (pictured in Figure 1) found that rates 
of babies being born with birth defects were as high as 30% in 2010, 
and more than 85,000 US Iraq War veterans were diagnosed with 
respiratory problems (Vidal, 2016). These pollution issues are linked 
to the constant state of war-readiness; with the US military constantly 
operating ‘burn pits’ as an inexpensive means of destroying waste whilst 
on deployment. Iraq War veteran Joseph Hickman recounted that 
soldiers would sleep less than a mile away from 270 ‘burn pits’, which 
incinerated items such as explosives, faeces and electronics twenty-four 
hours a day, with some still burning to this day (Hickman & Ventura, 
2016). Hence, a major contributor to damage to the climate caused 
by militaries is the fact that armed forces require perpetual upkeep, 
resulting in militaries choosing cost-effective and heavily polluting 
solutions to problems such as waste removal whilst on deployment, 
leading to both air pollution and human health hazards.
Figure 1: Map of Iraq, with Basra in the corner. Levels in lead in teeth and 
baby birth defect rates were found to be abnormally high in this region, 
which is near a US military base. Map data © 2021 Google.
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Hickman claimed that no regulations existed about what could be 
burned, which gives an insight into the second major facilitator of 
military emissions, lack of effective national and international policy. 
Military actions were made exempt from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
emission targets and the US won an exemption from emission limits 
for “bunker” fuels (dense, heavy fuel oil for naval vessels) and all 
greenhouse gas emissions from military operations worldwide (Angus, 
2016), hence demonstrating a clear lack of concern for the impact 
of militaries on the climate. Worse still, the Kyoto Protocol was not 
even ratified by the US, and in 1999 the House of Representatives 
further protected the US armed forces from acting on its carbon GHG 
emissions with a National Defense Authorization Act (United States 
Congress, 1999). Moreover, the Russian military has published no plans 
to reduce its own GHG emissions (Brzoska, 2012) and although NATO 
adopted the Green Defence Framework in 2014, which was set out to 
improve energy efficiency, the Framework does not include any GHG 
emission, specific carbon reduction or environmental performance 
targets (NATO, 2014). However, a plethora of high-ranking officials 
have continuously made statements about the threat posed by climate 
change and the need to reduce GHG emissions despite the bizarre 
lack of action on their behalf. For example, despite the Ministry of 
Defence’s (MOD) aims to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 (Ministry 
of Defence, 2020) and the MOD laying out GHG reduction plans in 
the Climate Change Delivery Plan 2010 (Brzoska, 2012), the new HMS 
Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales will carry 36 of the new F-35 
Lightning II combat aircraft, which consumes 60% more fuel per flight 
hour, thus producing much greater emissions, than its predecessor, the 
F-16 Fighting Falcon (Peck, 2019). In China, a similar disparity between
statements and concrete action has emerged; the People’s Liberation
Army general staff have set up expert commissions to study the potential
national security consequences of climate change, yet there have been
no authoritative statements made by the army on the issue, and when
climate change was debated at the UN Security Council in April 2008
and July 2011, the Chinese representative rejected the notion that
the Security Council should consider climate change (Brzoska, 2012).
Hence one of the main reasons for unchecked military emissions
becomes apparent – policy and corresponding measures to reduce
carbon and GHG emissions are not aligned, allowing militaries to
effectively bypass the desires of the public and international community.
The final reason for the unchecked growth of military emissions is 
the role of military-industrial complexes in arms production. In the 
US, defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing fight 
to secure contracts to manufacture vehicles for the military, by either 
lobbying politicians directly, or by promising jobs in said politicians’ 
home states. As a result, politicians are inclined to support projects 
such as the F-35 Lightning II, despite it being 70% over budget and 
aforementioned fuel consumption issues (Shalal-Esa, 2013). Hence the 
US military-industrial complex alone produces over 153 million metric 
tonnes of carbon pollution annually, on par with the total emissions 
from the Netherlands (Kahn, 2019). This problem is not exclusive to 
the US, with the UK’s MOD contractors having a poor record on the 
management of radioactive waste, with companies such as Sellafield Ltd 
receiving multiple fines for breaching of environmental regulations, 
but no long-lasting public consequences (Parkinson, 2020). Hence the 
complex relationship between politicians and defence companies means 
that elected representatives are often encouraged to turn a blind eye to 
environmentally costly projects in favour of political gain.
Combatting military emissions
The question then arises, how does the international community begin 
to combat these emission problems? The most trivial and obvious 
solution comes in the form of massively scaling back military budgets; 
proponents of the Green New Deal in the US have demanded for 
the military budget to be slashed in favour of increased spending 
on environmental projects. Closing overseas bases, such as the 
approximately 800 facilities currently operated by the US (Vine, 2015), 
would go a long way in cutting emissions; this would also benefit France 
in particular, which has nearly double the military carbon footprint of 
Germany because of its numerous overseas deployments (Cottrell & 
Parkinson, 2021), as well as the UK, which has 20% of the Royal Navy’s 
operating fleet deployed to the Middle East at any one time (Parkinson, 
2020). However, the implementation of drastic cuts to military budgets 
would require significant political capital, and hence the remainder of 
this article will discuss other solutions to this problem. 
The SGR group recommends an improvement in the collection and 
presentation of Sustainable MOD environmental data, which has been 
error-strewn and lacking in clarity in recent years (Parkinson, 2020). 
For instance, for the financial year 2017-18 the MOD quoted that 
their direct carbon footprint was 0.94 tCO2e (million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent), yet proper investigation uncovers that these numbers are 
only related to ‘Estates’ and ‘Business travel’. The SGR report calculated 
that the true emissions figure was 3.03 tCO2e, over three times the 
reported amount (Parkinson, 2020). A different report published by 
Brown University recommends a similar course of action for the DOD, 
advising that the department should report its fuel consumption to 
the US Congress in both its budgetary submission and in a separate 
annual fuel consumption report, as well as ensuring that this data is 
complete and well organised by disaggregating its data into fuel type, 
service, year etc. as well as including emissions from training missions 
and public displays (Crawford, 2019). Hopefully, this will persuade 
other major global powers to do the same, such as Germany, who 
currently does not make their carbon emissions data publicly available 
(Fort & Straub, 2019). Overall, encouraging armed forces to publish 
more comprehensive data on their impact on the climate would not 
only make militaries and governments more accountable to the public 
for their role in climate change, but it would also allow environmental 
groups to make better suggestions for areas of improvement. Publishing 
more data on emissions would also help voters recognise the dangers 
of military-industrial complexes and apply scrutiny to politicians who 
defend the manufacture of new, environmentally damaging  
military hardware.
It is also crucial for government policy and military initiatives to be 
aligned. As discussed before, whilst governments have appeared to 
make steps in combatting climate change, armed forces are far too 
frequently exempted or overlooked. SGR recommends ensuring that 
GHG emissions from UK military operations are limited by the Climate 
Change Act, and indeed UK military strategy as a whole ought to be 
shifted from long-range, environmentally detrimental ‘force projection’,
to a strategy that primarily focuses on territorial defence (Parkinson, 
2020). The US can follow suit by ensuring that the military is included 
in President Biden’s plan to cut national carbon emissions in half by 
2030 (Newburger, 2021). As for global targets, whilst the Paris Climate 
agreement did not exempt national militaries from emission targets, it 
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did not make countries legally obligated to reduce military emissions 
either (Nelsen, 2015). A revised global agreement which completely 
closes this loophole is crucial in making a coordinated effort against 
military pollution and ensure that military emissions remain relevant in 
future climate summits.
Finally, a renewed focus on research and implementation of fuel-
efficient and low carbon technologies would be beneficial to both 
militaries and the environment. Although existing jet fighters could 
potentially be adapted to use ‘drop-in’ sustainable fuel sources such 
as biomass and household waste, which would cut Royal Air Force 
CO2 emissions by 18% (Wallace & Shapps, 2020), these climate 
considerations appear to have been treated as an afterthought, 
with vehicles being adapted after several years of service instead of 
eco-friendliness being a core principle in vehicle design. Whilst the 
MOD has done taken action to reduce the carbon emissions of some 
of its building (Parkinson, 2020), more research is required into 
the environmental costs of manufacture and usage when designing 
new weapons and equipment, which hence limits the damage to 
the environment, and keeps consumption costs lower for militaries. 
However, SGR also notes that military climate initiatives ought to be 
treated with scrutiny, such as the US Defense Science Board’s More 
Fight, Less Fuel program, which is simply a misguided scheme with  
the aim of fighting wars more efficiently (Parkinson, 2020). Therefore, 
militaries must put climate change at the top of their agendas when 
considering which new technologies to invest in.
In conclusion, the impact of armed forces on climate change and 
carbon emissions is both broad and frequently overlooked, with 
ramifications for both human health and the environment. Their 
greenhouse gas and carbon emissions have been allowed to rise 
due to the global presence and constant state of war-readiness, 
unthorough government and international policy, and the power of 
military-industrial complexes, which result in politicians defending 
environmentally hazardous military projects. However, this situation 
is not irreparable, and by taking the advice of independent groups 
such as Scientists for Global Responsibility, ensuring that government 
policies and military actions match, demanding greater transparency 
and more data on military emissions, researching new, climate friendly 
technologies and potentially scaling back overseas military presences, 
emissions from armed forces can reach more sustainable levels without 
the need to make drastic cuts to military budgets.
Jack Johnson - Winner of 
the University of Birmingham 
Student Climate Change Writing 
Competition 2021
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30 Addressing the climate challenge
Strengthening the 
climate resilience 
of households in 
the Sundarbans
Recent decades have witnessed an increase in climate change related 
losses and damage. The evidence suggests that there has been a fourfold 
increase in the incidence of disasters. Hydro-meteorological disasters 
are the most common type of disasters globally. Furthermore, climate 
researchers have warned further that frequency of extreme events will 
rise leading to an increase in the number of disasters worldwide. At least 
207 natural disasters were recorded globally in the first six months of 
2020, well above the 21st century average (2000-2019) of 185 disasters. 
These disasters cost the world $75 billion, according to the Aon 
catastrophe report, released in July 2020. At least $71 billion, over 95 
per cent of the loss, was due to weather-related disasters. In fact, around 
92 per cent of these disasters between January and June were weather-
related. There were 14.6 million new internal displacements across  
127 countries in the first six months of 2020. 
Coastal areas are particularly vulnerable to increasing risks of erosion 
due to sea level rise. These will be further worsened by the human-
induced pressures. By 2080, millions of people in the densely populated 
mega deltas of Asia will regularly experience floods. Poor households, 
communities with climate-sensitive livelihoods and those living in 
coastal and river flood plains will be most vulnerable, and the impacts 
will shape the well-being of the communities, their education and skills, 
socio-economic development, infrastructure availability, and health 
outcomes. Mangrove ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to sea-level 
rise, amongst other climate related factors. For example, a one metre 
rise will completely inundate the Sundarban mangrove in the Bay of 
Bengal resulting in widespread damage to local ecosystems, which 
currently form a major base for the livelihoods of the communities  
that reside there. 
The impact of climate volatility in low-income countries, where 
climate events often result in irreversible losses and impede long-term 
development prospects, is not being met by effective policy responses. 
Involving communities in development can help poorer regions manage 
climate change and climate volatility by empowering local people to 
become active agents in creative resilience. These communities need 
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safety nets that are responsive to climatic risks and natural disasters, 
programmes to develop their livelihoods, and access to finance and 
insurance. The new wave of financing for climate change  
adaptation represents a unique opportunity for deploying these 
community-based interventions. 
My work in the Sundarban suggests that policies should be reorganised 
and designed to be flexible with the changing climate/weather 
events that negatively impact the households in this fragile area, their 
livelihoods and communities. In times of crisis, families often have few 
coping options apart from drawing down on their assets. Liquidating 
assets in this way may help families cope in the short-term, but it comes 
at the expense of long-term security and adaptation. This is especially 
important to consider as the impacts of climate change accumulate over 
time, and marginalised poor households will need support in adaptation 
and building resilience.
Business as usual is no longer working for the Sundarban community. 
Strengthening resilience does not stop at identifying the factors, but 
moving towards actions. Firstly, we need a better understanding of 
resilience – going beyond merely providing relief and short-term 
support to affected communities. Investing in long-term resilience is 
key. Household-level resilience can be improved with support to allow 
people to build up savings and acquire assets. The Indian government 
already has an array of safety nets that has capacity to buffer and help 
build resilience of the households, such as rural employment generation 
schemes, and midday meals for school children. However, from the 
study it is evident that they do not reach those who need them the  
most. These policies need to be part of the larger development and 
poverty reduction schemes that provide increased opportunities for  
education, and the vocational training which is crucial for the 
Sundarban households. 
Social protection enables rural transformation. Social welfare can 
promote inclusive transformation in many ways, though the evidence 
remains scarce at the macro level. Transformation is dependent on the 
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capacities of the households to invest in different forms of capital. This 
opportunity is determined by policies and institutions combined with 
social safety nets through various programs to bring about an inclusive 
rural transformation.
Improvements in employment benefits the community in multiple 
indirect ways. It is well documented that empowering women 
economically has positive impacts on health, education, and other 
dimensions of human capital. Multiple benefits come with the 
government investing in policies that create employment opportunities 
for rural households. Its advantage is that there is more income 
available for other household needs than food. Safety nets and 
conditions that favour this will enable rural transformation. 
FAO, 2016 suggested possible strategic adaptation interventions across 
sectors to build resilience of communities. These stress interventions for 
the water sector, in preservation of forests, in securing livelihoods and 
food, livestock, energy and in land use and river management.
2015 to 2016 are years of considerable importance as the majority of 
the governments across the globe agreed to the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai Framework), the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, and the World Humanitarian Summit Framework 
(WHS). These agreements and frameworks set out targets for the 
nations for achieving better preparedness for disasters, sustainable 
development and to tackle larger problems of the human world. 
It is interesting to note that the concept of resilience is central in all 
these agreements and frameworks, along all sectors and scales. These 
levels and areas are critical as resilience is complex and it is important 
to combine efforts in directions for disaster risk reduction, sustainable 
development and climate change. This effort would require strong 
financial mechanisms, policies and programmes that can deliver on one 
or more targets at the same time. However, it is still at an early stage. It 
will take time until these global agreements are fully standardised and 
implemented. It would therefore still be wise to plan for the micro level, 
making households more resilient. 
Sustainable Development Goals
Seventeen universal Sustainable Development Goals were set along 
with targets and various indicators for the national governmental 
interventions. In 2016 the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), published a report called Policy Innovations 
for Informative Change that provides a pathway for countries to 
imbibe the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development Goals. This 
draws attention to the need to address the root cause of the problems 
and urges to rebalance social, economic, environmental sectors and 
processes for sustainable development. However, transformation 
is not possible by just making new policies or investments, the 
necessary condition is that it needs participation from civil society and 
communities which will ensure inclusive processes to make this into a 
reality. 
Nation-led efforts that have tried to address the needs of the inhabitants 
through the numerous central and state government schemes in the 
Sundarban region. There are several projects both central and state 
that are similar to the universal goals and targets that are aimed for 
sustainable development. The best example of eco-social policy called 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 2005 
is now recognised and cited around the world. The policy integrates the 
social and environmental goals that ensures 100 days of employment per 
year to every rural household. The policy is devoted to environmental 
conservation, natural resources management that includes creating 
sustainable assets, water management and soil conservation. One of the 
pre-requisites to enforce the ‘rights and entitlements’ envisaged and 
make it community-oriented and demand-driven scheme. The success 
of the programme is entirely dependent on the participation of the 
community in general and women in particular since the share of latter 
in employment is almost 50%. The policy has benefited 20-55 million 
rural households and helped them come out of poverty. However, 
it comes with its own set of problems such as monitoring, access to 
resources and programmes and lower skills of the households. 
With this background the study recommends that the village 
administration can play a crucial role in facilitating, monitoring and 
accessing schemes that will only push the communities and thereby 
the households to build resilience to natural hazards events and other 
weather-related shocks. Several Indian government led schemes overlap 
with the goals. Out of seventeen goals, ten goals correspond with the 
Indian government schemes, and it is possible to incorporate the 
remaining seven goals in the programmes. My work identifies these links 
and recommends strengthening the role of village administration. 
Goals 1 to 3: The village administration can play a fundamental role 
in the identification of the vulnerable sections of the community and 
their needs. These exercises would ensure that families are covered 
and included in the Public Distribution System. It would give women, 
children and older adults access to food at all times. It would also 
promote climate-resilient agricultural practices would aid in ending 
hunger and achieving food security and improved nutrition for the 
families. Furthermore, they can ensure healthy lives and encourage 
well-being of the community members by regularly assessing and 
maintaining the quality of the health care offered, and promote 
awareness with the help of the health department. Currently, mental 
health care support is particularly lacking in the Sundarbans.
Goal 4 and 5: Sundarban families have significant education expenses. 
The village administration can plan for more residential schools for 
children, both boys and girls. It can also ease access to scholarships, 
textbooks, uniforms, and meals. The village council can also facilitate 
vocational evening courses for both school children and school 
dropouts. Currently, the school infrastructure is poor with substandard 
toilet and drinking water facilities. Girls are particularly affected by 
this. Village administration can promote, monitor and strengthen 
the quality of educational services. To achieve gender equality and 
empowerment to all women and girls, the village administration can 
promote equality through the Beti Bachao and Beti Padhao programme 
to save girls from discrimination and ensure their education. Providing 
incentives to the households to help them retain the girls in school 
could strengthen these. Vocational and small and medium business 
skills should be encouraged and imparted to girls who are not in school. 
In turn, this will ensure that there are skilled women that can contribute 
productively to the village economy. Gender equality cannot be 
achieved unless women are part of the planning and implementation of 
the current government programs in the village administration. Women 
are found to be better change agents of socio-economic transformation, 
efforts are needed to strengthen their participation for household 
livelihood security as well as better asset management.
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Goal 6 and 7: These goals concern the availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all, and are thus directly linked 
with the health of the population. The administration can ensure that 
households with and without sanitation facilities should be identified 
and awareness created for proper use and maintenance of these 
facilities. Local communities should be encouraged to participate in the 
development and plans for implementation. Awareness and education 
about hand and personal hygiene should be imparted to the community 
alongside to prevent the spread of diseases. Water resources should be 
monitored for both household and agricultural use. Recharge of lakes 
and wells should be ensured for the provision of sweet water during 
difficult summer months. It is important to ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 
The village administration should ensure that energy provision to 
the households is made through a network of government-led efforts 
along with Non-Governmental Organisations through its programs. 
Sundarbans is remote, and grid transmission is challenging mainly 
due to its geography. Solar energy could be a more pragmatic way 
of supplying energy to the households. Households need smokeless 
cooking stoves that are both energy efficient and reduce cooking time. 
Women should be included on village planning committees to ensure  
its deliverance. 
Goal 8: This goal also ties well with the development goal that lays 
importance in promoting sustained, inclusive economic growth, 
including employment of all people. Youth, both male and female, 
could give sufficient assistance in acquiring finance and credit from the 
village administration, be trained in relevant skills to start small and 
medium businesses. These efforts could also particularly include women 
and people with disabilities. Awareness is thus needed of labour laws 
labour rights, which could be imparted by the village administration. 
The corresponding current Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme is contributed to this goal. 
Goal 13 and 15: There is no clear plan that village administrations 
are responsible for combating climate change and impacts. These are 
national and state-level responsibilities. However, there are programs 
in which the village administration can play a crucial role. Most 
importantly, the village administration can facilitate awareness about 
climate change and climate variability on the lives and livelihoods of 
people in the community. Micro level vulnerability assessments should 
be conducted by the village administration along with the community 
to understand the impacts and needs of their community. The results 
from these evaluations could feed into village, state and national policy 
making for better mitigation strategies for livelihoods and building 
resilience of the communities for future events. Village administrations 
in the Sundarbans should promote and restore sustainable ecosystems 
and forests. Currently, it has been initiating mangrove afforestation 
drives and ensure their maintenance. Community-based management of 
forest areas through the Joint Forest management scheme is operational 
in the region. These should be further linked with Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme where local species 
of mangroves and other tree and plant species should be promoted. 
Further awareness on conservation of forests should be developed, 
especially given the uncertainties of weather and extreme  
weather events. 
Policy recommendations for the 
management of the internally displaced 
climate migrants
My work is mainly carried out in the transition zone (which includes the 
tidal zone) and the households in this area could become migrants or 
displaced people in the future. Sundarbans is a World Heritage Site that 
everyone should care for, mainly because the households are bearing 
the consequences of unplanned development elsewhere. It is therefore 
pragmatic to invest in a policy that caters to their needs. 
Conflicts, political instability and extreme weather events are among 
the primary reasons for migration today. In 1990, the First Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
noted that the greatest single impact of climate change might be on 
human migration and displacement. Despite the warnings and statistics 
that followed, little has been done in national or global arenas to deal 
with climate-related migration or to bolster international capacity to 
handle any large-scale movements. Policy responses have primarily 
focused on three areas: the definition of refugees, adaptation,  
and resettlement. 
Major climate change leads to human migration and reports say that 
around 24 million people across the world have become climate change 
refugees. These refugees are often neglected. Around 63 million people 
in India live in the 50 km range of coasts. Various areas are categorized 
as ‘low elevated coastal zone’ which are under threat of getting 
submerged because of the rapid increase in sea level. The people living 
in these regions face the imminent threat of displacement. The number 
of refugees can go up to 12 million by 2100. As per International 
Organization for Migration, a United Nations body, the Bangladesh 
coast will be impacted more than India. But this will put India in a 
disadvantageous position as it will face large number of migrants 
coming from Bangladesh.
The Disaster Management Act of 2005, makes it mandatory for every 
Ministry or Department of the Government of India, in centre or 
State, to prepare a Disaster Management Plan and accords them the 
responsibility of aiding in case of relief operations, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction after disasters. The Act ensures that the government 
and related authorities, both at the state and local level take “necessary 
measures for preparedness to respond to any threatening disaster 
situation or disaster”. The assistance for emergency responses, relief 
and rehabilitation, is to be met by the National Disaster Response Fund 
(NDRF) and the mitigation of disasters is to be borne by the National 
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Mitigation Fund, along with the State and District delineations of each 
of the funds above. However, the Act does not have a definite plan for 
resettlement or rehabilitation of such displaced population by disasters. 
The West Bengal Disaster Management Policy (2010) states that 
‘relocation’ must be a result of ‘need-based considerations’. It does not 
consider factors such as the nature of the calamity, the extent of damage
consent of the affected population, land acquisition, urban/rural land 
use planning, relocation packages, legal authorization for relocation an
rehabilitation and livelihood rehabilitation activities. The rehabilitation 
activities in the policy focus on the reconstruction of infrastructure, 
economy, agriculture, health and education.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
Director General Jose Graziano da Silva has stressed the need for 
investing in rural development and making livelihoods climate proof. 
He further points out that these should be an integral part of any 
solution to curb migration. Migration should be a choice and not a 
desperate act! This all holds true if the people are not located in places 
like the Sundarbans which have higher degree of physical risk such as 
flooding, sinking of the islands, salinity and sea level rise. Physical risk 
along with related fallouts such as social, cultural and economic make it 
even more challenging. Since 2016, we have seen a rise in violence in th
24 South Parganas. Many cite the influx of Bangladeshi migrants, and 
some cite an increase in communal tensions. We sensed this underlying 
tension in the villages during fieldwork. Several households are not 
prepared for anticipating and to cope from climate/ weather events. 
This will only push them into migration. In the Sundarbans region there
is increased pressure on both people and the place. There is migration 
from Bangladesh to India in search of a better life - coming from a risk 
environment to another risk environment and of Indian inhabitants 
already in poor state looking for relief and possible migration to main 
land India. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a clear definition 
on who is an environmental refugee and internally displaced people 
and who will bear the costs of their rehabilitation and resettlement. 
The Indian Government should prepare itself with local-regional and 
bilateral frameworks to prepare itself for this burden in the region  
and within the country. 
India has a long history of rehabilitation and resettlement of people 
and have supported political asylums and refugees from neighbouring 
countries and have resettled some people within the country. An 
example of this the resettlement and rehabilitation of inhabitants from 
the Lohachara island in the Sundarban. The total number of resettled 
people is between 4000 and 7000. However, it lacks a framework or 
policy for internally displaced people, or any bilateral agreement with  
its neighbours for environmental/climate refugees. 
Weather events and climate change are a global phenomena and the 
burden of costs for management and rehabilitation for climate refugees 
should be borne by the United Nations under the Adaptation fund 
through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 





and expertise through the Santiago Network. However to support 
the sustainable development agendas there is an urgent need to 
recognise the costs of climate induced loss and damage and devise 
a global costing and funding mechanism to pay for the losses borne 
by the most vulnerable communities in the global south. It would 
be helpful to explore seasonal migration routes and livelihoods Skill 
based rehabilitation. A land tenure system should be set by India, local 
inventory of inhabitants - land loss by erosion should be covered by 
insurance under the Adaptation fund. Government insurance scheme 
for climate events such as cyclones should be considered. 
Regional bodies should be urged to adopt declarations and conventions 
on internally displaced person (IDP) citing the African union 
convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced 
persons In Africa also known as the Kampala Convention as a model 
and promote implementation of these instruments. The Declaration 
should also urge governments to adopt national laws and frameworks 
based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and develop 
country strategies -- together with donor governments, international 
humanitarian and development organizations, civil society and 
internally displaced person (IDP)’s themselves -- to implement the 
agreed goals and work toward resolving displacement situations. In view 
of the imminent risk of accelerated weather/climate change induced 
mass migration/internal displacement, there is a need for immediate 
formulation of relevant comprehensive policies. Dedicated resources 
should be mobilised for the preparation and implementation of phased 
relocation plans for the vulnerable, while lead-time is still available. 
Furthermore, the study call for a global consensus on definitions  
and a decision framework for ensuring the responsibility for,  
and the rights of, environmentally displaced people in the future.
Neelambari Phalkey
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Unlike buildings, grown trees don’t ‘just stand there’. Before we 
consider the communities supported by mature trees, we should 
recognise the active nature of the trees themselves. More like whirlpools 
than buildings, trees continually exchange energy and material with 
their surroundings. Trees use sunlight to create order out of the chaos 
of the air and earth; tempting a scientist to call them the ultimate 
entropy deniers. By appreciating that trees must continually run to 
stand still, that forests are complex plant-animal-microbe systems rather 
than simply a bunch of ‘carbon sticks’, we gain a much more complete 
understanding of how standing forests have a significant influence on 
the flows of carbon, water, nitrogen, and other nutrients through the 
Earth system. 
When we consider the global CO2 budget it’s important to note the 
distinction between emissions, which are largely driven by socio-
economics, and sinks, which have a very strong biological component. 
Only a bit less than half the CO2 emitted into the atmosphere stays 
there; the rest is taken up by the ocean surface and the terrestrial 
biosphere. The research consensus is that the land carbon sink is  
bigger than the ocean sink. Currently, the northern hemisphere 
is taking up billions of tonnes of carbon, and the most important 
landscape for this uptake is temperate forest.
In the far north, the vast boreal forest may be taking up 0.5 billion 
tonnes of CO2 per year but, further south, temperate forest biome is 
taking up 0.8 billion tonnes, which is equivalent to all the emissions 
from the EU 27 nations plus the UK, or approximately the amount of 
CO2 released from deforestation globally. This is a huge number, worth 
almost £15 billion at today’s carbon trading price and much, much 
more in reality. The countries of the temperate zone – between the 30th 
and 50th parallels, very roughly, and encompassing the great majority of 
what is often called the Global North – are in an ideal position to lead 
in the adoption of practical measures to maintain and maximise the 
land carbon sink. Activities to maintain stocks of, and increase flows 
into, land carbon should recognise the three great forest biomes 
(tropical, temperate, boreal) and fit policy options to each. 
What we know
The land carbon sink is important now; how it reacts in future is critical 
to our climate projections. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) recognises the CO2 feedback on the land carbon sink 
as the most important feedback in the carbon cycle.1 ‘Feedbacks’ are 
the accelerator and brake pedals of any complex system such as climate. 
Positive feedbacks accelerate change; negative feedbacks, like that of 
CO2 on the land carbon sink, resist change. The CO2 feedback on the 
land carbon sink is often called “CO2 fertilisation” and is currently 
providing a very significant, but far from total, brake on global warming. 
CO2 fertilisation cannot now, and never will, offset entirely historical 
fossil fuel use and save us from global warming — not for the UK, 
and not for the world. Nevertheless, a key question for our climate 
projections is whether CO2 fertilisation will continue to provide its 
current planetary free gift, whether it will provide an even larger brake 
on climate change as CO2 levels increase further, or whether it will begin 
to decrease in importance as factors other than the CO2 level begin to 
dominate forest responses. 
Currently our understanding of how temperate forest will respond to 
elevated CO2 is based largely on the first-generation forest Free-Air CO2 
Enrichment (FACE) experiments, for example, the experiment in Sweet 
Gum in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, or the experiment in Loblolly pine in 
North Carolina. All of these experiments were in young plantations 
1   Ciais et al 2013. In: Climate Change 2013. The Physical Science Basis. Cambridge Univ Press. (Fig 6.22). 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ 
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growing in non-forest soils and so, for those parameters derived from 
FACE experiments, climate modellers are predicting the response of the
world’s forests based on the responses of young plantations, despite the 
majority of broad-leafed temperate forests being greater than 50  
years old.
We know that, as forests age, competition between trees intensifies, and 
this is expected to result in mature trees exploring more and more of 
their soil resource to acquire nutrients until the soil and the forest are 
optimally interlocked. In this case, mature trees would not be able to 
use additional carbon fixed under elevated CO2 to promote greater 
amounts of nutrient uptake and therefore may not be able to sustain 
a growth response to elevated CO2. However, in absorbing carbon, 
perhaps mature trees, in the temperate forests and elsewhere, find 
more nutrients to take up, use nutrients more efficiently, or both? To 
answer this, we require detailed experiments that link the carbon cycle 
to nutrient and water cycles to improve our climate models. Very few 
models have carbon coupled to nutrients, and those models are not 
challenged by data (because there have been no data).
As it grows to maturity, standing forest is not undisturbed; forests 
continually experience disturbance from fire, flood, disease, storm, 
and harvest. The ‘natural’ disturbances are increasingly affected by 
human influence, including the human influence on climate.2 Strong 
intergovernmental approaches to climate mitigation can stabilise the 
random effects of fire, flood, and storm. Strong regulatory measures 
can control the globalisation of invasive pests and pathogens. Moving 
harvest ‘closer to nature’ through carbon- and biodiversity-conscious 
management will ensure that standing forests continue to deliver 
environmental, social, and economic goods.3 
 
The latest research
FACE facilities are the key to understanding ecosystem-level responses 
under future atmospheric compositions. Several small-scale facilities 
exist; a number of first-generation forest facilities operated at the turn 
of the Millennium. Only two large-scale forest FACE facilities operate 
currently4, although plans for a third, in the Amazon, are well advanced. 
Forest FACE facilities are the largest climate-change experiments in the 
world (Figure 1); together, they represent a time-machine transporting 
the plants, animals and microbes of today’s forests into the atmosphere 
of the 2050s. International agreement to set up and run an Amazon 
FACE, would send a clear message from COP26 that world leaders 
appreciate the substantial evidence gap we are bridging very sketchily 
with models. 
Figure 1. The Free-Air CO2 Enrichment facility of the Birmingham Institute
of Forest Research: BIFoR FACE, one of the three largest climate-change 
experiments in the world. Three of the patches surrounded by the metal 
infrastructure receive elevated CO2 (150 ppm above an ambient level 
which is currently ~410 ppm). The other three, ‘control’, patches receive 
unaltered ambient air. Photo courtesy of Prof. Jo Bradwell.
How do the forests respond in FACE? The Australian facility, EucFACE, 
sited in old-growth eucalyptus forest outside Sydney, have produced 
a budget for their ‘Mediterranean-type’ climate and environment. 
Carbon is taken up when extra CO2 is available, as expected, but seems 
not to be stored in this hot, dry, and phosphorus-poor environment. 
If there is substantial CO2 fertilisation in standing mature forests, as 
our models and satellite measurements say there must be, we need to 
look elsewhere. A tremendous amount has been learnt in producing 
a carbon budget for EucFACE. The first precious data to challenge 
the leading climate models have been produced. The core of a forest 
time machine is in place; now we need to add the other great forested 
landscapes of the Earth to our investigation.
EucFACE has a sibling facility in cool, moist England: BIFoR FACE.5 
Although the quantitative details are yet to be peer-reviewed for BIFoR 
FACE, qualitatively the picture is becoming clear (Figure 2). Firstly, 
the forest under elevated CO2 draws more carbon into the trees (i.e. 
photosynthesis is increased6); wood production is increased; production 
of leaves and fine roots7 is increased; and secretions into the soil by 
the roots are increased. Ecologists say that the Gross Primary Production 
(GPP) of the forest is increased. This increased living plant mass 
stimulates microbial life, especially below ground, so that the respiration 
of CO2 — an inevitable by-product of all life — also increases. Unless 
significant amounts of old soil carbon are being accessed and used up 
in this increased respiration (unlikely but not impossible), the carbon 
balance overall is that the mature forest in BIFoR FACE is drawing 
carbon out of the atmosphere and so helping to lessen global warming. 
However, until detailed budgets are produced and until the experiments 
Rob MacKenzie Not just standing there: the carbon utility of 
established forest
2   The IPCC “1.5 degrees” report: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ 
3   For more information see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260197077_Carbon_sequestration_
Managing_forests_in_uncertain_times and https://theconversation.com/using-forests-to-manage-carbon-
a-heated-debate-81363
4   Norby, R. J., et al., Model-data synthesis for the next generation of forest FACE experiments, New 
Phytologist, 2015, DOI: 10.1111/nph.13593. Note that SwedFACE, the boreal forest FACE mentioned in 
this paper, is not yet underway.
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have been allowed to progress for a decade or even beyond, we will 
not be sure the degree to which this carbon uptake by mature forests is 
persistent.
Figure 2. Qualitative assessment of the effects of elevated CO2 on forest
at BIFoR FACE for the carbon cycle (green), water cycle (blue), nitrogen 
cycle (red). Arrows show the direction of extra flow under elevated CO2 
conditions. ‘Plus’ signs indicate an increase under elevated CO2. The 
inset image shows leaf mines, which are decreased under elevated CO2 
for the larvae of some species. Image from Hiclipart.com, adapted by Nine 
Douwes Dekker and Rob MacKenzie.
The FACE results show the land carbon sink is not straightforward and 
is emphatically not just a story about carbon. Our early results from 
BIFoR FACE show that the essential nutrient, nitrate, is less available 
under elevated CO2, because the plants and soil microbes are taking 
up more nitrogen to balance the increased carbon that is now in their 
diet. A very simple analogy to this requirement for balanced uptake 
of nitrogen and carbon in forests is the need to balance carbohydrate 
(mostly carbon) and protein (high in nitrogen) in our own diets if we 
are to stay healthy.
If we find that mature trees cannot take up more nutrients under 
elevated CO2 then it would mean that these biomes may have much less 
potential to take up carbon in the future than we are currently relying 
on, which would have massive consequences for the fight against climate 
change. The potential for carbon uptake by terrestrial ecosystems in 
the future would have been severely overestimated. According to one 
study, accounting for nutrient availability limitations added 15–150 ppm 
to atmospheric CO2 concentration or, equivalently, 0.14–0.6oC to the 
global mean surface temperature change at 2100.
If future carbon uptake by mature temperate forests were confirmed 
to be limited by nutrient availability, the forest-based CO2 removal 
techniques relied on in the IPCC’s “1.5 degrees” document would 
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be called into question. Much deeper cuts in allowable emissions of 
CO2 (equivalent to 8-33 years of emissions at current rates) would be 
required, with profound policy and societal implications. We need to 
know what future we are facing, and forest FACE facilities are the only 
way to probe this future experimentally.
The climate crisis is not the only global environmental challenge: a 
mass extinction is in progress for not-unconnected reasons. The world’s 
standing forests are intensely diverse8, particularly when left close to 
their primeval condition or restored to provide multiple ecosystem 
services resiliently. Whether storing more carbon or not, accelerated 
cycling of carbon and nutrients through the forest has profound 
implications for forest food webs and biodiversity. Increasing GPP in a 
forest is like increasing GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in a country: 
things are bound to change. In BIFoR FACE, for instance, some leaf-
mining grubs seem to do less under elevated CO2. These grubs are  
moth larvae that feed on the trees’ photosynthetic apparatus, the leaf, 
and are themselves parasitized by wasps. Other work in BIFoR FACE  
will investigate the implications of the changed nutritional quality of  
leaf litter on the forest floor food web and the impact of elevated 
CO2 on decomposition of deadwood by fungi and invertebrates. By 
recognising fully the carbon utility of standing forest, the international 
community will also provide essential knowledge to help prevent a 
biodiversity catastrophe.
So, nature-based solutions to climate change are not all about tree 
planting. Afforestation can never solve our problems with carbon and 
climate, even if we reinstated every terrestrial landscape to its most-treed 
extent. Working with nature strongly implies protection of, and care for, 
our standing forest, moving beyond the existing recognition of reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries to value all mature forest. In absorbing carbon, do mature 
trees in old-growth forests take up more nutrients, use nutrients more 
efficiently, or both? The answer to this question will unlock the CO2 
fertilisation conundrum and make our climate projections much more 
robust. Whatever the answer, let’s protect, expand, and manage our 
forests for their true value, not because we wish they would do the hard 
work of emissions reduction for us. 
Rob MacKenzie
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
5   Hart, K. M., et al. Characteristics of free air carbon dioxide enrichment of a northern temperate mature forest. Glob 
Change Biol. 2020; 26: 1023– 1037. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14786 
6   Gardner A, et al., Is photosynthetic enhancement sustained through three years of elevated CO2 exposure in 175-year 
old Quercus robur? BioRxiv preprint 2020: https://biorxiv.org/cgi/content/short/2020.12.16.416255v1 
7   Ziegler, C., et al., Quantifying carbon fertilisation of root biomass production from elevated CO2 in mature temperate 
deciduous forest. BioRxiv preprint 2021: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.04.15.440027v1 
8   See my recent overview talk: https://derby.cloud.panopto.eu/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=8620142d-9d03-
49f5-81d0-abc900cf1809 and a short radio interview: http://birminghamtreepeople.org.uk/bifor/
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Tree susceptibility and resilience to pests and disease
Trees, like all other organisms, experience a lifecycle. Starting from a 
seed, the seedling emerges from the earth and grows in size, reliant on 
the water and nutrients in the ground and on sunlight for provision of 
energy (sugars) via photosynthesis. This process means that the trees are 
creating nutrients in themselves whilst also depositing other nutrients 
into the earth from root exudates, fruit and seeds, leaf litter and bark. 
Over the millennia, trees have therefore attracted a wide range of fauna 
to tap into their tasty offerings as well as offering a haven for shelter 
(animals) or as a ‘birthing station’ (e.g. insects bury their eggs in the 
bark or leaves).
Naturally, humans have also been attracted to trees for various resources 
such as timber for construction, fuel for fires, sap for rubber, and seeds 
and fruit for food. In many cases, we have artificially selected trees for 
traits that are beneficial to us, for example gaining food of a particular 
quality, and in quantity, and thereby growing trees as crops (apples, 
pears, cherries). We have also planted trees for ornamental purposes 
(horse chestnuts and planes) and for timber production (pine, fir, 
spruce and larch).
Like human bodies, whose cellular content is at least half microbes, 
trees are not typically sterile entities. They will usually have microscopic 
organisms surrounding their roots, all over their surfaces and deep 
inside their tissues. In most cases, these are mutual interactions with 
partnerships between the microbes and the tree – exchanging nutrients 
between one another, much like an exchange of sweets in the school 
playground. We are also starting to realise that microbes living inside 
trees can do remarkable things like utilise greenhouse gas (GHG) 
methane. This discovery emerges from the realisation that microbes in 
the soil can create methane gas, which dissolves in water just enough 
to pass through the tree root system and through the trunk to the 
atmosphere – methane utilising microbes can access this methane to 
help them grow. Trees are of course also responsible for sequestering 
huge amounts of carbon, thus representing a vast carbon and 
greenhouse gas sink.
However, we are now observing a nexus of problems for trees 
particularly with the widespread emergence of pests and diseases. In the 
UK, the most prominent disease in recent years was Dutch Elm Disease 
that absolutely devastated the UK elm population. This disease is caused 
by a beetle that carries with it a fungal pathogen. More recently, Ash 
Dieback Disease (ADD, caused by the fungus Hymenoscyphus fraxineus), 
Acute Oak Decline (AOD, caused by a bacterial consortia) and Horse 
Chestnut Bleeding Canker (HCBC, caused by the bacterium 
Pseudomonas syringae pv. aesculi) have also been shown to be widespread 
within the resident tree population. The increasing incidence of these 
diseases can be attributed to a range of factors, unfortunately all linked 
directly or indirectly to human activities. Trade and the exchange of live 
plants and wood products spreads pests and diseases throughout the 
world. The introduction of a new disease (by humans) can be 
exacerbated by our changing climate. For example, warmer winters 
allow insect populations to continue to grow and cause more serious 
disease outbreaks when spring arrives. Changes in seasonality can also 
allow insects/pathogens to expand their ranges into regions that 
previously did not need to worry about these pests. Finally, alterations 
in precipitation, and especially periods of drought, can make trees 
more vulnerable to both introduced and endemic pathogens.
The way in which we grow trees and use once-forested land for our own 
purposes (city expansion, agriculture) has reduced the absolute 
numbers and diversity of trees that are grown. We have also dramatically 
narrowed the gene pools of commercially grown trees by strongly 
favouring monoculture (growing trees that are essentially copies of each 
other). Classic examples would be extensive forest clearance in the 
Amazon for soybean and cattle farming and in South East Asia for oil 
palm plantations, spanning approximately 3-5 million hectares (larger 
than Belgium).1 The large scale of these clearances and subsequent loss 
of ecosystem services has a direct negative impact on planetary health, 
as these smaller forests are unable to support the fauna (biodiversity) 
that depend on trees and, of course, the loss of carbon and GHG 
storage. Moreover, the spread and emergence of pests and diseases 
further exacerbates these issues, especially in monoculture systems 
because diseases can sweep through the entire crop. Severe disease 
outbreaks in tree plantations or forests do not only result in tree death 
but also have knock-on effects to release more GHG, pollution, and 
increase the risk of flooding and fires. A UK “rush to carbon” that 
focused on extensive planting of fast-growing clones would be making  a 
similar mistake: forsaking a healthy and biodiverse forest for  
a single-minded, but highly vulnerable, goal.
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Future predictions on the impacts of pests and disease suggest a 
worrying outlook for humans and wildlife.2 Climate changes will no 
doubt be a major part of this problem, for example, imagine that the 
UK sits in a temperate zone, but current climate predictions indicate 
that the typical London climate will change from its current status to be 
more like Barcelona in 2050. This is just one example of how climate is 
predicted to change in one part of the world – globally, it is clear that 
big changes are on the way. What does this mean for trees in the 
context of pests and diseases? And how do we study this and try to make 
the necessary preparations and changes to counter the effects. In other 
words, how do we make our forests resilient?
What we know
Like the COVID-19 pandemic, trees around the globe are suffering 
from major disease and pest outbreaks –trees are stationary and 
widespread, they are unable to communicate their illness, and we do not 
know how to aid them beyond an initial response of introducing stricter 
biosecurity measures. Governments around the world reacted quickly to 
tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, the parallel approach for 
trees and forests of the world is slower, but no less important. Unlike 
COVID-19, however, it is not a single disease that we face but many 
diseases caused by a very diverse set of pathogen species.
One of the most impactful issues for trees in the world right now is 
the Mountain Pine Beetle (Dendroctonus ponderosae), which is killing 
huge swathes of pine trees in North American forests. In Canada, for 
example, an area of 18 million ha (larger than the area of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland combined) has already been affected. 
Moreover, recent research shows that bark beetle epidemics influence 
wildfire severity, thus causing knock-on effects to the broader forest 
system. In the UK, we have outbreaks of invasive insect pests such as leaf 
miner (Cameraria ohridella) in horse chestnut and oak processionary 
moth (Thaumetopoea processionea) in oak; fungal pathogens such as ADD 
and red band needle blight of pine caused by Dothistroma septosporum; 
oomycete pathogens including Phytophthora ramorum on larch and 
Phytophthora cinnamomi in Sweet Chestnut; and bacterial pathogens, for 
example, AOD and HCBC. Scanning the horizon, we know that there 
are major pests and diseases beyond our island but close by, which if 
they gain entry, would threaten several native species (for example the 
Xylella bacterium towards several tree species) or severely threaten 
the survival of trees already under attack (the Emerald Ash Borer, for 
example, attacking ash trees suffering from ADD). Identifying the pests 
and pathogens causing disease is only the first step in designing effective 
control strategies to protect our native forests. Below we highlight some 
of the newest research that reveals the tools used by pathogens to attack 
trees and some novel strategies which we can employ to protect them 
from these attacks.
The latest research
The importance of trees has always been appreciated, but unfortunately, 
support for research into trees has diminished over the past few 
decades. With valiant efforts from colleagues in Forest Research, the 
Animal and Plant Health Agency and a determined group of academic 
colleagues, this is now changing with new funding streams from 
government and specific recognition of trees in the new UK Plant 
Science research strategy. However, trees are complex, slow growing and 
challenging organisms to work on, which means the scale of research, 
and the urgency for doing it, are major challenges. There is much to do.
A key pathway to fighting pests and diseases is to understand firstly, 
how pests and pathogens attack trees and secondly, how trees resist 
pests and diseases. This means we require detailed knowledge of how 
pests and diseases live, survive and spread, and especially how they 
attack and damage trees. In parallel, we need to examine tree genetics 
and physiology to identify the important characteristics distinguishing 
healthy, resistant trees from those susceptible to diseases and pests. 
Moreover, we need to know how pests, pathogens and trees perform in 
the ‘gladiatorial arena’ when the climate they live in changes.  
This knowledge will help us guide practitioners on appropriate tree 
planting schemes and promote management practices that help trees to 
fight back.
The Birmingham Institute of Forest Research (BIFoR) is well placed 
to address these challenges, with research programmes studying 
disease in ash, oak and cherry as well as plant immunity, using state-
of-the-art facilities at the University of Birmingham. The influence 
of increasing levels of CO2 is also being studied to evaluate how this 
mediates physiological changes in trees, insect colonisation and disease 
manifestation. This is being done using trees grown in elevated CO2 
levels, using the largest temperate forest Free-Air Carbon-dioxide 
Enrichment (FACE) facility in the world (Fig. 1), just 60km NW of 
Birmingham, and our new Wolfson Advanced Glasshouses, based on 
the University of Birmingham campus.. A centrepiece of our research 
efforts focuses on the iconic oak tree, which suffers from oak powdery 
mildew (PM) attacking its leaves and AOD, the bacterial disease which 
attacks the stem.
1   Globalization of the Amazon soy and beef industries: opportunities for conservation.  
Nepstad DC, Stickler CM, Almeida OT. 
Conserv Biol. 2006 Dec;20(6):1595-603. doi: 10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00510.x
2   Threats Posed by the Fungal Kingdom to Humans, Wildlife, and Agriculture.
Fisher MC, Gurr SJ, Cuomo CA, Blehert DS, Jin H, Stukenbrock EH, Stajich JE, Kahmann R, Boone C, 
Denning DW, Gow NAR, Klein BS, Kronstad JW, Sheppard DC, Taylor JW, Wright GD, Heitman J, 
Casadevall A, Cowen LE.mBio. 2020 May 5;11(3):e00449-20. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00449-20
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 Figure 1. The Free-Air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) facility of the Birmingham 
Institute of Forest Research: BIFoR FACE is one of the three largest 
climate-change experiments in the world. Pictured is one of six arrays 
surrounding mature trees and undercanopy; three arrays spray ambient 
air over the enclosed trees whilst another three arrays spray CO2 (150 
ppm above an ambient level which is currently ~410 ppm) over the trees. 
Photo courtesy of Prof. Jo Bradwell.
Powdery mildew, priming of oak defence 
and the impact of elevated CO2
Oak trees (Quercus robur and Q. petrea) are a keystone tree species of 
the UK landscape, with ~121 million trees supporting 2300 species 
(not including microbes) of which 326 are obligate associates (i.e. if 
oak dies off those 326 species also die off). In addition to supporting 
these vast ecosystems, oaks are an important part of British culture and 
have huge economic, ecological and social relevance. For example, 
they are versatile and tolerant to different environmental challenges 
and provide a source of high-quality timber. All these characteristics 
make oaks excellent candidates for use in UK woodland regeneration. 
However, British oak woodlands suffer widespread tree loss associated 
with biological threats. In addition, the oak regeneration capacity is 
highly compromised by the extreme vulnerability of oak seedlings 
and saplings to the fungus Erysiphe alphitoides, which causes the deadly 
powdery mildew (PM) disease (Fig. 2). Consequently, the PM fungus 
hinders the establishment of new oak forests. Current methods used by 
tree nurseries to control the PM fungus depend on the use of chemical 
fungicides, which are extremely limited due to their toxicity to human 
health and the environment1. Thus, in BIFoR, we investigate the 
immune strategies that allow oaks to fight against the PM fungus. 
Figure 2. Diseases in oak. (Right) The oak powdery mildew fungus 
growing on a young oak seedling in the University of Birmingham 
laboratories. As an obligate biotroph, it is necessary to continually 
maintain the fungus on living oak leaves. This allows researchers to 
perform controlled experiments year-round. (Left) Acute Oak Decline 
(AOD) in a mature oak tree, photo courtesy of Oliver Booth.
Plants, including oaks, are not docile organisms and they do react to 
infections by producing defensive compounds that impede or are toxic 
to the attacker. These defences are controlled by the plant’s immune 
system. Plants can also make advanced preparations for potential 
pathogen attack by sensitizing their immune system. This phenomenon, 
known as priming of defence, can been understood as a plant vaccine, 
because after an initial stimulus that warns of an upcoming attack, 
plants are able to activate their immune system faster and stronger.3  
Our recent work has demonstrated, for the first time, that oak seedlings 
can activate priming of defence against the PM fungus. This knowledge 
will be exploited for the development of resistant forests, responding 
not only to immediate threats but also building resilience to those  
that will appear in the future. 
3   Conrath, U. et al. Priming: Getting Ready for Battle. Molecular Plant-Microbe Interactions 19, 1062-1071, doi:10.1094/
mpmi-19-1062 (2006).
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The environment, and hence our changing climate, can impact the 
activation of priming of defence mechanisms. A recent government 
statement on climate change and forestry lists different actions that are 
needed to ensure that the tree species planted are resilient to extreme 
climate events and elevated CO2 (eCO2). This is because, whilst it has 
been speculated that eCO2 may increase tree productivity due to a 
carbon fertiliser effect, there are research studies that describe changes 
in the defensive capacity of plants after exposure of eCO2. For instance, 
in soybean, studies have shown that eCO2 leads to enhanced resistance 
to pathogens. However, other studies testing resistance against fungal 
pathogens indicate that eCO2 does not impact resistance in ragweed 
and even increases susceptibility in wheat. Sadly, our preliminary 
observations align with the latter studies and indicate that eCO2 results 
in higher levels of PM disease in oak seedlings. We have also observed 
that the activation of priming is compromised under eCO2. Given our 
aspirations to meet carbon targets through reforestation or afforestation 
via natural regeneration and colonisation, these results could indicate 
that in the future, we will have even greater difficulties regenerating oak 
woodlands due to this fungus. In BIFoR, we are working hard to find 
solutions, including long-term strategies through assessing the impact  
of eCO2 on mature oaks and their next generation. 
Acute Oak Decline and oak disease 
immunity
The principal disease threat to oak health in the UK is AOD (Fig. 2). 
The defining feature of AOD is the dramatic shift in the composition of 
microbial communities associated with trees, moving from a balanced, 
healthy community to an unbalanced and unhealthy bacterial complex. 
Three particular bacteria (Brenneria goodwinii, Gibbsiella quercinecans, 
Rahnella victoriana) are consistently found in disease lesions and disease 
progression is most extensive when all three species are present. These 
bacteria are also detected on symptomless, healthy trees, but as part of a 
diverse community, potentially pointing to the opportunistic nature of 
the disease.
Work at BIFoR is focussed on determining the role of oak tree genetic 
makeup (genotype) in relation to resistance or susceptibility to AOD 
bacteria. It has been proposed that long-lived woody species, such as 
oak, are reliant on having a large and diverse repertoire of genes that 
deliver disease resistance (immunity) to help them survive the many 
years to maturity. However, to date no oak disease resistance genes have 
been described. Our work aims to identify oak resistance genes that 
provide protection either against AOD or the PM fungus. By providing 
this information to tree breeding programs, tree nurseries and land 
managers, it may be possible to select oak genotypes best-placed to be 
fully resistant to pathogens in their environment. Our work is therefore 
targeted at helping to guide planting decisions for future forests, but 
this is likely to take many years, possibly decades to achieve this.
02 Nature
Tree susceptibility and resilience to pests and disease
Conclusion
The experience of 2020-21 and the global COVID-19 pandemic has 
taught us some harsh lessons about how diseases emerge and spread, 
how we manage them, and how to treat them. An important observation 
is that infections can vary from asymptomatic to acute disease to long-
COVID symptoms and to death. The world has mounted a reactive 
response (detection, monitoring, treatments, and vaccinations) rather 
than a well-prepared prevention- or intervention-based response 
(despite warnings from scientists). The lesson for tree diseases and pests 
researchers should therefore be clear; study not only the acute phase 
of disease, but also to prepare and anticipate how climate change will 
influence future disease outbreaks. With this approach, we will be able 
to tackle pests and diseases, be better prepared to prevent them from 
spreading and ultimately develop future forests that are productive, 
sustainable and resilient. Forests that are not productive, sustainable, 
and resilient will not serve the Paris Agreement and could cause  
more harm than good to global biodiversity.
Rob Jackson, 
Estrella Luna-Diez, 
Graeme Kettles and 
Megan McDonald 
Contact publicaffairs@contacts. 
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
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This article is a beginner’s guide to modelling climate change by 
statistical methods. We will see how data spanning 1850-2020 can be 
used to model global warming.1 
In the first part of this article, we comment on graphs of climate data. 
These data include global temperatures, atmospheric carbon dioxide, 
solar activity and particulates in the stratosphere. These variables 
have been chosen because they are of interest to both climate change 
doubters and believers.
In the second part of this article, we fit statistical models to these data 
to estimate the amount by which each variable has affected global 
temperatures during 1850-2020. The models indicate that increased 
atmospheric carbon dioxide can explain 1.26 to 1.33 degrees Celsius  
of the temperature increase while cyclical solar activity can explain 
about 0.12 to 0.40 degrees of the temperature increase.
The third part of this article includes instructions on how  
to estimate two statistical models of climate change using  
an Excel spreadsheet. 
A final section summarises and is followed by data  
and a technical appendix.
It is worth noting that statistical models (see http://www.
climateeconometrics.org) are rarely used in climate modelling. 
Instead, experimental and physical models are more often used, such as 
the simulations run by meteorologists. In these models, the parameters 
are decided upon by the researcher based on various sources, such 
as laboratory experiments, meteorological readings or the results of 
statistical models. These physical models are then used to run simulations 
to verify whether the simulations closely match the observed world. In 
contrast, statistical models are fitted directly to the observable data to 
determine their parameters. Both approaches are equally valid and both 
produce mathematical models that can be used to forecast  
climate change.
The data
In this first section, we look at graphs of the climate data as a 
preliminary step before estimating the statistical models in section two. 
The Data Sources Appendix includes details of the data sources. 
Figure 1 shows an overall temperature increase of about 1.5 degrees 
Celsius since 1850. The period 1850-1940 seems one of gradual 
temperature increase. The Second World War was a period of relatively 
high temperatures but followed by a period between 1945-1964 when 
temperatures did not increase substantially. The period since 1965 has 
been one of rapid temperature increase. There are smaller year-on-
year fluctuations but it is difficult to determine which of these are 
real fluctuations and which are measurement errors. Smoothing the 
year-on-year fluctuations is a bad idea because it would erase some 
important variations. For example, 1877 and 1878 have remarkably high 
1   Though the term global warming has fallen out of favour and been replaced by climate change, this article 
focuses on the observed increase in global temperatures and therefore directly on the warming climate.
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temperatures during a major El Niño episode in what was dubbed ‘the 
year without a Winter’. Conversely, there are some years with sudden 
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Figure 1: Average global annual temperatures and atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, 1850-2020
Figure 1 also illustrates the levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide,  
a major greenhouse gas.2 Greenhouse gasses work by allowing high-
frequency sunlight energy into the troposphere but blocking much of 
the lower-frequency heat energy from escaping. The scientific consent 
is that increased temperatures are mainly due to increased greenhouse 
gasses. Atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased by just over a third 
since 1850. 
Figure 2 illustrates sunlight energy reaching Earth, measured as Total 
Solar Irradiance (TSI) in kilowatts per square metre (kW/m2). TSI has 
a short cycle of about 11 years that coincides with planetary alignments. 
Solar TSI is included in our models but this is unlikely to explain much 
of the temperature increase because the overall fluctuation in TSI is a 
relatively small 0.18% with just a 0.0025 kilowatt increase relative to a 
level of about 1.36 kilowatts. We have overlaid a ‘smoothed TSI’ variable 
on the original one that suggests a two-century cycle but this is hard to 
confirm with less than two centuries of data. We have also illustrated  
the ‘Solar (TSI) cycle’ which is the difference between TSI and  
‘smoothed TSI’.
Figure 3 illustrates data on solar dimming caused by particulates high 
in the stratosphere. This is known as Stratospheric Aerosol Optical 
Dimming (SAOD). SAOD data are measured at the 550nm (nanometre) 
electromagnetic wavelength. Greater dimming leads to cooling by 
reducing the sunlight reaching Earth’s surface. These dimming 
data have several peaks that coincide with major volcanic eruptions. 
Eruptions with a Volcanic Explosivity Index of 6 have been illustrated3  
(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volcanic_Explosivity_Index for a 
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Figure 3: Total Solar Irradiation (TSI) reaching Earth in kilowatts per 
square metre 
2   Foote (1856, American Journal of Arts and Science) is now credited with discovering the Greenhouse Gas 
effect, based on experimental models using glass cylinders and sunlight. Her work remained largely 
unacknowledged until it was rediscovered by Sorenson (2011, Search and Discovery). 
3 Unfortunately, these data do not go back to the 1815 Tambora eruption (VEI=7). This had a major climatic  
impact (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_Without_a_Summer) and 1816 is sometimes referred to as ‘the  
year without a Summer’.
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The statistical model
In this section we will look at the results of fitting two statistical models to 
the data using the method of least squares4. In particular we use ordinary 
least squares (OLS), which is the simplest of these methods. OLS 
involves selecting the model parameters that generate the smallest 
(squared5) difference between the observed temperatures and 
temperatures fitted by the model. At the end of this section, we will see 
how to carry out these model estimates using the Excel software.
The first statistical model we fit to our data is on temperatures, carbon 
dioxide, total solar irradiance (TSI) and stratospheric dimming. The 
resulting model is:
Celsius = 0.0104 Carbon dioxide + 48.63 Solar (TSI) 
– 1.79 Dimming + 0.42 El Niño 1877-1878 – 55.4 + e
(1)
where we have also included a variable for the major El Niño event, set 
equal to one on 1877 and 1878, and zero elsewhere.
The parameter numbers in model (1) indicate how much each unit 
of each variable contributed to temperatures. For example, each part 
per million of carbon dioxide contributes an estimated 0.0104 increase 
in Celsius temperatures. Since 1850, carbon dioxide has increased by 
128.3 parts per million, contributing to an estimated 1.33 (= 0.0104 x 
128.3) degrees to the temperature increase. Solar irradiation also makes 
a positive contribution of 48.63 degrees per kilowatt. Increased Solar 
irradiance therefore contributed approximately 0.12 (= 48.63 x 0.0025) 
of a degree to increased temperatures. The upward dimming spikes 
illustrated in Figure 3 correspond with temperature falls based on the 
parameter –1.79. The El Niño 1877-1878 event has a large positive effect 
on temperatures raising them by 0.42 of a degree over this two-year 
period. The final parameter –55.4 is a constant that captures all that is 
missing in the model, such as the temperature effects of atmospheric 
water vapour or atmospheric methane, ozone and nitrous oxide. In a 
near-complete model we would have expected this constant term to 
be close to -273.15, which is absolute zero. Given no model is perfect, 
the residual errors e in model (1) represent differences between the 
observed and model-fitted temperatures.
Figure 4 illustrates the temperatures already seen in Figure 1, overlaid 
with the temperature values fitted from model (1). We can see how 
good the overall fit in this model is. Figure 4 also reports the squares of 
the residual errors e in model (1) that were minimised to fit the model. 
These represent the smallest squared residual errors that could be 
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Figure 4: Actual and model (1) fitted Celsius temperatures, and squared 
residual errors
In our second model we split the Solar (TSI) into its smoothed 
component and its cyclical component already illustrated in Figure 2. 
The resulting OLS model is:
Celsius = 0.0098 Carbon dioxide + 161.2 Solar Smooth + 11.31 Solar Cycle      
(2)                                – 1.87 Dimming +0.425 El Niño 1877-1878 – 208.4 + e 
Model (2) is very similar to model (1) with carbon dioxide explaining an 
estimated 1.26 (= 0.0098 x 128.3) degrees of the temperature increase. 
The main difference is the separate parameters on the two solar activity 
variables. The parameter on ‘Solar Smooth’ is 161.2, suggesting a 
stronger influence than in model (1). Model (2) suggests increased 
Solar irradiance has contributed approximately 0.40 (=161.2 x 0.0025) of 
a degree to increased temperatures. The paramete on the 11-year Solar 
Cycle is much smaller at 11.31, suggesting a very small effect.
How to fit a statistical model using Excel
Models such as (1) and (2) can be estimated using any statistical software 
(such as R, SPSS or Stata) and can even be carried out using spreadsheet 
programs such as Excel. Your estimated results are likely to differ very 
slightly from those in this article because the data are being continually 
fine-tuned and your dataset might not span the same years. Most people 
will probably have access to Excel and wish to use it to estimate their 
models. First make sure that the Excel ‘statistical add-ins’ are activated by 
selecting: File, Options, Add-ins, Go; and then make sure the ‘Analysis 
ToolPak’ and ‘Analysis ToolPak (VBA)’ options are ticked. To estimate 
equation (1) select: Data, Data Analysis, Regression and OK to launch 
the ‘Regression’ box illustrated in Figure 5. In the 
4   The method of least squares was first developed by astronomers such as Gauss (1777-1855,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Friedrich_Gauss) and Legendre (1752-1833, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Adrien-Marie_Legendre) to forecast the trajectory of comets. 
5 The reason for minimising the squares of the residual errors is both a matter of mathematical convenience 
but also because it confers useful statistical properties in the model. This is something that was discovered by 
the early astronomers.
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“Input Y Range” box insert the column with Celsius. In the “Input X 
range” box, insert the columns for Carbon dioxide, Dimming and 
Solar. If you included the variable labels when selecting the data ranges, 
tick the box for “Labels”. Then click OK and this should place a new 
estimated model into a new worksheet in the same Excel workbook.  
You can repeat a similar process to estimate model (2) but might  
need to reposition some data columns to achieve this.
Figure 5: Excel ‘Regression’ box used to estimate statistical models.
Summary
This article has shown us how to estimate a statistical model of climate 
change. In the first section we have seen various climate variables and 
gained an initial insight into how they might be interrelated. In the 
second section we have seen how to use Ordinary Least Squares model-
fitting to estimate two models of climate change. All of the proposed 
climate variables have some impact on the temperature increase 
experienced since 1850 but by far the greatest contribution comes from 
increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. The article appendices touch on 
data sources some advanced topics when it comes to statistical models  
of time-series data.
Data sources appendix
Temperature data in Figure 1 are from Berkeley Earth  
(http://BerkeleyEarth.org) Land and Ocean temperatures at sea level, 
developed by Rohde and Hausfather (2020, https://doi.org/10.5194/
essd-12-3469-2020). Berkley Earth describes itself as “Independent, non-
governmental, and open-source” and was originally established to look 
into the “merit[s] in some of the concerns of climate skeptics”.
Post 1959 carbon dioxide data in Figure 1 are based on atmospheric 
air readings at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii, made available 
by the Global Monitoring Laboratory (https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/
gmd/). Historical carbon dioxide data are based on numerous polar 
deep ice-core readings (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/
paleoclimatology-data/datasets/ice-core) by MacFarling Meure et al. 
(2006, https://doi.org/10.1029/2006GL026152). 
In Figure 2, recent TSI data spanning 1978-2020 by Coddington 
et al. (2015, https://doi.org/10.7289/V55B00C1) are based on 
satellite readings and were retrieved from www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdr/
atmospheric/total-solar-irradiance. Two historical TSI datasets by Marvel 
et al. (2015, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2888) and Miller et al. 
(2014, https://doi.org/10.1002/2013MS000266) were retrieved from 
https://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/solar.irradiance. Where the TSI 
data overlap, we use an average of the readings. 
Figure 3 solar dimming data spanning 1850-2012, with updates to Sato 
et al. (1993, https://doi.org/10.1029/93JD02553), were retrieved from 
http://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/strataer/ using the last available 
dataset tau.line_2012.12.txt. These are constructed from volcanic ejecta, 
terrestrial readings and satellite readings. We constructed the missing 
2013-2020 data by using detailed monthly data on volcanic eruptions 
retrieved from the Smithsonian Institution Global Volcanism Program 
using their data retrieval tool: https://volcano.si.edu/search_eruption.
cfm and supplemented with data by Siebert et al. (2010, Volcanoes 
of the World) from www.allcountries.org/ranks/volcano_explocivity_
index_ranks.html.
Advanced statistical appendix
In this appendix we touch on some important but advanced issues 
related to statistical model estimation. The first issue is related to 
ensuring the estimated models are not spurious regressions and the 
second issue is to construct valid significance test statistics on the 
estimated parameters.
The first issue is that it is easy to fit statistical models to data that are 
non-stationary, such as ever-increasing temperatures. To demonstrate 
that the statistical model is not a spurious regression we need to 
demonstrate that its residual errors are mean-reverting. This is typically 
done using unit root tests of non-stationarity. Applying the most 
commonly used one of these, the “Augmented” Dickey and Fuller 
(1981, https://doi.org/10.2307/1912517) (ADF) test to the residual 
errors of models (1) and (2) produces the following test statistics. These 
indicate the two models are super-consistent, cointegrated and not 
spurious because the residual errors are mean-reverting:
ADF test on model (1) residual errors, t-statistic = -7.4455, p-value = 0.000007
ADF test on model (2) residual errors, t-statistic = -7.5684, p-value = 0.000024
The p-values, based on MacKinnon (2010, https://www.econ.queensu.
ca/research/working-papers/1227), indicate strong rejection of  
non-stationarity of the error-residuals.
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Dependent variable: Celsius temperatures
in Engle-Yoo (1987) models












0.0104 35.77***  0.0107 15.95***  0.0098 24.43***  0.0093 10.46***
Dimming -1.790 -4.16*** -4.78 -4.87*** -1.872 -4.38*** -4.831 -5.16***
El Nino 
1877-1878
 0.420  5.20***  0.970  5.29***  0.425  5.32***  0.956 -5.04***
Solar (TSI) 48.63  1.75 69.30  1.10
Solar 
Smooth
161.2  2.76**  329.7  2.59**
Solar Cycle 11.31  0.35 -18.32 -0.26
Constant -55.40 -1.47 -65.97 -2.05** -208.4 -2.63** -298.4 -4.38***
R2 91.5%
Probability of having erroneously included this parameter * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The second issue is that we typically wish to test whether each model 
parameter is equal to zero and this is based on standard t-statistics. 
However standard t-statistics are not valid because some of the variabl
are non-stationary. Various corrections are possible and we apply the 
Engle and Yoo (1987, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(87)90085-
three-stage estimation correction. The first stage includes the models
already reported in models (1) and (2) but the t-statistics are not vali
The second stage (not reported) includes error-correction models wi
three-year lags of first-differenced temperatures and carbon dioxide 
among the regressors. The third stage involves adjusting the first stag
results based on second-stage correction results. The first-stage (i) an
third stage (iii) results for models (1) and (2) are reported in Table 1
The Table 1 results confirm that most of the variables are statistically 
significant in explaining global Celsius temperatures. Only the Solar 
activity variable is not significant in models (1.i) and (1.iii) but this 
might be because the short 11-year cycles are masking the effect of 
the long fluctuation. When Solar activity is split into its smoothed 
fluctuations and its short Solar Cycles, we see that the smoothed 
component is significant in explaining temperature changes. In all 
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Water security is concerned with availability of adequate quantity 
and quality of water for different uses and users. We need water for 
domestic (e.g. drinking, cooking, bathing, washing) and non-domestic 
(e.g. food and electricity production, industry, navigation) uses. Water 
also maintains and restores natural ecosystems. Some definitions of 
water security are narrow and focus on human beings exclusively - only 
individuals or both individuals and communities, the public and the 
private sector. Other definitions recognise the relationship between 
human and natural systems and include the natural environment 
as well. The spatial and temporal dimensions of water (in)security 
are intricately linked with principles of inter-generational and intra-
generational equity. This means, among other things, that water security 
requires water to be stored e.g., in aquifers, glaciers, and ice sheets to 
ensure availability not only in the short-term but also the medium- and 
long-term for people living in different countries and regions within 
countries, and experiencing different socio-economic and cultural 
realities, in the present and future generations. 
Water insecurity – the converse of water security - will result in 
conflict between different uses and users of different sources 
of water at different levels – from the local to the national to 
the global. This should not be equated with the spectre of 
‘water wars’ between states but it is no less frightening.  It 
is also important to remember that water insecurity is not 
an issue we might have to contend with in the future; it is 
the reality right here, right now. Water security is directly 
related to food security. According to the International 
Food Policy Research Institute, approximately half of 
global grain production will be at risk due to water  
stress by 2050 if business-as-usual persists. 
The relationship between climate 
change and water security 
Climate change is likely to exacerbate water insecurity and 
conflict among different uses and users of water. The Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) noted that water resources would experience 93 per 
cent of the impacts of climate change. More recently, the UN World 
Water Development Report 2020 noted that climate change increases 
the vulnerability of freshwater resources i.e., any naturally occurring 
water except seawater and brackish water. The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment 
Report will provide an update on the impact of climate change on water 
resources. 
Rising temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, and more extreme, 
less predictable, weather events are likely to lead to adverse effects on 
water resources in the following ways, among others:
• Boost evaporation
• Snow falls as rain
• Melting of glaciers, ice sheets, snow
• Frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts
• Wildfires
• Availability of surface water and groundwater
Heavy rainfall and breakdown of water treatment infrastructure during 
floods and extreme weather events can increase sediment and pollution 
loads in water sources. This will affect the quality of raw water and 
drinking water. 
The IPCC identifies a direct correlation between the increase in 
concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) and the adverse impacts of 
climate change on freshwater resources. Climate change mitigation 
measures to reduce GHG emissions could promote water security. 
Alternatively, mitigation measures could exacerbate water insecurity. 
Water is required to implement climate change mitigation measures 
e.g., generation of renewable energy (hydropower, geothermal) as an
alternative to fossil fuel use and carbon sequestration in sinks through
reforestation, bioenergy production and carbon capture and storage.
Climate change adaptation measures could also contribute to water 
security. Such measures include water retention by forests, wetland, and 
artificial storage facilities, soil improvement and water management in 
rain-fed agriculture, and flood protection measures. However, climate 
change adaptation measures in other sectors such as expansion of 
irrigation farming may affect the availability, quantity and quality of 
water resources. Improvements in water management could promote 
climate resilience without being labelled as climate change adaptation 
measures. Alternatively, water mismanagement could impede mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change. 
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Non-binding outcomes of governmental and non-governmental 
processes can also influence the international climate change regime. 
Here we are witnessing greater engagement with the relationship 
between climate change and water. Even before the Paris Agreement 
was signed, the Paris Pact on Water and Adaptation – Strengthening 
Adaptation to Climate Change in the Basins of Rivers, Lakes and 
Aquifers was entered into at the 21st session of the Conference of 
Parties of the UNFCCC (COP-21) in Paris in 2015. It represents a 
commitment to strengthening climate change adaptation through 
a joint, participative, integrated, and sustainable water resources 
management. The following year, for the very first time, a dedicated 
water action day (action day for water) was included in the Global 
Climate Action Agenda during COP-22 in Marrakech. It called for more 
attention to water as a way of providing solutions to help implement 
the Paris Agreement. Water action events have now become an annual 
feature (2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020). 
Another relevant outcome from COP-22 is the Marrakech Partnership 
for Global Climate Action, which enables collaboration between 
governments and the key stakeholders such as cities, regions, businesses, 
and investors. In 2019, the Marrakech Partnership launched Climate 
Action Pathways to outline the longer-term sectoral visions for a 1.5° 
climate resilient world in 2050 from the perspective of non-State 
stakeholders and set out actions needed to achieve that future. The 
Water Climate Action Pathway seeks to identify and accelerate action 
on water-related solutions on climate change mitigation and resilience. 
Other partnerships focus on geographical areas or stakeholders and 
include the Megacities Alliance for Water and Climate and the Business 
Alliance for Water and Climate.
Addressing climate change, 
ensuring water security 
The relationship between climate change and water security is complex. 
As we inch towards COP-26 in Glasgow later this year, any future 
roadmap to address climate change must consider the  
following suggestions:
(i) Climate change causes or exacerbates water insecurity by
compromising the availability, quantity and quality of different
sources of water for human and non-human uses at the global,
regional, national, and sub-national levels. The international climate
change regime must explicitly consider the relationship between
climate change and the hydrological cycle as well as the multi-scalar
dimensions of both. At the same time, the regime must be guided
by the differentiation principle. Water insecurity and vulnerability to
climate change go together for some countries. These countries also
fare poorly on the human development index.
Lovleen Bhullar 
Water (security) in the international 
climate change regime 
The international climate change regime includes the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
include a specific one on climate action. 
The UNFCCC explicitly acknowledges the relationship between climate 
change and water. It recognises that low-lying and other small island 
countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas 
or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing 
countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change. In fact, all parties accepted a commitment 
to cooperate to ‘develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans 
for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for 
the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected 
by drought and desertification, as well as floods.’ 
Like the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement recognises that certain 
countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
Unlike the UNFCCC, it does not specify the countries or include any 
reference to floods, droughts, and desertification. The Paris Agreement 
does not mention water at all, but water is implicitly embedded in 
several provisions. The Agreement aims to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change through mitigation and 
adaptation measures. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
specify the mitigation and adaptation measures that parties to the Paris 
Agreement commit to undertake to achieve this objective. 93 per cent of 
Intended NDCs submitted by countries in 2015 identify water as a 
central component of their adaptation efforts. Some INDCs link water 
to the provision of sustainable energy, which is a key climate change 
mitigation measure e.g., through construction of dams for hydropower 
generation. Further, the preamble of the Agreement recognises the 
fundamental priority of safeguarding food security, which is inextricably 
linked to water security and energy security. The preamble also states 
that parties to the Agreement should respect, promote, and consider 
their obligations on human rights. This presents another opportunity to 
acknowledge the link between climate change and water security, which 
implicates the right to water as well as the rights to environment and 
sanitation, and to undertake necessary measures to ensure 
complementarity between climate change mitigation and adaptation 
measures and water security at different levels. In any case, the Paris 
Agreement is intended to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC, 
which includes a specific commitment with respect to water. This leaves 
the door open for consideration of the relationship between climate 
change and water.  
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(ii) The international climate change regime implicitly recognises the
importance of water in achieving mitigation and adaptation goals.
This is evident from a perusal of NDCs. However, the discretion
vested in the parties to the Paris Agreement as they implement
this bottom-up approach could be steered towards ensuring that
they consider the reciprocal relationship between climate change
mitigation and adaptation measures on one hand, and water
resources and water security on the other.
(iii) Climate change adaptation measures might protect water resources
explicitly and promote water security implicitly. However, the
international climate change regime adopts an exclusive or
predominantly climate lens. The fact that several mitigation and
adaptation measures require water as an input might amplify the
threat of water insecurity for individuals and communities receives
less attention. We need a more nuanced approach that recognises
that solutions to one problem might create another problem.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures might result
in water insecurity.
(iv) Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures do not always
operate in isolation from one another. Complementarities are
welcome but we cannot rule out the potential for water resource
conflicts between adaptation and mitigation with implications for
water security at different scales and during different time-periods.
To the extent possible, a simultaneous evaluation of these measures
is necessary while recognising that there is no hierarchy between
the two.
(v) The international climate change regime must facilitate the
engagement of civil society organisations in discussions on climate
change and water. It must also expand the pool of stakeholders to
ensure that voices of concerned individuals and communities and of
experts (scientists) from different countries are heard and included
in the decision-making processes.
(vi) Decision-makers must recognise and explore the synergies between
the international climate change regime and international
law relating to biodiversity, human rights, watercourses, and
wetlands, among others. They must also acknowledge and fill
gaps in international law e.g., concerning aquifers and polar
ice that impede the development and operationalization of a
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and particle pollution (microplastics, 
engineered nanomaterials, pathogens)
on water quality
Berta Bonet, Iseult Lynch and Stefan Krause Freshwater biofilms as early warning systems for the 
combined impacts of climate change and particle 
pollution (microplastics, engineered nanomaterials, 
pathogens) on water quality
New research in our artificial stream mesocosms has shown that the 
increased temperatures predicted to occur by mid-century will lead to 
reduced aquatic biofilm diversity and enhanced susceptibility to other 
stressors. We found that combined exposure to elevated temperature 
and silver nanoparticles led to increased cell death in the biofilms of 
our artificial streams and a reduction of the surrounding protective 
matrix, as well as enhancing the toxicity of silver sulfide nanoparticles 
currently considered to be of low risk. As biofilms contribute to essential
ecosystems services, such as water quality and nutrient recycling, 
monitoring of UK waters under the UK 25-year Environment plan and 
the River Basin Plans should include and prioritise biofilm health, and 
strategies to utilise biofilms for monitoring and remediation since there 
is a strong connection between healthy ecosystems and human health. 
 
While for most of us, biofilms are the undesirable green/brown slime 
that cover buildings, boats, rocks and other surfaces in frequent 
contact with water, in their natural habitat, freshwater biofilms are an 
extremely hardworking part of the ecosystem, providing a range of 
essential services (often called ecosystems services) including water 
purification, carbon storage and nutrient cycling. Biofilms colonize 
any wet or submerged surface (substrate), and indeed recent advances 
in techniques for assessing microbial composition have shown that 
biofilms lining the pipes that bring drinking water into our homes may 
contribute to the high quality of drinking water, acting like the “good 
bacteria” in our guts by filtering out pollutants. Surface colonisation of 
biofilms is driven by extracellular polymeric substances (EPS) secreted 
by the bacteria, and this sticky mucus provides biofilms with stability and 
community structure, making them more resilient to pollution than 
individual microbes. 
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Biofilms are hugely variable in their composition, comprising algae, 
bacteria, and fungi, embedded in a protective mucus matrix  
(Figure 1), with each of the species having different functions and 
abilities. An established biofilm has a defined architecture, and biofilm-
associated organisms differ from their planktonic (freely suspended) 
counterparts with respect to the genes that are expressed. Freshwater 
biofilms can also incorporate clay materials, suspended solids, and 
corrosion particles entrapped into their mucus matrix, and are well-
known as sinks for pollutants (Bonet et al., 2012, 2014) thus aiding 
water purification. The different species within biofilms are closely 
associated and interact strongly with each other through secretion of 
signalling molecules (so-called quorum sensing). These interactions can 
be cooperative or competitive and are strongly affected by surrounding 
conditions; biofilms composition and structure change as they are 
exposed to extremes of flow, temperatures, light and nutrients in rivers 
and ponds.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the impacts of increasing temperature 
(T) and interaction with engineered nanoparticles (ENP) in terms of their 
composition, structure, and function.
Aquatic ecosystems are threatened by multiple environmental stressors 
including pollutants and climate change. Climate models predict 
mean annual temperature to increase by 3.5ºC in air and 2.2–4.3ºC in 
stream waters by 2100, and increased frequency of extreme hydrological 
conditions including droughts and floods, with potentially devastating 
effects on freshwater ecosystems and their ecosystem services. These 
predictions are reinforced by the UK Climate Projections 2018 study, 
the most up to date assessment of how the UK may change over this 
century, which also suggests that under the highest emissions scenario, 
summer temperatures could be 5.4ºC hotter by 2070, with the chances 
of a summer as warm as 2018 (when daytime temperatures in parts of 
the country consistently topped 30ºC are around 50% by 2050. Even 
under a low emissions scenario, the Met Office data indicate that the 
UK will see an increase in the average yearly temperature of up to 
2.3ºC by 2100. In freshwater systems, both temperature and hydrology 
are key controls on the rates of vital physiological processes such as 
respiration, growth, metabolism and enzymatic activities, and even small 
(e.g. 2ºC) shifts in temperature could markedly alter biofilm structure 
and functioning, and streams desiccation or drying out would alter the 
nutrient cycle (as biofilms become more heterotrophic i.e., needing to 
get nutrients by eating other organisms) and bacteria use more carbon 
and phosphorus for growth rather than nitrogen).  
While considerable progress has been made in understanding the 
environmental impact of many stressors in recent years, new potentially 
powerful, toxicants such as engineered nanoparticles (ENPs) and 
microplastics arising from mis-managed plastic waste, continue to 
emerge whose effects on aquatic ecosystems remain poorly understood. 
The release of ENPs into the environment is accelerating due to 
their widespread applications in cosmetics, textiles, food packaging, 
building materials, electronics and more. Current regulatory testing 
utilises standardised over-simplified conditions, and does not factor in 
any enhanced organism susceptibility due to climate change or other 
stressors. The impact of combined climate change and particle impacts 
on individual species, for communities such as river biofilms, and for 
the essential ecosystems services they provide are critical questions 
that require answers. European environmental legislation such as the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD 2000/60/EC) recognises the need to 
manage the environmental threat posed by climate change coupled with 
contamination, but knowledge of new ENP and microplastics stressor 
effects is only beginning to emerge.
As a major step towards understanding the climate change-enhanced 
environmental impacts of ENPs in aquatic ecosystems, the Horizon 
2020 funded project NanoTOX elucidated how much river warming 
affects fluvial biofilms structure and function, and how the presence of 
environmentally relevant concentrations of representative ENPs may 
further stress the communities (Figure 1). This was achieved through an 
innovative, interdisciplinary approach using an array of methods from 
the fields of ecotoxicology (ecology and toxicology), molecular biology, 
functional ecology and nanotechnology. Utilising UoB’s Environmental 
Change Outdoor Laboratory (or ECOLaboratory) and its recirculating 
streams at different temperatures, flows and pollution conditions, a 
large-scale mesocosms experiment was performed exposing biofilms to 
low concentration of ENPs at current and expected temperatures (18ºC 
vs. 25ºC). Since there is ongoing debate as to the role of nanoparticles 
versus dissolved ions, and the impacts of newly released (freshly 
dispersed) versus environmentally aged (transformed) nanoparticles, 
our experimental design included pristine silver nanoparticles (AgNP), 
silver ions as an ionic control (AgNO3) and a silver sulfide nanoparticle 
(Ag2S NP) designed to mimic the transformation that AgNPs undergo 
in the environment, such as during transport through wastewater 
treatment plants which are high in sulfide and a key route into the 
environment for nanoparticles. 
The experiment involved 40 flumes of 60 Litres each, 20 set at 18 °C and 
20 set at 24 °C, with 4 different pollutant treatments each: (i) untreated 
control, (ii) silver ENPs (AgNP, pristine ENP), (iii) silver sulphide ENP 
(Ag2SNP, aged ENP) and (iv) silver nitrate (AgNO3, ionic control Ag+), 
as shown in Figure 2. To assess differences over time, water and biofilm 
samples were collected just before adding the toxicants (0h) and after 
1 and 3 days to assess acute effects, and after 14 and 30 days to assess 
chronic effects. Functional and structural analyses were performed 
according to the protocols developed within the project. 
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Figure 2. (A) a photo of a former ECOLaboratory and (B) a scheme of  
the mesocosms set-up used to perform the experiment. (C) Detail of  
flume dimensions. 
Project results highlight that a temperature increase of 6 °C enhanced 
algal biomass, photosynthetic activity, and some enzyme activities while 
others decreased. Microscopic images showed a homogenisation of 
biofilm community composition (see Figure 3). These shifts should be 
taken seriously by river managers since they can modify the nutrient 
cycle in the freshwater systems as well as other ecosystem services, 
such their involvement in the global carbon budget, and thus have an 
important effect on the quality of water not only for the organisms who 
are living in the systems but also for human health. Both pristine and 
aged ENP agglomerated as soon as they were released into the system, 
due the content of divalent cations in water (calcium and magnesium). 
Even with such agglomeration, that could reduce the potential toxicity 
of AgENP, different toxic effects were observed between the different 
forms. AgNPs caused negative effects on fluvial biofilm respiration 
and on all diatom forms at 18 °C. Despite the effect on diatoms, AgNP 
biofilms retained or increased overall algal biomass and photosynthetic 
activity. Extracellular enzyme activity in biofilms (Phosphatase) was 
clearly affected over time by the Ag2S ENP and AgNO3 but not by 
Ag ENP. Phosphatase activity (related to phosphate degradation) was 
affected by aged ENP (Ag2SNP). These results are important since in 
theory these aged and unreactive ENP “should not cause” any biological 
effects and are considered to be of low toxicity. Increased temperature 
also affects ENPs properties such as solubility, dissolution and toxicity 
(Reidy et al, 2013), while flooding can (re-)mobilise the particles or 
enhance their sedimentation under drought conditions (as happens 
with natural particles). These results have important implications for 
the spreading of wastewater treatment plant sludge on agricultural
soils, since aged ENP (Ag2S NP) in theory “should not cause” any 
biological effects and are considered to be of low toxicity. Increased 
temperature also affects ENPs properties such as solubility, dissolution 
and toxicity (Reidy et al, 2013), while flooding can (re-)mobilise the 
particles or enhance their sedimentation under drought conditions 
(as happens with natural particles). These results have important 
implications for the spreading of wastewater treatment plant sludge 
on agricultural soils, since aged ENP (Ag2S NP) in theory “should not 
cause” any biological effects, but under climate warming conditions 
had effects on fluvial biofilms and thus might also affect soil microbial 
communities and thus soil health and productivity.
Figure 3. (A) Biofilm after 4 weeks at 18ºC and (B) at 25ºC, without any 
nanomaterials. Images show biofilm homogenisation at higher temperature 
and loss of extracellular polymeric substances.
Micro and nanoscale plastic particles have many features in common 
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combined impacts of climate change and particle 
pollution (microplastics, engineered nanomaterials, 
pathogens) on water quality
5302 Nature Addressing the climate challenge
with ENP, including their particulate nature. The effect of temperature 
on microplastics’ physical properties (e.g., increasing density causing 
faster sedimentation) and surface properties (e.g., making them 
less hydrophobic), coupled with the aforementioned impacts of 
temperature on aquatic biofilms behaviour can affect the leaching rates 
of additives and plasticizers from microplastics. Thus, microplastics and 
their components will affect microbial communities and their ecosystem 
services, while the biofilms will alter the microplastics’ properties. There 
is thus a critical risk that global warming effects will markedly exacerbate 
the toxic effects of microplastics on fluvial biofilms, impacting on their 
function and provision of essential ecosystems services. Additionally, the 
role of biofilms in sequestering microplastics could be utilised as a low-
cost strategy for their removal from water. Moreover, if specific plastics 
are found to age more effectively, or if biofilms are found to be effective 
barriers, this could be utilised more widely as a low-cost wastewater 
treatment strategy. Indeed, the first reports of utilising biofilms to trap 
microplastics for remediation, and of combining microbial biofilms and 
phytoremoediation via floating rafts, are beginning to appear in the 
literature, although again have not been assessed for their robustness 
under elevate climate conditions. 
Our research is also exploring the impacts and opportunities presented 
by freshwater biofilms to act as indicators and mitigators of the 
ecosystems impacts of combined threats of particulate pollution and 
climate change. This knowledge will support policy makers involved 
in river restoration, waste management, environmental remediation 
and more, and will feed into the 25-year Environment plan. Indeed, 
it is striking that Data figures released by the Environment Agency 
showed that no UK river has achieved good chemical status, suggesting 
pollution from sewage discharge, chemicals and agriculture are having a 
huge impact on river quality, based on the more stringent test standards 
compared to those used in 2016 when 97% of rivers were judged to have 
good chemical status. Our data on the combined impacts of particulate 
pollution and climate change on fluvial biofilm structure and function 
indicate an urgent need to review freshwater monitoring guidelines - it 
is extremely important to not only monitor water physicochemistry 
to assess and manage freshwater systems (risk assessments), but also 
to include biological analyses of ecosystem functioning, which are 
crucial in order to understand if a system is polluted and how it is 
affected. Biofilm is a powerful bioindicator of ecosystem health and 
can detect the bioaccumulation of metals (and most likely also plastics 
or their additives) even when levels are under the detection limit in 
water. The forthcoming changes to the UK river monitoring network 
planned as part of the River Basin Management plans 2021, as well 
as the improving quality of using fluorescence-based water sensors 
enable the detection of metabolism of biofilms in-situ. Complementing 
these, our current research is focussing on developing in-situ analysis 
tool to detect microplastics in situ in river systems (e.g. our team 
are currently developing a low-cost field-deployable Raman system 
for microplastic quantification in rivers via the Institute for Global 
Innovation theme on “Water Challenges in a changing world”) offer 
exciting new opportunities for UK-wide monitoring of biofilm health 
and interactions with microplastics, to support a range of regulatory and 
policy visions including the circular economy and the efforts to improve 
river health. 
This interdisciplinary project is a major first step in opening a new 
research line in climate-ecotoxicology, focussing specifically on biofilms 
as entry points to the food web and assessing ENP and microplastics 
impacts under current and future climate scenarios. Acting now, to 
monitor combined effects, and determine approaches to mitigate 
combined stressor effects on our critical river ecosystems is essential, 
and the solutions developed here are deployable in global south 
contexts also to support the achievement of Sustainable 
development goal 6 in providing clean water for all. 
Berta Bonet, 
Iseult Lynch and 
Stefan Krause 
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
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Henry Chapman Why the archaeology of peatlands matters as we look 
to COP26
Peat and peatlands have received considerable coverage in the media 
in recent months and remain in focus due to the positive contributions 
they make to climate change challenges at the heart of COP26.
In the UK, new support has been provided for peatland restoration, 
including the announcement in April of Natural England’s ‘Nature 
for Climate Peatland Grant Scheme’. The following month saw the 
publication of the England Peat Action Plan (EPAP) which included 
measures including phasing out the sale of peat compost.
With these new initiatives, there is a welcome emphasis on the valuable 
heritage that peatlands present. Heritage was highlighted within the 
EPAP, which also draws on the recent publication of Historic England’s 
‘Peatlands and the Historic Environment’ paper, focusing on the 
cultural and heritage value of peat.
But why is heritage so fundamental  
to peatlands?
Peatlands encapsulate millennia of landscape change, coupled with 
human adaptation, from populations that lived and foraged within these
environments to the final stages of industrial heritage associated with 
processes of peat extraction.
However, their key importance lies in the detail of the stories they can 
tell, and this results from their unparalleled potential for preserving 
organic materials – from wood and leather to perfectly preserved 
remains of the bodies of animals and even people – that, in most other 
contexts, would rot away and be lost.
 
The principal factors that decay organic material are fungi and certain 
types of aerobic bacteria. In a saturated and stagnant peatland, the 
impacts of these perpetrators of decay are diminished. Long-term 
preservation is achieved through stasis - a lack of change within their 
saturated burial environment.
The remains of preserved structures such as trackways not only inform 
about past human activity in an area, but also about changes in 
woodworking and carpentry techniques. From the wood itself, we can 
learn about past choices of different species for different tasks, and 
about the woodland management techniques used to procure it, such 
as the use of 35-50-year-old, overgrown oak coppice in the construction 
of a causeway on the Waveney in Suffolk. Furthermore, the differential 
growth of the tree rings in this wood tells us that the whole building 
enterprise took place within a three-month period – the spring of 75 
BCE. Just this example shows how communities over 2000 years ago 
worked to ensure the future for future generations. Within the context 
of COP26, this is ever more relevant.
But peatlands do not just preserve the objects and structures that people 
made in the past. The peat itself forms an archive of past environments. 
By analysing the macroscopic and microscopic plant and animal 
remains we can construct detailed understanding of past environmental 
changed, human response to such change and, in some instances, 
human impact on their environments. An example from Derryville bog 
in central Ireland showed how the construction, use and repair of a 
road through what was a developing bog in the Bronze Age impeded 
the bog’s hydrology resulting in a catastrophic bog burst. A salutary 
story of human agency creating environmental damage nearly 3,500 
years ago.
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Although rare, perhaps the most tangible of all archaeological 
discoveries from peatlands has been the perfectly preserved remains  
of humans. These examples, known as bog bodies, offer an unparalleled 
opportunity to be literally face-to-face with our prehistoric ancestors. 
Most bodies were discovered in times and places where peat cutting 
was undertaken by hand, although more recent, sometimes very 
fragmented, remains have been made following mechanised  
peat cutting.
A perfectly preserved body can tell us so more than just the miracle 
of being able to see a prehistoric face. Soft tissue and hair, alongside 
evidence of disease and healed injuries, tell us about who these 
individuals were in life. Textiles and clothes, where they were buried 
(for many bodies were placed naked), inform us about their status, 
but also about how such objects were manufactured. For many bodies, 
unhealed wounds tell us how they died, in some instances raising 
questions about the likelihood of ceremonial killing, or rituals of 
human sacrifice. Their stomachs contain the remains of their final meal, 
not only giving indications about their economies, but also about the 
final hours of these individuals’ lives.
With such exceptional preservation potential in peatlands, it is perhaps 
not surprising that our understanding of ancient peoples - of where we 
come from - builds from the intricate detail that peat presents us with.
We hopefully look to a future of reduced peat loss with plans for 
restoration, with benefits that are paralleled in issues of biodiversity and 
climate change. But there is still a need for care and caution. Locally, 
challenges of peat loss through developments persist, with the potential 
for devastating impacts. And even where we seek to re-wet and restore 
peatlands, the processes are far from easy, with far reaching implications 
for heritage. For much archaeology, the impact of the damage is already 
felt and, unless we act quickly, more will be lost. Re-flooding requires 
infrastructural manipulation and, once a peatland becomes wet again, 
the chances to find new sites is severely diminished. Even where sites are 
found, they become logistically challenging to deal with.
These challenges can be addressed through multi-agency and multi-
interest collaboration. To do this, we need to ensure a wider public 
understanding of the heritage value of peatlands. Recently, such 
collaboration can be seen in places such as Hatfield Moors in South 
Yorkshire. Here, within a landscape actively being restored, access and 
understanding of heritage has been through community ventures and 
reconstruction projects, the first of which focused on an internationally 
important Neolithic site towards the centre of the bog. Whilst the  
site itself cannot be seen on the ground due to the needs for its 
continued preservation, it can now be experienced through the  
co-produced replica.
Collaboration on projects such as this provides a framework for 
engagement and discussion around how the different priorities 
relating to peatland can pull together. Whether your starting point 
is climate change, biodiversity, or heritage, their interrelatedness 
is fundamentally important.
This article was originally published in the Birmingham Brief.
Henry Chapman
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
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elephant in the 
COP room
Fossil fuel subsidies are major obstacles to the climate change and 
energy security-driven transition towards sustainable energy sources. 
They undermine the competitiveness of renewables and encourage the 
over-extraction and wasteful consumption of energy sources that are 
responsible for around two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
The increased recognition of their adverse environmental effects over 
the last few decades has prompted numerous intergovernmental fossil 
fuel subsidy reform initiatives. However, the primary intergovernmental 
forum for negotiating the global response to climate change (i.e., the 
UNFCCC) is conspicuously absent from the forefront of these initiatives. 
Fossil fuel subsidy reform first appeared on its agenda some three 
decades ago, but it has remained a peripheral issue within the  
UNFCCC ever since. 
The environmental case against  
fossil fuel subsidies
The environmental case for fossil fuel subsidy reform is straightforward. 
Subsidies make fossil fuels artificially cheaper to consume and profitable 
to produce. Cheap fuel prices encourage wasteful consumption and 
undermine the pursuit of energy efficiency. Production subsidies in the 
form of tax emptions and low royalty payments enable the production 
of fossil fuels that are otherwise economically unviable. 
The fact that no other human activity generates more emissions than 
fossil fuel production and consumption makes the transition away from 
fossil fuels essential to keep the global average temperature increase 
below the 1.5°C limit set in the Paris Agreement. However, our current 
over-reliance on fossil fuels for virtually everything makes the transition 
one of the most difficult challenges the world has ever faced. Making 
the transition happen without disruption and delay requires a massive 
and urgent improvement in the development and deployment of energy 
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efficiency and renewable energy technologies. Countries are taking a 
wide range of legal and policy measures towards this direction, but their 
simultaneous subsidisation of fossil fuels is detrimental to the transition.
Renewable energy sources have come a long way in their 
competitiveness, but they are not likely to outcompete and replace 
fossil fuels if governments continue to subsidise them. Fossil fuels have 
benefited not only from decades of subsidies and free public 
infrastructure but also from the failure of the market to internalise the 
negative externalities of fossil fuel combustion and the positive 
externalities of renewables. Switching subsidies from fossil fuels to 
renewables must be a first-order priority in any country’s effort to help 
accelerate the transition. The COP has already agreed in the Paris 
Agreement to such action by undertaking to make ‘finance flows 
consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate resilient development’. Fossil fuel subsidies make finance flow 
in the wrong direction and lock the world into unsustainable and high 
carbon energy systems. 
Intergovernmental fossil fuel  
subsidy reform initiatives
Fossil fuel subsidies first appeared on the international environmental 
agenda during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in the 1990s. An earlier 
draft of the Kyoto Protocol contained an explicit reference 
to the progressive phasing out of ‘subsidies in all fossil fuels’ as one 
of the policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
corresponding provision in the final text of the Kyoto Protocol replaced 
the specific reference to fossil fuels with a generic reference to subsidies 
in ‘all greenhouse gas emitting sectors’. The diluted language and 
advisory nature of the provision undermined its ability to attract much 
attention to fossil fuel subsidies.
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Intergovernmental efforts to promote fossil fuel subsidy reform 
started in earnest with the 2009 G20 Summit at which G20 Leaders 
agreed to ‘phase out and rationalize’ ‘inefficient fossil fuel subsidies’ 
over the medium term. This agreement has prompted numerous 
intergovernmental organisations and forums to launch their own 
fossil fuel subsidy reform initiatives. The Leaders of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) echoed the G20 commitment to 
‘phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption’ at their Summit in 2011. The G7 Leaders also agreed to 
eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 at their 2016 Summit 
in Ise-Shima, Japan. Nine non-G20 countries have formed the Friends 
of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) to advocate for fossil fuel subsidy 
reforms in various intergovernmental forums. Fossil fuel subsidy reform 
has also become part of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
One of the targets to ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns (G12) is the rationalisation of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies 
that encourage wasteful consumption by 2030. A group of 12 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Members issued a Statement at the last 
WTO Ministerial Conference in 2017 calling for fossil fuel subsidy 
reform in the multilateral trading system. Moreover, most recently, five 
WTO Members have launched negotiations for a plurilateral Agreement 
on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability (ACCTS) that aim, among 
others, to discipline environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies.
These initiatives have successfully made fossil fuel subsidy reform an 
important component of the climate policy toolkit, but fossil fuel 
subsidies remain prevalent and considerably higher than renewable 
energy subsidies. The OECD and IEA estimated that fossil fuel subsidies 
in 77 economies alone amounted to $478 billion in 2019. This figure is 
without considering the value of the negative externalities from fossil 
fuel production and consumption that the IMF counts as part of its 
post-tax subsidy estimate. Governments are not only failing to phase 
out their existing subsidy programmes, but they are also introducing 
new ones. Promising to build back better and greener and at the same 
time subsidising fossil fuels is affront to such promises – let alone to the 
various commitments they undertook to eliminate such subsidies. 
 
The UNFCCC and fossil fuel  
subsidy reform
The Paris Agreement makes no explicit reference to fossil fuel subsidies 
nor fossil fuels. The reference to fossil fuel subsidy reform as one of the 
climate finance options in the draft text did not make it to the final text 
of the Agreement. However, the bottom-up nature of the Agreement 
affords countries the opportunity not only to determine their own 
emission reduction targets but also to pick the policy measures to meet 
them. A few developing countries took advantage of this opportunity 
to include fossil fuel subsidy reform to their intended climate policy 
measures. This is a significant step in the right direction but insufficient 
for at least three reasons. First, only 13 of the 191 Parties to the 
Paris Agreement mentioned fossil fuel subsidies in their Nationally 
Determined Continuations (NDCs). This is despite the fact that nearly 
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all countries subsidise fossil fuels in one form or another. Second, 
with a few exceptions, most of the 13 references to fossil fuel subsidy 
reform are coached in a broad and imprecise language that is difficult 
to monitor and ascertain compliance. Third, and most importantly, 
the mere inclusion of fossil fuel subsidy reform in NDCs falls short of 
providing the necessary incentive and support governments need to 
implement such reforms. Governments – especially in the Global South 
– often face backlash in their attempt to reform fossil fuel subsidies. A 
recent study found that 41 countries encountered at least one fuel riot 
between 2005 and 2018 in response to fossil fuel subsidy reforms. Such 
protests are the function of multiple factors.
The most prominent of this is lack of public awareness and participation 
of stakeholders in the reform process. Fossil fuel consumption subsidies 
are often justified in the name of the poor and vulnerable groups of 
the society. As such, they form part of social welfare policies to protect 
such groups against high fuel prices. The problem is that most fossil 
fuel subsidy programmes are targeted so poorly that they benefit middle 
and high-income households more than low-income households. The 
regressive nature of most fossil fuel subsidy programmes means that 
those with higher energy consumption capture most of the benefits. 
To make matters worse, low-income households are more likely to 
feel the increased fuel prices in the aftermath of subsidy reforms 
than their richer counterparts are. Unless fossil fuel subsidy reforms are 
accompanied by effective public awareness campaigns and more targeted 
compensatory schemes, they will continue to trigger public protests. 
Undertaking fossil fuel subsidy reforms in times of low oil prices such as 
the current one will also help lessen the backlash. The public backlash 
also stems from the failure of reforms to encompass compensatory 
schemes that alleviate the adverse effects of fossil fuel subsidy 
reforms on low-income households. It is important to acknowledge 
that low-income households suffer the most from the removal of 
fossil fuel consumption subsidies. Successful reforms require clear 
implementation plans and compensatory measures directly targeted 
at the poor and other vulnerable groups. Countries such as India 
and Iran have replaced some of their price-based fuel subsidies with 
direct cash transfers. The implementation of such schemes, however, 
poses significant administrative burden for most developing countries 
with weak institutional and human resources. This is one area where 
international organisations could support fossil fuel subsidy reforms in 
developing countries.
The reluctance to address fossil fuel subsidies within the UNFCCC 
(beyond NDCs) stems from the consideration that energy issues 
remain the exclusive prerogatives of national governments. The 
numerous multilateral initiatives to promote fossil fuel subsidy reform 
however suggest that a common understanding and some degree of 
consensus has emerged on the need to address fossil fuel subsidies at 
the intergovernmental level. The increasing evidence of the crucial 
role subsidies play in perpetuating the status quo and maintaining the 
dominance of fossil fuels in the global energy supply mix is yet another 
reason why the COP can no longer afford to treat fossil fuel subsidy 
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reform as a peripheral issue. The key item on the COP26 agenda is 
securing global net-zero by 2050. No pathway to net-zero exists that does 
not require the fundamental restructuring of the global energy system. 
Even the International Energy Agency (IEA) has now recognised that 
a ‘radical transformation of the global energy system’ is required to 
achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The world stands no chance 
of reaching net-zero and limiting the rise in global temperatures to 
1.5 °C without keeping the majority of fossil fuels in the ground. This 
means that our chance of reaching net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 
hinges on our ability to accelerate the transition towards sustainable 
energy sources. Any net-zero commitment at COP26 therefore needs 
to come with clear and strong dedication to address one of the major 
culprits to the energy transition – fossil fuel subsidies.
COP26, Biden and the  
United Kingdom 
COP26 comes at a critical time. The coronavirus pandemic has shown 
how much the world is ill-prepared to respond to a public health 
emergency - let alone to the ‘even deeper emergency’ of climate 
change. Urgent and co-ordinated action is needed if the world is to 
stand any chance of avoiding the catastrophic consequences of climate 
change. Making such action an integral part of the recovery from the 
pandemic is essential to avoid (and correct) past mistakes and accelerat
the transition towards sustainable energy future. Subsidising the fossil 
fuel industry in the name of recovery will perpetuate and further 
entrench fossil fuel use. It is therefore imperative that COP26 sends 
a clear and strong signal on the need to phase out existing fossil fuel 
subsidies and refrain from introducing new ones under the guise  
of recovery.
Recent developments in the United States and United Kingdom  
provide some grounds for optimism on this front. The coming into 
power of the Biden-Harris administration in the United States and its 
strong determination to combat climate change will help recover the 
fossil fuel subsidy reform momentum undermined by the administratio
of Donald Trump and its pro-fossil fuel and anti-environmental rhetoric
over the last four years. The administration has already brought 
back the United States to the UNFCCC and promised to restore 
US leadership to global climate action. It has also enjoined Federal 
Agencies to ensure that ‘Federal funding is not directly subsidizing  
fossil fuels’ and ‘eliminate fossil fuel subsidies from the budget  
request for Fiscal Year 2022 and thereafter’. Only time will tell how 
much of this will translate into action but having one of the leading 
greenhouse gas emitters and fossil fuel subsidisers on board is crucial 
for the intergovernmental movement against fossil fuel subsidies.
The United Kingdom is also taking important steps in the right 
direction ahead of COP26. Over the last two years, the government 
has launched various renewable energy support programmes to 
help businesses build back greener, promote green innovation  
and supercharge green start-ups. It has also announced its plans 




crucial to help accelerate the sustainable energy transition, but the 
continued subsidisation of fossil fuels undermines their effectiveness. 
It is incoherent to introduce renewable energy support measures 
and subsidise fossil fuel at the same. The UK is one of the key G20 
countries that not only failed to honour their fossil fuel subsidy 
reform commitments but also introduced new subsidy programmes 
since the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh. The government deny its 
subsidisation of fossil fuels despites numerous reports to the contrary. 
The government need to stop hiding behind technicalities and a 
narrow definition of fossil fuel subsidies to maintain policy measures 
inconsistent with its climate change agenda. The UK has joined 
forces with the FFFSR recently in calling for fossil fuel subsidy reform 
at the COP26. The joint communique urges countries to turn their 
commitments into action with urgency. If the government is serious 
about tackling climate change and climate leadership, the starting 
place is to be transparent about its own subsidisation of fossil fuels. 
Recognition and clear plan of action to reform fossil fuel subsidies is 
essential for the UK to have any moral authority to urge its guests to 
take action against their fossil fuel subsidies at the COP26.
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Martin Freer Reducing global temperatures through decarbonisation 
of heat
In the venture to decarbonise all parts of human activity much of the 
focus has fallen on energy. Often electricity has been a euphemism for 
energy and decarbonisation of energy has become the decarbonisation 
of electricity.
 
In a UK context great progress has been made. In 2020 42% of the 
country’s electricity generation was from renewable generation rising 
from 5% over a ten-year period. Coal-based electricity generation has 
dropped dramatically. In 2010 fossil fuel derived electricity was about 
three-quarters of generation, now low-carbon sources, including nuclear 
exceed those of fossil fuels. This is quite a transformation and has been 
driven by ambitious government policy, enshrined in the 2008 Climate 
Change Act. The introduction of novel market mechanisms such as 
contracts for difference (CFDs) and agreed strike prices gave long-term 
confidence to developers which has seen an extraordinary investment 
in offshore wind and nuclear projects. The scale of the offshore wind 
programme has seen the strike price for offshore wind reduce by a 
factor of 3 to ~£50/MWh. The same level of cost reduction has not been 
seen in the nuclear sector where only the Hinkley Point C project has 
made it off the starting blocks. The UK’s programme of small modular 
reactors (SMRs) could unlock a cost reduction pathway. 
In the present mix of energy utilisation in the UK, heating accounts 
for about 40% of the energy consumption and about one third of the 
carbon emissions. To date, in contrast to electricity, very little progress 
has been made in the decarbonisation of both domestic and industrial 
heating. The UK generates most of its heat utilising natural gas and 
sits at the high end of the spectrum in terms of the carbon intensity. 
Scandinavian countries, in contrast, are some of the greenest where 
there are significant components of heating delivered by electricity and 
district heating.The district heating systems are well-developed pieces 
of infrastructure which take advantage of waste heat sources such as 
energy from waste. Little progress has been made in the UK on heat 
decarbonisation because of the significant challenges involved. Unlike 
greening of the electricity grid, where the appliances in the home are 
immune to changes in the source of generation and the switch from 
coal to wind can be done without any need for the customer to change 
behaviour, heat will need a change in 25 million homes. 
There are three accepted ways of delivering low carbon heating. The 
approach that UK government has most enthusiastically endorsed is 
use heat pumps which use electricity to extract heat from the external 
environment, air or ground, and pump it into the building. The UK 
government’s 10 point action plan for the delivery of net zero sets out 
an ambition to install 600,000 heat pumps a year by 2028. The challenge
with a heat pump solution is that it that it is expensive compared to 
a gas boiler, by a factor of 10 to 20, and is not a direct one-for-one 
replacement. The intensity of heat generated by a heat pump is less 
than that of a gas boiler and hence there is need for hand-in-hand 
improvements to the thermal efficiency of the home. The cost and level 
of disruption is therefore high. Alternatives to this approach are either 
the use of hydrogen or district heating. 
In the case of hydrogen the approach is intuitively simple, the natural 
methane gas in the gas grid is replaced by hydrogen. The gas boilers 
can either be adapted or replaced by dedicated hydrogen boilers 
and cooking can also use hydrogen. The challenges to delivering a 
hydrogen-based solution, however, are not trivial – despite the apparent 
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simplicity. First there is a need to ensure the piping infrastructure 
used to transport hydrogen is sufficiently modern that the hydrogen 
does not attack the piping material and cause embrittlement and 
cracking. Then there is the need to generate sufficient hydrogen at 
the scale which is required to displace the present methane usage, 
recognising that the energy density of hydrogen is lower than natural 
gas. The preferred method of generating hydrogen is one which is as 
low carbon as possible, green hydrogen. It is assumed that this will be 
done using electricity from renewable generation, such as wind. The 
economics of this are not as attractive as for heat pumps, as a unit 
of electricity can generate 3 units of heat for a heat pump, but less 
than 1 unit of heat for hydrogen given the efficiency of electrolysis is 
maximally about 70%. Thus, for a hydrogen solution one needs over 
three times as much electricity to be generated. Alternative sources of 
hydrogen, blue hydrogen, are possible, but rely on the development 
and demonstration of large scale and highly efficient CO2 capture and 
storage. The preferred option at present is to transport that captured 
hydrogen to offshore saline aquifers in the process of carbon capture 
and sequestration. 
Thus, to deliver low carbon solutions for heat pumps and/or green 
hydrogen a significant amount of additional electricity generation is 
going to be required which could be up to a factor of four higher than 
presently delivered; approximately 40 MW. This will require a massive 
scale-up of offshore wind and solar generation, with not insignificant 
consequence for grid stability. The intermittency of wind and solar, 
where there can be extended periods of low generation is an issue if at 
the same moment the system is relying on that generation for heating. 
There is a clear need for some form of grid-scale energy storage system 
which can store either heat or electricity or both. The proposition that 
the development of electric vehicles will create a second life market 
for lithium-ion batteries which can be used for energy storage, or that 
that electric vehicles plugged into the charging infrastructure can 
be used for a large battery is unlikely to be a solution. The type and 
scale of storage required to manage the future grid will not be met 
by this type of battery, but rather technologies such as compressed air 
energy storage, CAES, or liquid air energy storage, LAES. These are in 
development, with potential for deployment in the next 5-10 years.
Heat pumps consume an amount of electricity which is of the scale of 
running several electric kettles continuously. If all houses on a street 
and all streets in a suburb are running heat pumps and if all the homes 
are also charging electric vehicles this then very quick provides an 
electricity demand which is higher than the rating of the local electricity 
grid. As a result, there will need to be significant reinforcement of the 
local grid infrastructure to support low-carbon heat pump heating and 
electric vehicle charging.
 
The last, main, source for delivering low-carbon heating is the 
Scandinavian approach – district heating. Here hot water/steam 
is circulated in pipes to the buildings which then circulate the 
heat through their heating systems either directly or through a 
heat exchange process. Cities such as Birmingham, Coventry and 
Nottingham have district heating systems serving the large municipal 
buildings in the city centre. Indeed, the system which serves 
Birmingham distributes heating, cooling and power. There is the 
possibility for the extension of such networks across wider swathes of 
cities, particularly in dense urban environments. The installation of 
district heating is highly invasive and needs pipework laying and is not 
the ideal solution in low density residential areas. The source of the heat 
for such systems in the UK is typically combined heat and power plants 
(CHP). These consume natural gas and hence are not low carbon. 
To make these systems low, or zero, carbon there is a need to either 
combust hydrogen rather than methane in the CHP engines or use 
sources of waste heat. Such sources could be geothermal, industrial or 
even from the energy from waste incinerators which are used to process 
municipal waste. At present most of the UK’s district heating systems are 
not configured in this way.
It is clear then why the UK has not made so much progress in 
decarbonisation of heat – it is really very difficult to achieve without a 
simple solution that can be rolled out. These challenges were analysed, 
with a series of policy recommendations to assist in the CBI-University 
of Birmingham joint policy commission on Net-zero: The Road to Low 
Carbon Heat, chaired by Lord Bilimoria, published in July 2020. Among 
the recommendations was that there needed to be coordination across 
the sector to deliver heat decarbonisation – a National Delivery Body, 
NDB. The NDB would coordinate the national infrastructure required, 
the scaling up of production in terms of heat-pumps and hydrogen 
boilers, support the creation of national skills and training programmes 
to create low-carbon heating engineers, to provide the expertise such 
that local heat planning and heat zoning joins up into a deliverable 
national decarbonisation plan and also to create the right portfolio 
of incentives and penalties to induce change. The UK government is 
poised to deliver its heating and buildings strategy and it is clear there 
is a need to be purposeful and ambitious to accelerate what has been a 
slow and muddled start to heat decarbonisation.
The Midlands is proposing a National Centre for Decarbonisation of 
Heat, NCDH, working between local government, academic institutions, 
innovation Catapults and industry to coordinate the delivery, as a 
potential delivery arm of the NDB. The NCDH would work on a whole 
series of activities including driving down the cost of delivering heat. 
This would be the analogue of what has been achieved in offshore 
wind. As a benchmark of heating installation, the cost of heat pump 
installation for heat pump and thermal retrofit is £20,000 per house 
and 25 million homes, so of the order of £500 billion. An innovation 
programme which took just 10% off the installation costs would save 
£50 billion, which is a staggering amount and could be redeployed 
elsewhere in the energy system, or even in healthcare. The Midlands 
has the assets to lead decarbonisation of heat, since it is home to several 
major companies such as Worcester-Bosch, Baxi and Engie, state-of-the-
art manufacturing expertise through the Manufacturing Technology 
Centre, the Energy Systems Catapult, Energy Capital  
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and a powerful network of Midlands universities through the Energy 
Research Accelerator. These are some of the organisations which, along 
with the Green Finance Institute, are advocating the development of the 
National Hub for the Decarbonisation of Heat (NHDH).
Regional and national leadership in creating low-carbon heating 
solutions will provide massive economic potential for delivery of heating 
solutions and services to international markets. The BEIS clean growth 
transforming heating report identified an estimated £11 trillion of 
public and private investment will be required in the global energy 
sector, including heating, between 2015 and 2030 if the signatories to 
the Paris Agreement are to meet their national targets. Of this Ricardo 
Energy & Environment, in their work for the Committee on Climate 
Change, estimated the low carbon economy in the UK could grow 11% 
per year between 2015 and 2030, four times faster than the rest of the 
economy, and could deliver between £60 billion and £170 billion of 
export sales by 2030. 
The CBI have called this the decade of delivery. What this captures is 
that we have heat pumps, we have electric vehicles, we have wind and 
solar and we have large scale nuclear generation and we need to stop 
treading water and get on and deliver. However, the journey to low-
carbon heat is not going to be easy, it will require massive behavioural 
change and enormous national coordination. As such structures such 
as the proposed National Delivery Body and National Centre for the 
Decarbonisation of Heat will place an absolutely crucial role.
Martin Freer
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
1  Ricardo Energy and Environment for the Committee on Climate Change ( 2017 ) UK business opportunities 
of moving to a low-carbon economy ( supporting data tables ) www.theccc.org.uk/publication/uk-energy-
prices-and-bills-2017-report-supporting-research/.
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Energy from 
waste and the 
circular economy
In spring 2020, Birmingham Energy Institute and the Energy Research 
Accelerator released their policy commission report exploring how 
energy from waste (EfW) can be integrated into regional and national 
circular economy strategies, and setting out the economic and research 
opportunities for the Midlands. A series of roundtable events with 
national and regional politicians, industry, business and environmental 
stakeholders accompanied the launch. These provided opportunities 
for feedback on the report’s proposals and for exploring opportunities 
in both the East and West Midlands to develop systems thinking on 
EfW. One year on, in advance of COP26 in Glasgow, we reflect on the 
findings of the report and the current position of energy from waste in 
circular economy and net-zero strategies and policies. We alsoconsider 
the future opportunities for research and industrial engagement for the 
University of Birmingham.
The waste industry has long held that EfW is effectively carbon neutral 
because it displaces the production of greenhouse gas emission 
from landfilling waste (including the more potent GhG methane - 
approximately 30 times more harmful as a greenhouse gas than CO2) 
to produce a necessary resource - energy. However, this argument 
is increasingly hard to defend because the carbon intensity of grid 
electricity declines as more renewable generation is brought online. 
As our policy commission report argued, without capturing waste heat, 
which only 1 in 5 UK plants currently do, the carbon intensity of EfW 
is second only to coal combustion due to indiscriminate incineration 
of all waste at EfW facilities. In particular, the incineration of non-
biogenic waste, including large quantities of plastic, is where the 
landfill displacement argument really ‘breaks down’. From an emissions 
perspective, we would arguably do better to bury materials that don’t 
break down quickly rather than incinerating them in inefficient EfW 
plants. That said, one then needs to consider the leaching of  
those materials into the wider environment. 
This argument was central to the policy commission report and 
informed the following high level recommendations: Existing and new 
EfW plants should exploit waste heat potential in order to significantly 
reduce the carbon intensity of each unit of energy produced; there 
should be a focus on developing second-generation EfW technologies 
including AD, pyrolysis and gasification, which turn waste into 
molecules and products, as well as energy; there should be scaled-up 
roll out of, and further R&D into, small-scale carbon capture 
technologies that turn CO2 emissions from EfW into products. 
Politically, there is a challenge for local and regional authorities 
considering the role of EfW as part of their energy system, portfolio 
of energy assets, and zero-carbon circular economy strategy. As 
environmental campaigners and researchers reasonably point out, 
retaining, and possibly expanding, EfW facilities creates a demand for 
waste streams to incinerate and demotivates actions higher up the waste 
hierarchy to reduce, reuse, repair and recycle waste rather than using it 
for energy recovery. There is a reluctance within some local authorities 
to show an ongoing reliance on EfW to deal with household and 
commercial waste, though others such as Leeds and Nottingham City 
Council already have EfW as part of their energy strategy. In the West 
Midlands, the Combined Authority (WMCA) have initiated ‘Kickstarting 
the West Midlands’ Circular Economy’ to better understand the 
opportunities for developing a circular economy approach across the 
whole region. 
There is a potential opportunity to make EfW more circular as part of a 
heating decarbonisation strategy; heating accounts for around 40% of 
energy utilisation and one third of the UK’s carbon emissions. For areas 
of high population and building density, district heating is a preferred 
option. Many cities across the Midlands region have well-developed 
district heating schemes installed or planned. At the moment, most of 
these schemes are reliant on combined heat and power (CHP) plants, 
fuelled by natural gas. For district heating to be lower carbon and more 
sustainable, there is a need to transition from methane to hydrogen for 
heat and power generation, but most crucially, to also utilise waste heat 
from EfW plants. 
Using waste heat from existing and planned EfW facilities should be  
a priority in local governments’ planning and procurement processes. 
There are examples where this is happening: Coventry City Council 
have developed a scheme which transports heat from the EfW plant 
6.6 km to the city centre; in Stoke, they are developing a scheme which 
would combine EfW, geothermal and industrial waste heat. Progress has 
not been universal, as evidenced by the ongoing challenges integrating 
the Birmingham EfW plant at Tyseley into the city’s district heating 
system, where optimising energy recovery for both heat and power  
has not been incorporated into the procurement process for  
the future contract of the EfW plant. 
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This illustrates the competing challenges that local authorities wrestle 
with in setting priorities where net zero and energy efficiency, waste 
processing, and the circular economy are not considered holistically 
and decisions and operations remain siloed. The limited capacity of 
local government, due to the economies of austerity cuts, means that 
they have to prioritise the delivery of key services and have a reduced 
ability to deal with complex issues that cut across departments and 
political portfolios. There is a need for greater devolution to the 
regions of responsibility and resources to support the development of 
infrastructure that can simultaneously and synergistically evolve the 
circular economy and carbon reductions. The WMCA’s 5 year plan 
and the associated discussions linked to devolution provide a basis for 
creating the required platform at the regional level to develop and 
deliver a circular economy and net-zero plan across the West Midlands.
Even with better utilisation of the waste heat from EfW plants, there 
will continue to be questions about the sustainability of incineration for 
waste processing. Greater segregation of household and commercial 
food and organic waste will enable a reaccelerated roll out of anaerobic 
digestion and the production of biogas to displace natural gas. This may 
be an option for CHP plants, alongside the production of hydrogen 
using steam methane reforming as the hydrogen economy grows. The 
digestate from anaerobic digestion can also be used in the production 
of fertilizer in a process which captures CO2. In addition, the removal  
of the organic fraction from waste streams reduces the production  
of methane, which, from an emissions perspective, makes landfill  
more attractive. 
EfW clearly does have benefits, as outlined, 
if the energy potential is fully captured 
into the energy system. Increasingly, 
this means focussing on heat rather 
than electricity. However, for EfW 
to be fully circular efficient and 
affordable, carbon capture 
technology for EfW facilities 
and technologies will need 
to be developed. The recent 
announcement that Veolia 
will work with Carbon Clean 
to become the first UK 
operator of EfW facilities to 
demonstrate the latest carbon 
capture technology is an 
important development for the 
sustainability of this sector and 
the evolution of EfW towards  
zero carbon.
The UK Government’s Ten-Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution 
provided a strong vision towards net zero, with a heavy focus on 
hydrogen, nuclear, offshore wind, the natural environment and other 
key sectors. However, it is rather quiet on how to integrate the circular 
economy. As the Birmingham Energy Institute and Energy Research 
Accelerator’s Energy from Waste and the Circular Economy report identified, 
there are plenty of ways that the benefits of a circular economy can  
be integrated into energy systems, and indeed, would benefit the  
Ten-Point Plan. 
Production of hydrogen and substitute transport and aviation fuels 
are both possible from the processing of plastic, biomass and organic 
waste streams through pyrolysis and gasification processes. There 
are a number of companies who are scaling up the demonstration 
of such technologies, ensuring that they are both economically and 
commercially viable. Pyrolysis is a difficult process to manage due to the 
thermal environment required and the residues created. As a result, 
it has had a slightly tortuous journey to commercialisation. Even now, 
funding has typically been for the capital development of the plant, and 
has not extended to the operational costs of performing the extended 
validation tests required to de-risk the proposition for investors. This is 
a fundamental weakness in the UK’s approach to the transition of this 
sector and there is a risk that UK companies leading in this sector will 
not reach full commercialisation. One year on from the publication 
of the policy commission report, there remains a strong need for a 
national coordinated support programme for this sector to ensure that a 
key element of the circular economy and energy from waste is delivered.
 
Many of the benefits of integrating the circular economy and energy 
and fuels production can only be found through co-location of 
technologies, waste streams and consumers. The Resource Recovery 
Cluster (RRC) concept set out in the policy commission report shows 
how co-location means that the waste heat and gases from EfW processes 
can be inputs to other processes. They can also be maximised to be 
of greatest value in terms of energy vectors, whilst reducing the need 
for transportation and subsequent efficiency losses. There are several 
emerging examples of this type of synergistic operation. Tyseley Energy 
Park (TEP) has a biomass plant that gasifies waste wood, creating green 
electricity, which in turn is distributed on-site through a private wire. 
A low-carbon refuelling station at TEP has a 3 MW electrolyser for the 
production of hydrogen for vehicles, including a hydrogen bus fleet, 
powered using the green electricity. 
TEP is also the location for the Birmingham Energy Innovation Centre 
(BEIC) and a business incubation facility, which again can utilise the 
green electricity produced by the biomass plant. The BEIC will house 
a range of energy technology programmes including energy storage 
and hydrogen and fuel cells, and will provide a support platform for 
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a waste-to-fuels programme in collaboration with the Fraunhofer 
Institute. Another key research development at TEP is battery and 
magnets recycling, with University of Birmingham academics developing 
techniques for the recycling of electric vehicle lithium-ion batteries 
and rare earth element magnets from motors and wind turbines. 
The ability to integrate these research programmes in one place 
enables the exploitation of TEPs different energy vectors, including 
green electricity, heat and hydrogen. The business incubator will 
accommodate SMEs who are developing new energy or waste processing 
technologies. The site is growing organically into a RRC.
Post-industrial sites are ideal locations for RRCs. The policy commission 
focussed on East Midlands coal power stations nearing the end of 
their life, but with significant infrastructure, such as high-capacity 
grid connections, which could be redeployed and developed as RRCs. 
Ratcliffe-on-Soar is one such location and the site owners, Uniper, are 
currently looking into developing an ecosystem around an EfW plant 
that would include hydrogen production. This site is ideally located next 
to East Midlands airport, the M1 and M42 intersection and lies adjacent 
to the HS2 extension. The development is integrated into the plans of 
the East Midlands Development Corporation and links to the  
Freeport application. 
Locations such as Tyseley and Ratcliffe have the potential to transform 
the way the Midlands manages its resources, waste processing and 
energy production, creating ecosystems that support R&D, business 
growth and the commercialisation of innovative technologies, and 
with knock-on social, environmental and economic benefits for the 
surrounding area and communities. These sites can become beacons 
for the rest of the UK, showcasing how energy from waste can be fully 
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sustainable fuel
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In this discussion paper, we explore the potential of ‘green ammonia’ 
to not only decarbonise fertiliser production, but also pave the way for 
an environmentally cleaner energy system and facilitate our transition  
to a renewable energy-based global society.
Why do we need green ammonia?
Ammonia (NH3) – the major ingredient of agricultural fertilisers 
that helps feed nearly half the world’s population – is one of the most 
important chemicals for sustaining human life on the planet. However, 
its manufacture is responsible for around 2% of the global carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions, a greenhouse gas that is the primary driver 
of global climate change. Its carbon footprint per tonne is significantly 
higher than other high production volume chemicals. This is because 
the process currently relies on fossil fuel feedstocks. Therefore, a new 
‘green ammonia’ production process with net-zero carbon emissions 
needs to be implemented.
Ammonia is manufactured by reacting nitrogen and hydrogen gas 
together. As the most abundant gas in the atmosphere, nitrogen can 
be easily separated from air. Conversely, hydrogen does not occur 
naturally in substantial amounts and needs to be extracted from 
other sources. In current ammonia production, hydrogen is extracted 
from fossil fuels, with carbon dioxide as a by-product. Consequently, 
ammonia production cannot be decarbonised simply by transitioning 
the electricity grid to low-carbon energy. If we are to minimise the 
carbon footprint of ammonia production, there must be a transition 
towards green ammonia whereby hydrogen is generated from the use 
of renewable electricity to split water. In this way, green ammonia is 
manufactured from a feedstock comprising air, water and renewable 
electricity, making it an environmentally clean and  
widely-accessible process.


























Future Technology: Green Ammonia
Figure 1: A comparison of existing ammonia production with the green 
ammonia production process.
What are the opportunities for green 
ammonia use beyond fertilisers?
While the decarbonisation of ammonia production for fertilisers is 
already critical to meeting net-zero emissions targets, green ammonia 
also has immense potential to serve as a next-generation zero-carbon 
fuel. In this way, it represents a highly-flexible way of storing renewable 
energy and a key complementary technology to direct electrification. 
Ammonia is easily stored as a liquid using modest pressure or 
refrigeration; in this form, its energy density per unit volume is 
around 40% that of petrol. This makes it an attractive energy storage 
mechanism for long-duration energy storage or large amounts of 
energy, and a possible solution to the longstanding challenge  
of storing hydrogen cheaply.
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Transportation: Ammonia can be used directly as a fuel – burnt in 
an internal combustion engine – or ‘cracked’ to release its stored 
hydrogen to power electric cars, buses and trains. This flexible end-
use of ammonia has prompted serious consideration of its use in 
the transportation sector. The maritime industry, which currently 
relies almost exclusively on heavily polluting oil-based fuels is actively 
exploring the use of ammonia as a direct fuel. Critically, there is 
potential to retrofit existing two-stroke maritime engines for ammonia 
use, which provides a viable pathway to decarbonising long-lived 
shipping vessels. Furthermore, by circumventing the challenge of  
storing hydrogen in very-high-pressure tanks, ammonia may also  
provide a cost-effective refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen- 
powered vehicles.
Grid-balancing: The demand for electricity tends to fluctuate 
throughout a day, and across different seasons in a year. In the UK, 
for example, energy demand increases by around one third during 
the winter months. The electricity distribution grid must be able to 
respond to these varying demands. In a renewables-based grid, this is 
challenging because of the inherent intermittency of solar and wind 
power. Consequently, energy storage technologies are indispensable 
to the smooth functioning of power distribution networks, storing 
energy during times of excess, ready to use when demand outstrips 
supply. A chemical fuel like ammonia, with high energy density and 
straightforward storage requirements, is well placed as a long-duration 
energy store, complementing the rapid response which can be 
achieved with batteries and pumped hydro.
Renewable energy commodity: The cost of renewable electricity now 
largely depends on the quality of the wind/solar resource. However, 
connecting remote areas with outstanding renewable energy resources 
to markets looking for cheaper energy is a key challenge when it 
comes to take advantage of those cost variations. Unlike hydrogen, 
which is also actively explored as an energy store, ammonia does not 
need to be stored under very high pressures or very low temperatures, 
leading to lower transport costs. Furthermore, being an already widely 
manufactured industrial chemical, a robust global ammonia distribution 
infrastructure at the megatonne scale is already in place, which can be 
harnessed to unlock the enormous potential of this market. Because 
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Figure 2: Ammonia: key facts
Where are the applications of green 
ammonia being demonstrated?
The diverse applications of green ammonia, as outlined above, have 
evolved beyond the stage of conceptualisation, with several pilot-scale 
demonstrations now being reported:
• MAN Energy Solutions has released plans for a commercially-available
two-stroke engine running on ammonia by 2024, and a retrofit
package for existing vessels the following year.
• A consortium led by Siemens built the Green Ammonia
Demonstrator, based at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the
UK, which is one of the first systems to demonstrate the viability of
small-scale green ammonia production and the full cycle of power-
ammonia-power.
• Yara, one of the world’s leading fertiliser companies, has partnered
with ENGIE to test green hydrogen technology for ammonia
manufacture in their facility in Western Australia. In the same region,
the ‘Asian Renewable Energy Hub’ project, which began in 2014,
continues to make rapid progress. The 26 GW renewable energy
project will include an annual green ammonia production capacity of
nearly 10 million tonnes, and would approximately double Australia’s
installed renewable electricity capacity in a single project.
• In the Netherlands, Yara has teamed up with Ørsted, a renowned
offshore wind developer, with the aim of manufacturing 75000 tonnes
of green ammonia per year. Companies like Haldor Topsoe and
Maersk have also recently unveiled plans for green ammonia projects.
• Air Products has partnered with the Saudi Arabian Government to
announce a 4 GW solar project at NEOM which will produce
green ammonia.
By no means do the projects cited above constitute an exhaustive 
list of green ammonia projects worldwide, yet they illustrate the 
growing global interest in the technology, which has now started to 
reverberate in government policies too. The Japanese Ministry for 
Economy, Trade and Industry’s roadmap for fuel ammonia targets 
green ammonia imports of 3 Mt by 2030 to support co-firing in power 
plants and shipping fuels, increasing to 30 Mt by 2050. While the Indian 
Government is set to invite bids for green ammonia projects in 2021, the 
German Government is financing a feasibility study into ammonia-based 
hydrogen transport as part of its ambition to invest 9 billion euros in 
green hydrogen for industrial use. Likewise, the Canadian Government 
recently led the development of a hydrogen strategy for the country, 
which integrates aspects of green ammonia to achieve net-zero emissions 
by 2050. 
What challenges need to be overcome?
Notwithstanding the appreciable technological progress and increasing 
governmental policy focus on green ammonia, there are a few key 
barriers that must be overcome for the technology to become a 
prominent strategy in the pursuit of decarbonisation. The first of these 
challenges is posed by the ‘scale’ on which green ammonia would 
need to be manufactured. The current annual global production of 
‘brown’ ammonia is over 175 million metric tonnes. This capacity, 
which primarily caters for the production of fertilisers, might 
appear to be significant; however, in order to decarbonise maritime 
transportation alone, replacing the energy content from existing fuels 
would require almost all of the current global ammonia production 
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volume. Therefore, green ammonia would need to be manufactured 
in substantially larger quantities, and this would possibly require the 
proliferation of small-scale production facilities that have good access to 
renewable electricity to complement the traditional, centralised, large-
scale nature of ammonia manufacture. 
Given the urgency to decarbonise, the deployment of green ammonia 
production would need to be achieved in a relatively short timeframe. 
Encouragingly, much of the necessary technology exists to be able to 
begin this transition. What is needed now is support for projects which 
combine these existing technologies to the green ammonia supply 
chain: demonstrating the viability of green ammonia production, 
direct ammonia fuel in combustion engines and gas turbines, and 
ammonia cracking units which can supply high-purity hydrogen for 
fuel cell vehicles. There will be immense downward pressure on the 
cost of the final energy delivered, particularly if green ammonia 
contributes to decarbonising heat and grid-balancing applications. 
Efforts to produce technologies which integrate different energy 
storage processes to improve overall efficiency should be prioritised. 
Public and private support for these projects, including through the
use of subsidy schemes such as those which have so effectively 
promoted the deployment of wind and solar energy, will help drive 
down costs and meet the challenging pace of transition required. 
Similarly, implementing accredited standards for the carbon footprint
of fertilisers and fuels derived from ammonia may help generate 
a consumer drive for sustainable ammonia products.
While ammonia’s potential contributions as a zero-carbon fuel are 
clear, its corrosive nature and the toxic impacts of its uncontrolled 
release into the environment must be considered in any expanded use. 
Efforts to minimise excess nitrogen release through the use of fertilisers 
remain a critical environmental stewardship focus. In contrast to use 
in agriculture, the uses of ammonia as a sustainable fuel would only be 
designed to release harmless nitrogen gas back into the environment. 
The existing safe practices for handling and transporting ammonia 
can be readily applied to these new contexts. Nevertheless, appropriate 
regulations from governments which enable the use of ammonia in 
energy applications, but also ensure safety and minimise any emissions 
of ammonia or nitrogen oxides must be developed. 
Of course, research and development focused on improving the 
economic competitiveness of green ammonia will be critical. Scientists 
in academia and industry continue to work on these aspects. These 
include initiatives such as developing improved catalysts for ammonia 
production and cracking, entirely new paradigms for ammonia 
production directly from air and water, as well as better process 
integration. For example, there are potential synergies between 
different energy storage technologies, such as liquid air energy  
storage and green ammonia production, which may improve  
overall cost and efficiency.
There is also a clear argument for extensive public outreach for the 
concept of green ammonia. For instance, the substantial carbon 
footprint of agricultural produce that the general population consumes 
often gets overlooked. With regards to next-generation transportation, 
electric vehicles have become a topic of active discussion in the public 
domain, and so has green hydrogen as an alternative fuel.  
 
It is important that green ammonia now enters this conversation more 
prominently. Besides educating the general public about ammonia’s 
potential to be a transportation fuel, such a discussion will also  
allow addressing public perceptions of the risks associated with  
using ammonia.
Summary
Green ammonia has enormous potential in the grand global challenge 
of decarbonisation. The technology will continue to help us feed the 
world’s growing population but at much lower environmental impact. 
By virtue of being a hydrogen and energy store, ammonia can feature 
in wide-ranging applications, including being used as a transportation 
fuel and for grid balancing. Despite numerous demonstration projects 
being underway, there are several barriers that currently preclude 
the manufacture and use of green ammonia on a global scale. 
Overcoming these barriers will require government initiatives and 
public engagement to complement R&D efforts. Meeting the world’s 
increasing energy needs and reducing carbon emissions do not need 
to be mutually exclusive, and green ammonia shows that both these 
demands can be met. The versatility of green ammonia to be an 
alternate technology in many of the leading carbon-intensive sectors 
makes a stronger case for a greater dialogue among policy makers and 
the general public. The mission of achieving net-zero emissions by 
2050 is highly challenging but one that is essential. And without green 
ammonia being deployed on a large scale, succeeding in this global 
mission will be all the more difficult.     
Manoj Ravi, 
Yulong Ding and 
Josh Makepeace
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From the Paris Agreement in 2015 to the agenda for the upcoming 
COP26 in November, there is a growing consensus that to resolve 
the climate emergency means making net-zero emissions a priority 
at international, national, and local levels. Governments, academia, 
emissions experts and businesses are all working on solutions that will 
help balance the amount of global greenhouse gas (GHG) produced 
and the amount removed so that overall emissions are ‘net-zero’. 
For example, the UK was the world’s first major economy to pass 
net-zero emissions into law by 2050. And in 2020, the UK government 
published its ten-point net-zero emissions strategy, which included plans 
to accelerate the shift to net-zero emission vehicles (EVs), ban sales of 
petrol and diesel cars, and decarbonise the transport sector by 2030. 
However, the systemic adoption of zero-emission technologies has 
created a significant shift in demand for natural resources, causing 
many cross-boundary sustainability issues within the value chain of 
the manufacturers of these technologies. The mining of critical raw 
minerals required for electric vehicle batteries, for example, damages 
the livelihoods of people living in nearby communities, causing water 
stress and scarcity, environmental pollution and issues of forced labour.  
Where we are now
Given these problems, any responsible business model needs a detailed 
understanding of the sustainability footprint of its value chain, including 
all three GHG emissions scopes. Scope 1 emissions are direct from 
a company’s operations, and scope 2 are indirect emissions from 
purchased energy. Scope 3 are divided into upstream emissions that are 
from a company’s purchased goods, supply chain, employee travel etc., 
and downstream emissions from the processing and use of a company’s 
products after the sale. 
Setting ambitious targets is one thing and delivering against them 
is another. Unfortunately, at the moment, net-zero emissions is a 
nebulously defined concept and many companies still only account 
for scope 1 emissions direct from their operations. There is currently 
no shared pathway for businesses to align with the Paris Agreement to 
limit global warming to 1.5 by 2030, considering a company’s entire 
value and supply chain emissions. Likewise, there is a lack of accounting 
mechanisms that incorporate a circular economy approach necessary 
to evaluate the GHG emissions and sustainability impacts of different 
global value chains.
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Most policy and regulatory frameworks underplay the essential role of 
accounting in achieving a circular economy (CE) and the global shift 
to net-zero emissions. Using a CE accounting approach can reduce the 
negative impacts of silo and linear thinking, open up new possibilities 
for transitioning to a net-zero economy, and help a business manage 
its value chain as a series of interrelated activities that positively and 
negatively affect each other. It also allows for a fuller representation  
of a business’ production and consumption value chains and how  
they relate to individuals and institutions.
Like in natural ecosystems, waste is reused and regenerated in a 
continuous loop in a CE model, helping a business identify how  
and where to use resources more efficiently and effectively. But a CE 
approach won’t automatically result in the most sustainable solutions 
for manufacturers of net-zero emissions technologies unless their 
accountants and sustainability experts map the entire product value 
chain and its global sustainability impacts across different sectors  
in their decision-making processes. 
Where we want to go
Suppose a mass transition to EVs is key to helping the world deliver on 
the climate change commitments in the Paris Agreement and tackle 
air pollution from road transport. In that case, mechanisms must be 
developed capable of monitoring and addressing the EV industry’s 
impacts across different sectors – from the mining of raw minerals for 
making batteries to the use of renewable energy for customers charging 
them from the grid. 
The first stage in this process is to analyse GHG emissions for the 
industry across all three scopes, identifying which activities are core and 
have the most significant impact on emissions. Secondly, by undertaking 
what’s called a ‘nexus analysis’, you can map all the relevant flows of 
the materials and resources used in EV production and consumption – 
from initial extraction to end-of-life disposal – showing where mining, 
cleaner energy and EVs structurally intersect each other. It’s at these 
intersections where critical decisions, conflicts and potential changes 
are most likely to occur. 
Understanding where different institutions are positioned relative 
to these critical intersections will provide valuable insights into their 
dependencies, powers and agency to transform the value chain of any 
net-zero technology. For instance, the mass adoption of EVs will require 
a substantial increase in the mining of cobalt, manganese, nickel and 
copper, and investments in charging infrastructure and renewable 
energy sources. Therefore, a CE accounting model will need to consider 
all these different upstream relationships in the EV global value chain 
and attempt to geographically unbundle and holistically remodel them 
as part of a broader industrial ecosystem.
Without this kind of CE accounting and nexus analysis, there is a real 
risk that the transition to net-zero emissions required by the Paris 
Agreement could, in fact, end up adversely impacting human rights, 
the natural environment, climate change, air pollution and local 
communities within the value chain of net-zero technology companies. 
That’s why this approach must be encouraged and formalised in 
policies, frameworks and international charters for net-zero emissions. 
And new digital technologies, like Blockchain and life cycle assessment 
mechanisms such as ISO 14040:2006, are already helping provide better 
tracking and verification of materials within a circular economy to help 
monitor supply chains labour issues and account for carbon emissions 
from all relevant processes following a product entire life cycle.
Ultimately, this way of circular thinking can help transform the current 
problems of net-zero emissions transition planning and management 
into opportunities to address a whole range of underlying and 
interconnected social, technological, ethical, environmental and 
political issues that will benefit the entire COP 26 agenda  
for a more resilient and sustainable world.
Nana O Bonsu 
and Ian Thomson
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 




04 Clean transport72 Addressing the climate challenge
Clean air: 
bringing local 
synergies to the 
global climate 
challenge
William Bloss, Joe Acton and Jian Zhong Clean Air: bringing local synergies to the global  
climate challenge
“Clean Air”, measures to reduce carbon emissions, clean air zones, 
electric vehicles, net zero, global warming – this now-familiar 
terminology is often conflated in public understanding and sometimes 
mixed up in policy ambitions, obscuring valuable co-benefits from what 
should be complementary strategies. 
This is not just semantics: there are many policy win-wins between 
climate and air pollution measures, but also some tensions – and these 
benefits and tensions arise differently geographically, and hence, 
electorally. For many air pollutants, changes in local behaviour deliver 
local air quality improvements and hence improve the health of 
the local population – while tackling the climate challenge requires 
reductions in the growth of global carbon dioxide concentrations.
Recent polling by Climate Outreach revealed that 87% of people 
were very or somewhat worried about climate change, with 50 - 94% 
of respondents accepting that climate change was “real and caused by 
human action”. However, significant proportions (up to 40%) felt that 
we should “focus on protecting the environment at home”, rather than 
global engagement. Importantly, there is a strong correlation between 
the groups which are least engaged with the climate challenge, and 
those who support a local focus for environmental improvement. 
Being clear over the distinctions and complementarities between 
climate change and air pollution allows us to prioritise the biggest 
policy wins overall, and can make behaviour change more relevant to 
the communities involved and impacted, increasing their agency and 
engagement. Here we unpick the distinction between climate and air 
pollution, and their contrasting geographies of effect. We illustrate the 
scope for regional policy win-wins focussing upon transport measures in 
the West Midlands.
Climate change: mostly global
Climate change – the increase in global mean temperatures, changes 
in weather patterns, and ocean acidification – is primarily driven by 
increasing concentrations of long-lived greenhouse gases, of which 
carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important. “Long lived” here means 
that carbon dioxide lasts for many years in the atmosphere (more 
precisely, whilst the carbon is cycling between the atmosphere, oceans 
and biosphere). Carbon dioxide mixes around the planet through the 
atmosphere, and carbon dioxide levels in the air above Birmingham are 
similar to those above Beijing and above Bermuda – the atmospheric 
levels reflect integrated global emissions. 
Climate policy related to carbon dioxide is a global challenge, requiring 
international approaches such as the Paris Agreement and COP26. 
The environmental science reality is that individual countries or cities 
cannot control the CO2 levels in their atmospheres – or the climate 
change they will experience – through national actions alone.
This framing of the climate challenge as a tragedy-of-the-commons 
issue, with narratives of intergenerational and geopolitical inequity 
tensioned against (near-term) economic cost has hindered progress and 
public (and hence political) palatability of action. Why should I change 
my lifestyle to reduce emissions, at cost to me, when my geopolitical 
neighbour isn’t doing the same? This narrative can change when we 
consider air pollutants species which are present in the air at levels 
harmful to human or environmental health (carbon dioxide is not 
directly harmful to health at the levels usually encountered in  
outside air).
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The Air We Breathe
In urban environments, the key air pollutants driving health impacts 
are fine particles suspended in air, and nitrogen dioxide gas (NO2). 
Airborne particles include PM2.5 – the fraction of particulate matter 
(PM) less than 2.5 micrometres in diameter, around 1/50th the width 
of a human hair, small enough to be inhaled into our lungs. In the UK, 
the combined effects of long-term exposure to nitrogen dioxide and PM
cause 24-36,000 excess deaths each year, and air pollution was recently 
identified as a material cause of death for the first time in a Coroner’s 
Report, in the case of 9-year-old Ella Adoo-Kissi-Debra.
The dominant source of nitrogen dioxide in urban environments is 
local road traffic exhaust emissions – especially from older and diesel 
vehicles – with smaller contributions from industry, power generation 
and other activities. The main PM emission sources are combustion – 
domestic solid fuel combustion, industrial combustion, road transport 
(exhaust and non-exhaust) and industrial processes, alongside 
agriculture and natural components. A significant proportion of PM 
is formed in the atmosphere from gases, which, in turn, derive largely 
from road transport, power generation and industrial combustion.
There is therefore very strong overlap between many of the sources  
of air pollution (i.e. combustion) and of anthropogenic carbon 
emissions (i.e. fossil fuel combustion). 
 
Air pollution: all politics is local
However, the geography of air pollution differs: atmospheric chemistry 
removes nitrogen dioxide from the air, on a timescale of 12-24 hours. If 
we reduce traffic emissions in a given city, nitrogen dioxide levels in that 
city will fall, and health benefits to the local population will result. To 
use the example above, Birmingham can improve its air quality without 
needing action in Beijing, or in Bermuda. Airborne particles last a little 
longer – they are removed by processes like rainfall and deposition 
to surfaces, and persist for a few days in the lower atmosphere – so a 
regional-to-national approach is needed.
This means that local, regional and national action to tackle many key 
carbon emissions – e.g. fossil fuel combustion for heating, industry, 
power and transport – also address many of the dominant local and 
regional air pollution sources. As the air pollutants have much shorter 
lifetimes, local changes leading to reductions in their local emissions 
give rise to lower local concentrations and improved health outcomes 
for the local population – a subtly different proposition to  
encourage action.
Transparent communication of the air quality benefits from climate / 
net zero measures can increase the support for difficult policy choices, 
and more accurately account for the secondary benefits that many 
such measures have. While formal methods exist to account for the air 
quality co-benefits of carbon emissions reductions, there is limited wider
appreciation of the distinction between the climate and air pollution 
geographies. Indeed, images of cooling towers (releasing water vapour, 
i.e. harmless clouds) are recurrent in news stories regarding air




Surveys have found that air pollution concerns resonate, and images 
of air pollution have been found to be the most effective in visually 
communicating the health impacts of climate change; – 75 % of 
respondents say that air pollution was the climate impact they felt they 
could do most about personally – compared to, for example, 6 % in the 
case of floods. However, quantifying the air quality / climate interactions 
can be challenging.
In the West Midlands, the University of Birmingham’s WM-Air project1 
has been working with the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) 
to quantify and illustrate the air-quality co-benefits of net zero policy 
options, aligned with the WMCA’s commitment to achieve net zero by 
2041. A key aspect of regional decarbonisation is transport strategy, 
including bus, car and light vehicle electrification – as transport 
accounts for 36% of West Midlands carbon emissions. In parallel, many 
areas in the region experience elevated nitrogen dioxide concentrations 
(leading to significant health and economic impacts, outlined in a 
recent CBI report, and driving policy responses such as the Birmingham 
Clean Air Zone).
1  WM-Air is a five-year project programme of activities to apply the latest research science to deliver regional 
impact - in societal, economic and policy terms - in support of improved air quality and health across the West 
Midlands.  WM-Air is led by the University of Birmingham, funded by the UK Natural Environment Research 
Council, and delivered through a portfolio of projects with external partners.
Financial support from NERC (NE/S003487/1) and the University of Birmingham Institute for Global Innovation.
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Here we show the air quality co-benefit for an achievable vehicle 
electrification scenario, focussing on service vehicles. If the region’s 
buses were electrified, and 50 % of light delivery vehicles converted to 
electric, the WM-Air air quality model predicts reductions in annual 
mean nitrogen dioxide concentrations of 15 – 35 g m-3, or 20-35 %, 
could be achieved. These results probably underestimate the air quality 
benefits, as the light delivery fleet has expanded significantly with final-
mile-delivery of online shopping during Covid.
Impact of bus electrification + 50% light vehicle electrification (total 
traffic levels unchanged) on annual mean nitrogen dioxide concentrations 
across the West Midlands. Upper panel: Reduction in annual mean 
nitrogen dioxide; Lower panel: percentage change vs Business-as-Usual 
scenario. We assume no impact of the power generation source, i.e. 
remote or renewable electricity generation.
William Bloss, 
Joe Acton and 
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A more complex picture
We have highlighted one aspect of the air quality-climate interchange, 
emphasising the local pay-off in terms of air pollution and health from 
actions which effectively tackle the climate challenge. There are many 
more nuances to this story – some of which represent policy tensions 
rather than win-wins (for example, diesel vehicles typically have lower 
carbon emissions than their gasoline equivalents, but higher air 
pollution emissions) and which are detailed elsewhere.
Further exploration of scenarios such as that shown above can unpick 
issues of environmental equity and justice. In the example above, 
focussing on bus route electrification tends to concentrate the air 
pollution reduction benefits to areas of the highest population density; 
prioritising light delivery vehicles achieves an even greater reduction 
in exposure – but lower gains for the most polluted locations which 
tend to correlate with the most disadvantaged communities. The air 
pollution co-benefit from climate policy can then become a measure of 
policy prioritisation, a tool for local environmental improvement, and a 
mechanism addressing local environmental health inequalities.
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within the  
railway sector
Extreme weather impacts railway operations causing damage and 
disruption for passengers. As railway infrastructure (e.g. bridges, 
embankments) is often longlife (50+ years), it must be resilient to 
current weather and future climate to enable safe and efficient railway 
operations. Under the Climate Change Act, Network Rail are mandated 
to assess their weather and climate resilience, and in 2020 provided 
their second iteration of plans. This article will examine the efficacy 
of these new Weather Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation 
plans against international best practice, and offer recommendations 
on how Network Rail and the broader transport sector can embed 
climate adaptation within business as usual. It will present a globally 
leading framework for climate adaptation that enables any organisation, 
regardless of its size or climate preparedness to begin the process of 
adapting to climate change.
Victorian infrastructure and  
climatechange
If you travel from Bristol Temple Meads to London Paddington 
along the Great Western Railway, your journey will take you through 
Box Hill Tunnel (originally the world’s longest railway tunnel), over 
Maidenhead Railway Bridge (Figure 1), on a route that was designed 
and constructed by the famous Victorian engineer, Isambard Kingdom 
Brunel between 1830 and 1850. This historic infrastructure predates 
climate change, and during its construction in preindustrial times, the 
annual mean UK temperature was approximately 1°C cooler than in the 
recent decade. 
Despite the many declarations of climate emergencies, and current 
climate pledges and policies to achieve net-zero, global temperatures 
are likely to be 2°C warmer by 2100. A global warming of more than 
1.5°C as compared to pre-industrial levels is associated with the more 
dangerous impacts of climate change, such as increased frequency of 
extreme weather and greater sea level rise. UK Climate Projections 
show that in the future, the UK will have hotter, drier summers and 
milder, wetter winters. Extreme weather, such as heavy rainfall events 
or hot summer temperatures are becoming more frequent. Summers 
like 2018 could happen every other year by 2050. Within this general 
pattern of climate change there are regional variations; for example, the 
greatest summer temperature increases and summer rainfall reductions 
are projected for southern England. Extreme temperatures can cause 
assets to overheat and become unreliable and heavy rainfall can lead 
to flooding, landslips, or material washout onto tracks. Slower changes, 
such as the increased desiccation of clay soil embankments due to hotter 
drier summers can impact slope stability or track geometry. Sea level rise 
towards the end of the century may lead to closure or rerouting of  
some of our coastal railway sections, as the annual cost impact of  
coastal flooding and storm surges make existing routes no longer 
operationally viable.
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As such, infrastructure operators and owners such as Network Rail must 
adapt to a changing climate. The railway network is integral to modern 
society, and weather-related disruption causes wider socio-economic 
impacts. For example, the closure of the Devon coastal railway line for 
two months following storm damage at Dawlish in 2014 is estimated 
to have cost the local economy up to £1.2 billion. Many of us have 
stories of long journeys home following “no trains north from Euston” 
or a “bus replacement services between Oxenholme and Edinburgh 
Waverly”. Most seriously, weather damage to railway infrastructure has 
the potential to cause derailment and loss of life as in the Stonehaven 
tragedy 2020, when heavy rainfall was linked to the washout of stones 
onto the railway line. 
Adapting our railway infrastructure is no easy task; the railway network 
is composed of many different assets of different ages and lifespans, 
which are vulnerable to different types of weather, and are located in 
different parts of the country with different geography and geology 
that experience different types of weather and extreme weather, and 
different future climate change.
Weather resilience and climate change 
adaptation (WRCCA) at Network Rail
Under the Adaptation Reporting Power (ARP) set out in the 2008 
Climate Change Act 2008, the Secretary of State can request that 
infrastructure operators such as Network Rail report on how they are 
addressing current and future climate impacts. This feeds into the 
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, and the National Adaptation 
Programme. Although the process is not currently mandatory, Network 
Rail have committed to reporting on their progress and action via the 
five-yearly ARP process, supported by information and evidence  
from their Weather Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation 
(WRCCA) strategy. 
Network Rail are implementing their WRCCA strategy through eight 
Route level action plans, where a ‘Route’ is a Network Rail area of 
operation such as the ‘Southeast’ or ‘Northwest and Central’. This 
regionalised approach helps to address the differences in geology, 
geography and regional climate across Great Britain. The first iteration 
of the Route WRCCA plans were produced in 2014 (for the 2014-
19 period), and these were updated around 2020 for the 2019-2024 
planning period. Each WRCCA plan follows the same format for a 
particular route. The plan initially describes the geography and climate 
of the Route, to undertake a vulnerability assessment of the Route to 
current and future weather. For example, it considers how weather, 
such as maximum temperature, or the consequences of weather, such 
as increased river flows linked to increased rainfall, will change in the 
future, along that particular Route (Figure 2). Information on climate 
change and changing river flows are provided by the Met Office and 
Environment Agency. The following impact assessment outlines how 
weather and future climate change can impact different types of assets, 
such as track, signalling, or buildings. Past performance measured 
using delay to schedule information (Figure 3) is used to attribute 
delay minutes and delay costs (the compensation paid out to delayed 
passengers) to different types of weather along that particular Route. 
This quantifies the impact of different types of weather or weather 
hazard for different years and different Routes. Finally, each plan 
outlines a series of actions to improve the resilience of the Route to 
weather and climate, and the investment available for the planning 
period. These might include ‘hard’ adaptation actions, such as asset 
renewals or repairs, or ‘soft’ adaptation options such as liaising with 
other stakeholders such as the Environment Agency to reduce  
flood risk. 
Climate resilience and adaptation 
on the global scale
Railway infrastructure often has a lifespan of multiple decades. Globally, 
the climate is changing, and extreme weather and linked hazards such 
as wildfires and flooding are increasing. It is therefore imperative that 
railway organisations embed climate adaptation within their business 
as usual for failure to consider climate change can lead to increased 
costs or delays in the future. Indeed, the European Union Climate 
Change Adaptation strategy requires infrastructure operators to 
undertake resilience assessments as a condition of receiving funding 
from the European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund. 
For example, in Slovakia, climate change risks and vulnerabilities were 
considered in the modernisation of a key passenger and freight railway 
corridor. This example and others are shared in the EU Climate-Adapt 
portal which features more than 100 case studies of adaptation from 
across Europe. Both SNCF (France) and Deutsche Bahn (Germany) 
have high-level strategies for climate change adaptation. 
In order to support sector-wide adaptation to climate change, the Rail 
Adapt project led by Birmingham Centre for Railway Research and 
Education (BCRRE) for the International Union of Railways (UIC) 
collaborated with global transport stakeholders to develop a framework 
for climate change adaptation that can be used by any organisation, 
regardless of its current level of climate change awareness (Figure 4). 
The two-sided framework comprises an adaptation strategy and an 
implementation plan. The process is circular and iterative which is 
crucial to incorporate new information and change. This could include 
new climate information (climate projections evolve in detail and 
precision), changes to resilience (assets are renewed, assets deteriorate, 
hazards change), or organisational change (changes to governance or 
company structure). The Rail Adapt Framework also encourages links 
with stakeholders, in different parts of the same organisations, and in 
other sectors. Railway infrastructure rarely operates in isolation, and has 
interdependencies with the energy sector, who provide power for railway 
operations, and the ICT sector (Information and Communications 
Technology) who enable communications. Infrastructure is only as 
strong as its weakest link, and failure at a critical node, sometimes 
referred to as a “single point of failure” can lead to cascade failures 
across multiple infrastructure sectors. For example, the flooding of  
an electricity supply substation in Lancaster in December 2015 left the  
city without power for over 30 hours and affected all critical 
infrastructure including road and rail transport, ICT, water supply,  
and emergency services. 
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Next steps for Network Rail 
A comparison of the WRCCA plans with the Rail Adapt framework 
shows that Network Rail are making good progress at embedding 
climate adaptation within their business as usual. The WRCCA plans 
include many core adaptation concepts, such as identifying hazards, 
vulnerabilities, and losses, and generating action plans. Our research 
with transport operators indicates that Network Rail are leading the 
way globally, and that the WRCCA plans should be considered an 
international example of current best practice in this area. However, 
in this developing area of infrastructure adaptation to climate change 
there are opportunities to improve and refine the process. A recent 
review by BCRRE and Climate Sense highlighted two key areas  
where the WRCCA plans can be improved, ultimately to increase  
railway resilience. 
Firstly, future iterations of the WRCCA plans should broader in scope 
and consider interdependencies and interacting risks with other 
sectors (such as energy supply), and greater extremes of weather 
and longer-term climate change, including high-level low-probability 
climate change. This would require greater collaboration with external 
stakeholders such as local authorities and flood resilience groups at 
Route-level to support the WRCCA plan development process, but also 
at a strategic level to align climate resilience agendas across the UK. 
Network Rail are a member of the Infrastructure Operators Adaptation 
Forum, an interdisciplinary UK-wide group that facilitates knowledge 
exchange between senior professionals working in this area, across 
multiple sectors including national and regional government, to 
share tacit knowledge provide a collaborative approach to adaptation. 
Network Rail should also incorporate high-level low-probability climate 
change, or so called ‘worst-case’ scenarios within their adaptation 
planning, not least as this is the current government recommendation 
for sea-level rise. 
Secondly, the implementation of the WRCCA plans requires further 
development to provide greater clarity on option analysis and 
governance, and to demonstrate line of sight from adaptation needs 
to asset management. All WRCCA plans provide options to improve 
resilience, but the rationale behind the prioritisation could be clearer 
and more consistent. Moreover, following the recent organisational 
restructure at Network Rail the ownership of the WRCCA plans needs 
to be restated. More generally, the organisation of investment and 
planning into five year blocks (known as Control Periods) disconnects 
with the longer-term view required for effective adaptation. Adaptation 
pathways, a means by which to plan for long-term change but prioritise 
short term needs are a potential way forward.
These suggestions for Network Rail improvement highlight the 
importance of the circular approach to adaptation shown by the Rail 
Adapt framework that allows for changes to become incorporated  
within adaptation.
Conclusions
The Great Western Railway, with its historic Brunel engineering serves as 
a useful reminder of the longevity of our railway infrastructure, and the 
need for long-term infrastructure adaptation planning. It also predates 
climate change, and as such was designed for a climate that no longer 
exists. The Great Western Railway and similar Victorian infrastructure 
are poignant reminders of how quickly rapid industrialisation produced 
the carbon emissions that changed our climate. 
Today, the railway infrastructure is the backbone of modern society, 
transporting people and freight around the country. It is an important 
part of climate mitigation and efforts to meet net-zero by 2050 because 
rail travel produces far less carbon emissions than travel by private car. 
The railway network must also be resilient to future weather and climate 
change. The adaptation challenge facing Network Rail is clear. Weather-
related railway disruption must be minimised to reduce socio-economic 
impacts, but the size, range, and geographic distribution of the railway 
network (i.e. the very same things that make it backbone of public 
transport) make this a complex task. That said, Network Rail are leading 
the way in embedding climate change adaptation as part of business as 
usual in the rail sector. 
Figure 1: J.M.W. Turner’s 1844 painting entitled Rain, Steam 
and Speed shows an early steam train crossing the recently 
completed Maidenhead Bridge. The original painting is now in the 
collection of the National Gallery, London. National Gallery file
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Figure 2: The change in daily maximum temperature for the West 
Midlands regions for 3 different time slices as determined from the 
RCP6.0 90th percentile. This graph forms part of the vulnerability 
assessment for the West Coast Mainline between London Euston and 
Birmingham and is taken from the Northwest and Central Route weather 
resilience plans 2019 – 2024 produced by Network Rail. For original 
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Figure 3: The delay minutes attributed to different weather types for the 
Northwest and Central Route that includes the West Coast Mainline 
between London Euston and Birmingham between 2006 and 2019. 
Image taken from the Northwest and Central Route weather resilience 
plans 2019 – 2024 produced by Network Rail.
Figure 4: The Rail Adapt framework for climate change adaptation. From 
Quinn et al, 2019.
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or trouble for 
climate change?
Since the Industrial Revolution, the amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions has risen exponentially due to the expansion of business 
sectors, transportation, households, and human activities – causing 
extreme climate change across the globe. The crisis brings with it 
negative social impacts such as natural disasters, animal extinctions, 
human ill health, and shrinking food supplies. To deal with this global 
warming issue, the Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature 
rises to below 1.5oC compared to pre-industrial levels. In order to 
minimise the impacts of climate change, various international policies 
have been put forward; for example, Greenpeace has long advocated 
for substituting coal, oil and gas with other greener and cleaner forms 
of energy. In addition, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) has 
been involved in global, regional and national projects aimed at tacklin 
climate change. 
According to the global CO2 emission data, almost one-quarter of total 
emissions stem from the transport sectors. Transportation has become 
a fundamental necessity for getting to work, for leisure and so on. We 
see some cities taking innovative approaches to encourage people to use
public transport to reduce their carbon footprint rather than using thei
own cars. For instance, Washington DC’s regional government suggeste
their residents comply with car-free days in three ways: work from home 
or outside their regular workplaces, use public transport or ride-share.
Nevertheless, the reduction in emissions from transport has become  
a challenging and urgent issue for researchers and engineers across  
all transportation sectors; with the most appropriate strategies  





Compared to other transportation modes, railways make a small 
contribution to total emissions (4.2%), whereas the emissions from 
roads, where most users have their own vehicle, comes in at 72.6%. 





The share of CO2 emission from each mode of transportation (Source: 
UIC, 2017)
The seamless and broad connection between public transportation 
modes has become the key enabler of mobility in developed and 
developing countries. Multimodal transport hubs have been built 
up in many countries such as China, Singapore, and the USA. These 
hubs aim to increase cross-mobility by generating sustainable offsets 
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in communities where there are fewer cars, resulting in a reduction in 
the transport sector’s carbon footprint. Some studies have compared 
the emission rate of each transportation mode in European countries. 
The findings showed that high-speed rail (HSR) has the lowest emission 
at 17 gCO2 per passenger kilometre (pkm); whereas, private cars and 
aeroplanes emit 30 and 153 gCO2 per pkm, respectively. This implies 
that HSR yields the lowest emissions, six times less than private car. 
However, convincing people to take HSR services instead of a private 






















Comparison of the amount of CO2 emissions of HSR with other modes of 
transportation in the EU (Source: UIC, 2017)
To reduce the impacts of climate change in the transport sector, we 
need to made advances in both policy and technology and innovation. 
In terms of policy, it is essential to change people’s behaviour and 
increase their awareness about climate change. On the other hand, 
technology and innovation developments have been considered long-
term approaches to clean transport and therefore to tackling climate 
change. It is now time to wind ways to accelerate their adoption.
Policy proposals
Practical measures to reduce energy consumption and use green 
energy sources are widely used in many countries. We propose five 
policies to support the development of clean transport. Firstly, all public 
vehicles must avoid using fossil fuel; Decarbonisation – the reduction 
and elimination of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels – is now recognised 
globally as an essential element of tackling climate change, and the 
transport sector must play its part. 
Secondly, the net-zero emission concept must be applied to all transport 
modes. The key principle of net-zero emissions is balancing the amount 
of carbon emissions and the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
Transportation sectors must discharge and remove CO2 at equal levels 
using advanced technologies such as carbon capture, carbon storage, 
and carbon trading. Governments need to make net-zero emissions 
mandatory across transport sectors and work to gain public support. For 
example, the UK Government has set a target of achieving net-zero by 
2050 – all diesel vehicles must be removed from the system by 2040 as 
an early tactic to reach this goal. In practice, smart planning on public 
transport can be a net-zero enabler. Effective transport planning should 
encompass the ticket price, routes and passengers’ demands. A unified 
network that genuinely supports passengers’ journeys with various 
routes is essential. In addition, the government must integrate all public 
transport on both regional and international scales. Finally, public 
services should offer a reasonable price to all customers. These measures 
will serve to steadily increase the accessibility of public transport.
A third policy measure should consider the mode of transport versus 
the travelling distance, since each mode has particular suitability over 
different operating distances. Cars have become a competitive mode for 
routes of less than 300 km. In contrast, trains and aeroplanes are more 
suitable for distances between 300 km and 1,000 km and over 1,000 km, 
respectively. Therefore, introducing a seamless public transit network or 
transportation hub to support passengers’ journeys can lead to a long-
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The share of passenger transportation modes in Japan by distance (km) 
(Source: Kojima and et al., 2017)
Restricting private car usage and encouraging the take up of public 
transport seems a straightforward way to reduce emissions, but a 
significant change in public behaviour is required. A fourth policy 
approach should therefore focus on campaigns to encourage people 
to use public transport. In Paris, for example, the enforcement of 
the “odd-even licence plate” system had a significant impact on air 
pollution. This campaign has been used in Paris on several occasions 
since 1997, resulting in an significant decrease in the number of private 
cars on the roads. Beijing city, in China, launched a similar rule in 2008 
to decrease air pollution and road traffic. Nevertheless, this method 
is potentially less appropriate in suburban areas that lack appropriate 
public transportation systems.
Lastly, a fifth policy approach would be to limit eco-unfriendly vehicles 
in big cities. An engaging public campaign can raise people’s awareness 
of the impact of transport emissions, especially on air quality. According 
to the air quality index (AQI), most city centre and central business 
districts (CBD) have been encountering severe air pollution due 
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to traffic congestion and industrial activities. Hence, the authors’ 
suggestion is that eco-unfriendly vehicles should be banned in more 
polluted cities. For instance, Paris, in France, has banned all diesel 
vehicles made before 2006 from the city centre. This rule is applicable 
from 8 am to 8 pm during weekdays. Birmingham, in the UK, has 
implemented a permanent “Clean Air Zone” in the city centre – older 
vehicles which do not meet emissions standards are charged a fee to 
enter the restricted zone. As a result, the air quality in those regulated 
areas should gradually improve due to the lower emissions.
Technology and innovation development
Technology and innovation can be applied alongside our proposed 
policies to develop clean transport systems. Key to this is replacing the 
combustion engine and materials to reduce CO2 emissions.
First, any outdated vehicle’s combustion system should be replaced. 
Most existing vehicles are designed to support only diesel power. 
However, obsolete cars with a diesel engine has been banned in many 
cities such as Paris (France), Stuttgart (Germany), and Birmingham 
(UK). In other words, private and public diesel vehicles will be phased 
out over the next few years and their replacements will be powered by 
electricity or renewable energies. Various technologies and innovations 
have already been installed in new vehicle models that will reduce 
environmental impacts. For example, the Japanese N-700 series 
Shinkansen train is designed with a hybrid system; it supports both 
combustion energy and an electric motor. The new High Speed Rail 
model is considered a lower emitter than an aeroplane over the same 
travelling distance. 
Second, the selection criteria for a vehicle’s materials need to consider 
recyclability and weight. One notable material, “Carbon fibre reinforced 
polymer (CFRP)” is both sufficiently tough and light to be used in 
automotive parts such as car’s bumper, car’s spoiler, and railcar’s bogie 
frame. An increase in the use of recyclable materials can decrease the 
amount of energy used and CO2 emissions from all recycling stages, 
i.e., dismantling, shredding and cleaning processes, and also reduces 
waste in landfill sites. In High Speed Rail vehicles, for example, research 
shows that the replacement of the CFRP materials in the main parts 
shows a 73.1% recycling rate of total vehicle mass. Additionally, the light-
weight material can decrease energy consumption, which also results in 
reduction of CO2 emissions. 
The application of these technologies and innovations in the 
transport sector could significantly reduce CO2 emissions. Moreover, 
implementing them, in combination with effective transport policies, 
could enable the global climate change targets to be reached more 
swiftly. The sooner these policies are implemented, the sooner existing 
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The UK has reduced its carbon emissions by 44% relative to levels 
recorded in 1990 with the transport sector acting as the largest emitter 
of Greenhouse Gases at 38%. Rail transport only contributes 2.5% of 
transport emissions, however rail must still decarbonise to achieve net-
zero emissions by 2050.
Significant developments to decarbonising the rail industry include 
establishing a long-term rolling stock strategy to remove diesel-only 
trains from the GB rail network by 2040. However, for Heritage Rail 
where many trains are coal powered, how can they decarbonise? A 
simple option would be to stop steam trains from operating, but this 
would remove the excitement of watching a steam engine come to life 
and diminish the educational experiences that Heritage Rail offers.
At the University of Birmingham, we are exploring the decarbonisation 
of Heritage Rail, introducing hydrogen fuel to existing trains 
without reducing their historical value. This will inform policy for 
decarbonisation of Heritage Rail.
Figure 1: Example of new green-marked number plate (Gov UK)
UK progress on transport emissions
The UK has recently been commended by US climate change envoy 
John Kerry, for its progress on addressing the climate emergency, 
reducing its carbon emissions by 44% relative to levels in 1990, much 
quicker than other wealthy nations. The UK’s strategy has been to set 
a net-zero goal for 2050 to drive changes across all sectors to reduce 
emissions and decarbonise. So far much of the focus on reducing 
carbon emissions has been on roads, however the rise of electric vehicles 
will help address this, especially those that can be identified by a green-
marked number plate. Cars, vans and HGVs are not an unjustified focus; 
the biggest contributor to UK carbon emissions is transport, and by far 
the biggest contributor to that is road transport.
Given that, you might wonder why we bother to look into rail 
decarbonisation, given that less than 2% of UK transport carbon 
emissions come from rail, making up just half a percent of total UK 
emissions. However, these numbers alone do not tell the full story; 
as the UK’s hundreds of diesel trains churned their way through 476 
million litres of diesel last year, producing other emissions including 
small particles, and nitrogen and sulphur oxides, as they go. Diesel 
trains are not only noisy, smelly and generally unpleasant but they are 
also harmful as particulates and other emissions are known to have 
a negative impact on human health. This is a particular problem in 
enclosed train stations such as Birmingham New Street, where levels 
of these airborne pollutants can be very high. If we want to encourage 
people to use the railways, with the consequent reduction in congestion 
and emissions and improvement in quality of life, we therefore have a 
responsibility to reduce emissions.
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Decarbonising GB rail
Plans have already been made to start decarbonising the railways, 
such as the removal of all diesel-only trains from the national network 
by 2040. Significant progress has already been made, with the UK’s 
passenger rail CO2 emissions falling considerably over the 2010s, despite 
an increase in passengers. 
While positive progress is being made on the mainline network, there 
is one area of the railway which is going to be difficult to decarbonise; 
heritage railways. When the main attraction of a railway is coal-burning, 
steam-powered trains, it would seem there is little that can be done. 
Of course, we could ban steam-powered trains, but this would ruin 
the attraction of these railways, which are important for the tourism 
of the communities they serve and are an important steward of social 
and cultural history. Various coal alternatives have been tried, with 
varying degrees of success, but largely they have proved unsuitable. So 
how could heritage rail be brought into the age of low carbon, without 
reducing their appeal to enthusiasts around the world? One aspect of 
the heritage scene that could be explored is decarbonising heritage 
diesel trains, for which there are a number of possible solutions. 
Figure 2: Steam locomotive are often the main attraction for heritage 
railway (authors own collection)
Figure 3: Detail view of a partially disassembled Class 08, showing old 
fashioned electrical equipment (author’s collection).
While it might be possible to run heritage diesel trains on biofuels, this 
is not as simple as it would at first appear. Firstly, these fuels are not a 
perfect solution; even though their production does take in carbon, 
they need to be transported to where they are used, and growing crops 
for biofuel can take up valuable land. Secondly, many older diesel 
engines may struggle to run well on modern biofuels, which may make 
this solution impractical. Another option is to replace the engine of a 
heritage diesel train with a system that produces fewer, or no, emissions. 
At first glance, this might not make sense for many diesel trains either; 
part of the attraction is the noise, the sights, and the sounds produced 
by these trains and the consequent feeling of nostalgia for by-gone times 
which these railways trade on.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all the trains on a 
heritage railway are there for public amusement. In order to marshall 
trains, move around old trains for maintenance, and keep the railway 
running smoothly, heritage railways require smaller locomotives called 
shunters. While these are often historic themselves (the most common 
type is the Class 08, dating from the 1950s), they are very seldom the 
main attraction.
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What would be the options for decarbonising such a locomotive? If we 
were to take inspiration from the car industry, we could convert them 
using batteries. Although electric cars are increasingly becoming the 
norm, but batteries are not without their problems. The main issue is 
that the amount of energy that can be stored in a battery is limited and 
while no longer a problem for cars, trains are much bigger and heavier 
requiring more energy to keep going, particularly when shunting 
another train. In addition, the current diesel trains are expected to be 
in service for hours or even days at a time without refueling, and when 
they do refuel, this is expected to take a handful of minutes rather than
the long durations typical for battery charging.
There is therefore a clear need for a technology which will provide 
more energy than a battery. One technology showing great promise 
is hydrogen, which when stored as a compressed gas, can store a lot 
more energy than a battery. This gas can be used in a fuel cell, which 
combines hydrogen with oxygen from the air. This reaction produces 
an electric current, which in turn can be used to drive the train. This 
is far more environmentally sound than a diesel engine as it produces 
no harmful emissions. While it is true that much hydrogen is produced 
from natural gas, hydrogen can also be produced by electrolysis of 
water; passing an electric current through it to split it into hydrogen 
and oxygen (an experiment many will have done in chemistry at school
albeit on a much smaller scale). If this electricity comes from renewable




Figure 4: Hydrogen Hero at Rail Live 2020 (authors own collection).
The first University of Birmingham foray into the sphere of hydrogen-
powered trains was an entry to the Institute of Mechanical Engineering’s 
Railway Challenge, a competition for miniature locomotives entered by 
teams of young people. Subsequent years of the competition saw better 
 
and better entries from the University, culminating in Hydrogen Hero, 
which appeared not only in the competition but also at other events 
such as Rail Live and Modern Railways Rail Vehicles and Enhancements.
Figure 5: HydroFLEX crossing the viaduct into Evesham on a mainline 
test run (UoB/Porterbrook).
Further, in 2018 the University partnered with train leasing company 
Porterbrook to produce HydroFLEX, the UK’s first full-scale hydrogen-
powered train. This project involved taking an old electric train and 
feeding it with electricity from a hybrid system containing both a 
hydrogen fuel cell and a battery. As the project progressed, it brought 
with it considerable experience of adapting advanced hydrogen 
technology to a practical railway context. This experience is very much 
transferable to a shunter on a heritage railway as many of these old 
locomotives are diesel electric, meaning that they have a diesel engine 
which drives a generator to produce electricity for the motors driving 
the train. It is entirely possible to replace this diesel engine with a 
hydrogen fuel cell system, to produce a modern zero-emission train 
engine inside a heritage shunter shell. Such an approach is not without 
challenges. While far better than batteries, hydrogen storage still takes 
up a lot more room inside the locomotive than the equivalent diesel 
tank; this must be factored into the design. 
There are numerous other difficulties to be overcome; the controls 
of the locomotive, normally connected to a diesel engine, must be 
adapted to control a hydrogen fuel cell; the radiator and cooling must 
be changed; and the electronics of the fuel cell system must be adjusted 
to feed the existing locomotive. However, none of these challenges is 
insurmountable, and with HydroFLEX, the University has proven itself 
capable of overcoming them, working alongside a multitude of partners,
suppliers and the wider railway industry. The sharing of such valuable 
experience with partners is also an ideal opportunity for up-skilling 
engineers across the rail industry as the widespread introduction of 
hydrogen-powered trains gets closer.
 
 
Stuart Hillmansen, Peter Amor, Rachel Fisher,  
Charles Calvert and Alex Burrows
Decarbonisation and Heritage Railways
8504 Clean transport Addressing the climate challenge
The advantages for a heritage railway of a hydrogen-powered shunter 
go beyond the reduction in carbon emissions. Such a conversion 
process would take a shunter out of service for a while, which presents 
an opportunity to overhaul the remaining components such as brakes, 
and to smarten up the bodywork with a fresh lick of paint. Further, 
the working environment on these upgraded hydrogen locomotives or 
HydroShunters can be cleaned up and vastly improved over the noisy, 
oily environment currently encountered. In addition, the HydroShunter 
would be unusual and interesting, potentially bringing in more visitors, 
while demonstrating clean, green rail initiatives and improve the 
wider public perception of emissions reductions and heritage railways. 
Following the impact of Covid-19 on heritage lines, bringing the railways 
back to life with a sustainable and modern twist may well improve 
revenues for the ailing sector.
Figure 6: Hydroshunter: Diesel locomotive set to be converted to 
hydrogen power (Severn Valley Railway).
While it is still challenging to envisage the decarbonisation of coal 
powered engines, the conversion of behind-the-scenes locomotives like 
shunters can provide many benefits both for heritage rail and for the 
rail industry as a whole.
Stuart Hillmansen, 
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When the UK Climate Change Act entered into force in 2008, the 
UK Government was charged with setting legal targets to reduce the 
emission of greenhouse gases by at least 80%, compared to a 1990 
baseline, by the year 2050. Although at the time this target was seen as 
ambitious, it soon became clear that it would require revision to allow 
the UK to meet its global climate change pledges, as well as to improve 
the UK’s performance at the national level. In its 2019 Net Zero report 
(p17) the Climate Change Committee recommended that rather than 
setting “a 97% target that leaves a small residual amount of emissions”, 
it would be more appropriate to set a net zero target. Section 1 of the 
Climate Change Act was subsequently amended in 2019 to reflect a 
reduction of greenhouse emissions based on achieving a net zero target 
by 2050. 
Setting a net zero target
Such a target can be achieved through a combination of the removal 
of existing greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere together with 
a reduction of overall emissions. A net zero target is not the complete 
elimination of all greenhouse gases. Instead, the ultimate logic of the 
net zero approach is to achieve a balance between the production and 
removal of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This will be primarily 
achieved through various measures instituted by national governments 
coupled with ambitious initiatives in the private sector and wider 
societal changes.
One possible criticism of the net zero calculation is the reliance on 
technological change to deliver either emissions reductions (as with the 
switch to electric mobility) or to remove GHGs (for example though 
carbon capture and storage). Because such technology transitions take 
time, initial progress to the target is slow and considerable faith 
is placed on the capacity of future technological change to deliver 
decarbonisation. These technology transitions will require a variety 
of cross sectoral measures relating to energy generation, storage, 
consumption and efficiency. Moreover, a net zero target also assumes 
that the removal of greenhouse gases will not only be achieved through 
investment in technology but also by the contribution of natural carbon 
sinks such as forests and oceans.
In order to reach the 2050 target, the 2008 Climate Change Act put into 
place a trajectory for achieving climate neutrality in the form of carbon 
budgets whereby the Secretary of State has a duty to set an emission 
target every five years for each budgetary period.1 This accommodates a 
gradual reduction of GHGs, recognising the point made above that 
some measures require time to deliver the desired reductions in carbon. 
Thus far, five carbon budgets have been set and the sixth carbon budget 
is currently being prepared. Despite the initial success in reaching the 
targets set in the first two budgets and being on track to meet the target 
set in the third budget by 2023, the UK is not on a trajectory to meet the 
targets set in the fourth and fifth budgets. The 3rd carbon budget (2018 
to 2022) prescribed a target of 37% reduction by 2020 while the 4th 
carbon budget (2028 to 2032) prescribes target of 51% reduction  
by 2025. 
Net zero policy initiatives and questions 
of environmental justice
If we examine the variety of sources of greenhouse gas emissions 
across a range of sectors, it becomes clear that there is a limit to what 
government can do to mandate emissions-reducing activity. Some 
of the most common measures that governments have put in place 
include the setting of emission standards and targets as well as banning 
1  Climate Change Act 2008, s (4)
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2  HM Government: Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution: Building back better, supporting green jobs, 
and accelerating our path to net zero, November 2020, p. 14, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
the-ten-point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution 
3  Ibid p. 14. 
Robert Lee and Aleksandra Čavoški
certain activities or product regulation as illustrated by the phasing 
out of the sale of new petrol and diesel cars. Alongside such regulatory 
initiatives, there is room for soft law mechanisms such as partnering in 
voluntary schemes with private companies to reduce GHG generation, 
providing public information on low carbon alternatives and investing 
in research and development on low carbon technologies. However, 
technology transitions, such as the shift to electric vehicles, and their 
success in meeting emissions targets will require wider societal buy-in. 
Furthermore, these changes will have different impacts on various social 
groups, generating significant environmental justice implications. 
Taking as an example the policy of banning the sale of new diesel and 
petrol cars, this ban was initially planned for 2040 but then moved 
forward to 2030.2 However, the policy will permit the continuing “sale of 
hybrid cars and vans that can drive a significant distance with no carbon 
coming out of the tailpipe until 2035”.3 Assuming the continuing growth 
in the proportion of electricity provided from renewable sources, the 
switch to electric mobility offers obvious benefits in terms of reducing 
GHG emissions but, as electric vehicles remain relatively expensive, it 
passes the cost of the technology transition to the consumer (either 
directly for domestic transport or indirectly for commercial vehicles). 
Aside from the cost of electric vehicles there are also infrastructure 
and energy costs, as well as further costs in the handling of end-of-life 
batteries which may be reflected in the overall price. Finally, we know 
from earlier technology transitions that consumers may lose rather 
than gain from such shifts. In 2008, in the European market, diesel 
technology was promoted as a lower carbon technology and consumers 
duly invested in new diesel cars only to find that concerns about urban 
air quality and tail pipe emissions saw the market for used diesel vehicles 
stall. There remains a possibility that this pattern could be replicated  
in relation to electric vehicles given competition from other low 
emission transportation technologies such as hydrogen and synthetic  
fuel-based systems.
Although 2030 has been chosen as the start date for the ban, as that 
date approaches one might expect that sales of internal combustion 
engine cars will fall as consumers become reluctant to invest in soon-
to-be redundant technology. On the other hand, consumers may not 
wish to switch too early while electric vehicle technology, e.g. in terms 
of range and speed of re-charging, continues to improve. Nonetheless 
sales of electric vehicles may increase rapidly in the late 2020s creating 
issues of manufacturing capacity. For less wealthy consumers, who 
will buy vehicles from used car markets, the shift to electric vehicles 
may take more time. Prior to that shift, these consumers may face 
higher maintenance and fuel costs (as demand for petrol/diesel falls). 
Climate change governance and environmental justice
Meanwhile such drivers of older vehicles are already facing higher 
motoring expenses in the form of charges to drive older vehicles in 
ultra-low emission zones in urban conurbations where many such 
consumers live and work.
Often when we focus on decarbonisation we fix on questions of 
sustainable production (such as energy generation) but the electric 
mobility illustration shows that patterns of sustainable consumption 
may be no less crucial. We depend on individuals’ behavioural change, 
though such change is not cost free and will create impacts likely to 
generate concerns about environmental justice. So, for example, the 
move to net zero carbon may require significant re-investment in 
domestic heating, cooling and insulation systems at a time when, in 
England at least, the average fuel poverty gap is widening.
Environmental justice challenges
This presents Government with some considerable challenges. One 
immediate question is how far Government is able to develop policy 
which will incorporate environmental justice considerations. This has 
not always been the case as an example from solar power can illustrate. 
The take-up of domestic solar energy systems was encouraged through 
financial incentives, particularly through Feed in Tariffs (FiTs) which 
offered attractive payments for the surplus electricity produced by solar 
panels, when fed back into the grid. This form of subsidy was broadly 
more generous than other mechanisms such as the Renewable Heat 
Incentive, creating some feeling of unfairness. The FiTs system was 
withdrawn in 2019 as costs of solar investment fell and volumes 
of feed-in to the grid grew, but there is no doubt that early investors 
gained more as tariffs fell over time and early FiTs promised long-term 
and index-linked returns. Research into initial investments in domestic 
solar power systems found relatively few installations in poorer areas 
with a disproportionate level of investment in wealthier locations, which 
indicates that environmental injustices can be compounded.
A second challenge relates to mechanisms to engineer change. In 
late 2020, the UK Climate Change Committee suggested a 20% cut 
in meat and dairy by 2030, rising to 35% (for meat only) by 2050. In 
April 2021, when the UK Government accelerated some of its targets to 
reduce GHGs, the Business Secretary announced that he might turn to 
a vegan diet to help combat climate change. The formal position taken 
by Government, however, was that ‘anti-meat’ regulation would not be 
introduced. This is an understandable position from a government with 
distinctly libertarian instincts and the restrictions placed on everyday 
freedoms during the pandemic may have heightened these instincts in 
political circles. 
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The problem is whether in the face of a climate emergency it is really 
enough to shrink the role of government and put trust in autonomy in 
the hope that people do the right things. It seems odd to put so much 
emphasis on the targets yet provide such a sketchy roadmap as to how 
we might reach them. Moreover, the setting of top down targets risks 
a lack of buy-in or even a democratic deficit, given the sizable changes 
that the targets imply and their potential disproportionate impact on 
certain groups. This is not to decry target-setting but rather to point 
to the necessity for inclusive and participative decision-making on how 
these targets can be met.
Finally, it is worth remembering that climate change is an environmental 
justice issue both globally and locally. At a global level it is a cruel irony 
that may countries that have made much lower contributions to GHG 
emissions will suffer most under its impacts. At the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference in 2009, developed countries pledged $100 billion 
per year by 2020 to help developing nations adapt to the impacts of 
climate change. Unfortunately, accounting mechanisms to assess this 
were never put in place but it appears not to have been met even with 
the most generous metrics. So, in financing domestic transitions, this 
global commitment should not be lost.
In terms of domestic victims of climate impacts – such as those flooded 
out of homes or overtaken by sea level rise – whose ruinous situation 
is not of their making, the appeal must be for communal engagement 
with climate change mitigation and adaptation to the greater benefit of 
all. It would be great if we were able to trust voluntary individual action 
but the reality is that immediate and dependable legal mechanisms are 
needed to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation. Setting 
targets should not be mistaken for action representing, as it does, the 
easiest possible form of political intervention. Devising governance 
solutions to deliver those targets in a manner which is conscious and  
respectful of environmental justice is a much more exacting test of 
political leadership.
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Recent episodes of environmental disasters such as wildfires, typhoons 
and droughts provide evidence of the catastrophic economic impact 
of climate change. These events have a devastating impact on 
infrastructure, natural habitats and have inflicted suffering on our 
collective wellbeing. The climate crisis is therefore an immediate 
existential threat. The former Bank of England governor and the UN 
envoy for climate action and finance, Mark Carney, has warned that 
the climate crisis potential death toll could, by far, exceed the Covid-19 
pandemic. The estimated annual cost of natural disasters caused by 
climate change is about $18 billion in low and middle-income countries 
and $390 billion to companies and households worldwide. 
The extensive burning of fossil fuels is the primary source of 
greenhouse gases emissions. Transportation, electricity production,  
and manufacturing sectors accounts for the larger proportion of 
emissions that traps the heat in the atmosphere and causes global 
warming. Global warming, in turn, has led to even greater demand on 
energy; the world energy consumption in 2019 was roughly 584  
exa-Joule (this is equivalent to powering 27 light bulbs of 50W each for 
13.8 billion years). This, indeed, has implications for financial sector 
to fund the transition to greener economies to combat the impact of 
global warming. Figure 1 presents the CO2 emission in 2019; the top 4 












Figure 1: Mt CO2 emission in 2019
Source: Global Carbon Project
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Hisham Farag and David Dickinson Moving towards a sustainable planet: what is the role 
of financial markets?
Recognising the important role of the financial sector in combatting 
climate change, HM Treasury and the Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, in 2019, published the UK Green 
Finance Strategy. This aims at greening financial systems by focussing 
financial market attention on investments that contribute to a major 
transformation to clean and resilient economic growth. The Green 
Finance Institute (GFI) was created as part of this policy initiative with a 
remit to achieve an inclusive, net-zero carbon and resilient economy.
To bridge the funding gap, financial markets are moving in a positive 
direction to deliver sustainable greener economies. Funding the 
transition to sustainable low-carbon economies is a challenge that 
needs solidarity from the international community. Climate Finance 
is therefore an important part of the international drive to achieve a 
solution to the problem of Climate Change. 
Financial institutions worldwide, prompted by their own risk 
assessments, by investors, as well as by Regulators, are developing 
innovative sources of finance that have led to the rise of “Climate 
Finance”; The UNFCCC defines climate finance as “local, national or 
transnational financing—drawn from public, private and alternative 
sources of financing—that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation 
actions that will address climate change”. Figure 2 shows that the annual 
climate finance flows exceeded USD half-trillion mark for the first time 
in 2018 and clearly will grow further over the coming decade to meet 
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Figure 2: Total Global Climate Finance Flows 2013-2018
Source: Climate Policy Initiative
However, this is a drop in the ocean compared with the funding 
provided to fossil fuel-based projects. During the five years, post Paris 
Accord, the top 60 banks worldwide poured $3.8 trillion into fossil fuels-
based projects. Figure 3 presents the top 15 banks financing fossil fuels 
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Figure 3: Top 15 banks financing fossil fuels globally, 2016 – 2020  
(US Billions)
Source: Banking on Climate Chaos Report, 2021
The challenges facing the global economy are clear from these relative 
funding figures and the changes in production and consumption that 
are required are similarly huge. Financial markets and institutions 
will need to develop green finance as a matter of urgency in order 
to provide the finance required to deliver the necessary shift to a 
green economy. Therefore, financial innovation is bound to be a key 
mechanism for delivering sustainable economic structures.
Innovation in financial markets
Financial innovation has the power to significantly change the 
landscape of finance available for businesses. The creation of Green, 
Blue and Social/Sustainability Bonds is one example of financial 
innovation that has delivered funding to support the response to 
climate change. The proceeds of Green Bonds are committed to 
finance climate friendly projects while the proceeds of Blue Bonds 
are devoted to fund sustainable marine and ocean-based initiatives. 
These innovations are non-mutually exclusive types; for instance, Social 
Bonds could be common ordinary Bonds but with proceeds directed 
to environmentally friendly projects. The cumulative market value of 
Green Bonds issuance to date is US$1.185tn. In 2019, Fannie Mae - the 
US Federal National Mortgage Association – issued the largest amount 
of Green Mortgage Backed Securities (US$22.8bn). And HSBC has 
recently announced their global commitment to provide $100 billion in 
sustainable financing and investment by 2025. Figures 4 and 5 present 
the quarterly global Green and Sustainability Bonds issuance up to the 
third quarter of 2020. 

































































































































Figure 4: Quarterly Global Green Bonds     

























































































Figure 5: Sustainable Bonds Quarterly Volumes    
Source: Refinitiv Deals Intelligence
But there is much more to do in terms of financial markets 
development, instruments, and regulations to achieve the required 
switch to green investing. In the wake of its commitments to reach net 
zero carbon emissions by 2050, the UK is the first country to set out 
plans to issue the first ever Sovereign Green Bond while the Republic of 
Seychelles was first to issue sovereign Blue Bonds worth US$15 million 
in October 2018. Morgan Stanley, in collaboration with the World Bank, 
issued $10 million worth of Blue Bonds to clear plastic pollution in the 
ocean and The Nature Conservancy announced an ambitious plan to 
issue $1.6 billion worth of Blue Bonds by 2025. More funding will be 
required in the wake of the Japanese government’s recent decision to 
release 1.23 million tons of radioactive contaminated water from the 
Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean.
Green or Blue Bonds issuance sends a strong positive signal to 
stakeholders on a company’s commitments towards undertaking 
environmentally friendly projects. However, companies may issue such 
innovative Bonds to improve their image “greenwashing” or to benefit 
from the use of cheaper finance. A recent study finds that the two main 
motivations for investors to hold socially responsible mutual funds are 
social preferences and social signalling and that financial motives are 
not the main driver for socially responsible investments (SRI) decisions.
Financial markets implications 
Beyond the creation of new financial products, uncertainty about the 
economic impact of climate change, pricing and hedging for climate 
risk, further complicates the estimation of risk premia and the overall 
social cost of climate change. It is becoming clear that carbon emission 
has implications for stock markets; a recent study finds that higher 
carbon emission leads to lower valuation of US companies. Another 
study found evidence of “carbon exposure premium” as the required 
rate of return for companies with high carbon emission exceeds 
those with lower emission. Carbon Pricing is a key policy followed by 
46 national jurisdictions – as of November, 2019 – to address climate 
change. Such initiatives will have an impact on the cost of capital and 
companies with high levels of carbon emission will have lower market 
values consequently.
However, the imposition of carbon taxes could have unintended 
consequences for the energy sector, such as fossil fuel stranded assets. 
Climate risks, in particular regulatory risk, also have implications for 
portfolio construction and asset allocations. Fund managers, as a result 
of increasing pressure from stakeholders, incorporate Environment, 
Social and Governance (ESG) criteria into their portfolios. A study 
found that incorporating ESG criteria into investment decision could 
reduce portfolio risk.
The economic implications of climate change have been investigated in 
fixed income securities markets. For instance, Green Bonds are found 
to offer, on average, lower yields (since they are issued at a premium). 
However, a recent study investigated whether investors are willing to 
sacrifice higher yields for societal benefits and found no difference 
in the pricing of Green and non-Green bonds; this implies that the 
greenium is zero. This result varies across countries as those impacted by 
climate change are expected to pay higher underwriting fees and higher 
premiums on long-term municipal bonds reflecting the higher risks 
associated with climate change that they face. Overall, stock markets are 
found to react positively to the issuance of Green Bonds. 
Climate change also has implications for the real estate sector; sea 
level rise and flooding riskea level rise and flooding risk are obvious 
examples that have clear economic impact, for example the impact 
of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 on property prices in New York City. The 
long-term impact of climate risk has been investigated. A study found 
that by the year 2100 around 13.1 million Americans will be impacted 
if the sea level rises by 1.8 metres; another study estimates that about 
1.9 million houses worth of $882 billion, mainly in Florida, will be at 
risk of flooding if the sea level rises by six feet. A recent study found 
that houses exposed to rising sea levels are sold on average 7% less 
than unexposed properties. Awareness of global warming is increasing; 
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a study found that where local temperatures are abnormally high, the 
volume of Google searches for “global warming” is increasing across 
different cities around the world.
Hedging against climate risk is a key challenge for financial markets as 
the existing derivatives instruments and specialised insurance products 
typically do not cover the long-term impact of climate risk. A recent 
study designed an alternative approach to hedge against climate risk 
by designing a “climate news” index using the WSJ coverage of climate 
change news. While, climate-resilient assets will continue their growth, 
empirical research will need to inform decision-makers and regulatory 
bodies about improved measures of companies’ climate risk. This 
will spur financial innovation to develop appropriate techniques for 
hedging against climate risk, the social cost of carbon emissions, and the 
impact of climate risk on financial stability. 
Disclosure and shareholder activism
Although, voluntary disclosure is an essential step towards greater 
transparency on climate risks, a policy intervention is required to make 
such disclosure mandatory. The UK is the first country to establish a 
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) which aims 
to make disclosures fully mandatory across the economy by 2025, going 
beyond the ‘comply or explain’ approach. While the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regularly assesses how current climate 
change disclosures adequately inform investors, the U.S. climate envoy, 
John Kerry, recently highlighted that President Biden is set to issue an 
executive order on climate disclosure in capital markets.
Since financial markets are global there has been a push towards 
standardisation of regulation and supervision. The British Standard 
Institute (BSI) has developed a set of standards for financial institutions 
to align with the global sustainability challenges and to promote the UK 
Green Finance strategy. The Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) published 
its Climate Bonds Standard and Certification Scheme in 2010 and the 
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), introduced the 
principles of green loans in 2014 as voluntary initiatives.
Stakeholders also play a fundamental role in shaping corporate 
culture and raising awareness of the ESG and SRI investing; the 
United Nations-backed Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI) 
and the  promote the importance of incorporating environmental, 
social and corporate governance issues into investment practices. ESG 
assets under management have a value of around US$40.5 trillion, 
which is equivalent to one third of all professionally managed assets. 
Shareholder activists continue to put pressure on boards to undertake 
voluntary disclosure of the potential impact of climate change and its 
risk mitigation measures. A recent study found that shareholder activists 
play an essential role in influencing companies to disclose climate 
change risks voluntarily. The study also found that stock markets react 
positively to climate-related disclosure. Shareholders of BP, Exxon 
Mobil, Occidental Petroleum, and PPL Corporation agreed proposals  
to disclose on the risks of climate change. However, recently, the board 
of Berkshire Hathaway unanimously recommended shareholders  
vote against a proposal to disclose the company’s climate risk 
management approach. 
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There is a large strand of literature that considers how to align 
directors’ interests with wider stakeholder interests to combat the 
impact of climate change. In 2009, the Business Roundtable in the 
US redefined the purpose of corporations in a statement signed by 
181 CEOs that required them to commit to lead their companies for 
the benefit of all stakeholders. A recent study found that aligning 
executive compensation to ESG criteria leads to an increase in social 
and environmental initiatives. Another study found that 51% of S&P 
500 companies incorporate ESG metrics (mostly subjective) in their 
incentive plans. In the UK, 45% of FTSE100 companies incorporate 
ESG measures into their executive incentive plans. 
Concluding remarks 
Although, most countries have committed to reach net zero carbon 
emissions by 2050, the current political landscape and the impact of the 
Covid-19 pandemic could influence implementation plans. Recently, the 
UK, EU and the US have committed to a substantial cut (50% - 68%) 
in carbon emissions by 2030. However, India as one of the top carbon 
emitters see the 2050 net zero target as a “pie in the sky”. This could 
lead to “free riding problems”; a recent study argued that countries 
that are not taking serious measures towards reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions will benefit if other countries do reduce their emissions. The 
study emphasises the need to establish a governing body with clear 
responsibility to ensure all countries deliver on their  
climate commitments.
The rapid growth in financial technology casts doubt on achieving the 
net-zero carbon by some countries. The world electricity consumption 
for Bitcoin in 2019 was 126.07 terawatt-hours (TWh). This is higher 
than the total energy consumption in Norway (124.13 TWh per year) or 
Argentina (125.03 TWh per year). A recent study reported that, in April 
2020, 75% of the world’s cryptocurrencies mining is found in China and 
that the growth in crypto assets and blockchain activities is expected to 
generate 130.50 million metric tons of carbon emissions by 2024.
While Sustainable Finance will continue its growth, academics and 
practitioners are facing challenges to set out a new research agenda 
including important policy questions about risk and return profiles and 
premiums (the greenium) of green financial assets particularly in the 
context that the risks associated with climate change are very long term. 
In addition, there are questions to be answered about the objectives of 
investors who hold green assets. For instance, why do investors sacrifice 
a reasonably high rate of return on conventional bonds and invest in a 
lower rate of return on sustainable bonds? Disclosure on climate risks 
also presents different perspectives in the context of market reaction; 
the results of academic research reveal that voluntary disclosure leads 
to a positive stock market reaction as investors value transparency. 
Regulatory bodies are often required to continue to raise the disclosure 
bar until mandatory disclosure is in place. Further research is needed 
to understand the costs and benefits of regulation in respect to climate 
change. For example, there are unintended consequences of addressing 
climate change risks. In Jan 2021 the market value of energy companies 
listed on S&P500 dropped by 12% compared with market value in Jan 
2020. The growth in sustainability-based investments, together with 
divestment campaigns by stakeholders, has led some fund managers 
to screen out polluting companies from their portfolios. This may be 
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welcomed as a market response to climate risk, but it is unclear what the 
long-term impact of such market moves will be. Given that the market 
capitalisation of the biggest ten energy companies worldwide by the end 
of 2020 was about US$2.2trilion, it could lead to a substantial stranded 
assets risk and a potential systemic risk. 
We conclude with a set of recommendations for policy debate. 
First, company boards should think strategically about their wider 
stakeholders and align shareholder value with stakeholder value. 
Second, regulatory changes should be made to tax negative externalities 
and to raise the disclosure bar leading to a mandatory disclosure on 
climate related risk and its mitigation measures, and to design an 
international mechanism by which a fair climate finance contribution 
by top emitters is achieved. Third, international collaboration should 
be established to accelerate the transitions towards clean energy and 
to put measures in place to mitigate any unintended consequences of 
that transition. Fourth, there should be a clear strategy from financial 
institutions and markets to develop financial products and institutions 
that can assist in the process of moving to a sustainable economy. 
This includes the creation of financial assets that fund the real sector 
developments that will stop global warming and, more generally, 
prevent damage to the environment. Finally, we should recognise that 
economies and financial sectors may need to move at different speeds 
and the role of international agencies in achieving a balance across 
developed and developing economies is important in this regard. 
Hisham Farag and 
David Dickinson
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
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Environmental degradation is a challenge for scientists, to understand 
the causes, consequences and potential solutions, and for economists, to 
ensure that the behaviours of firms and households evolve to reflect and 
account for the true costs of environmental damage. The UoB-Nankai 
Joint Research Institute for Green Growth addresses the dichotomy 
of economic growth under the market system and environmental 
protection, which has at its heart the Precautionary Principle. Our 
premise is that operationalising benign by design production, a 
technology driven focus on emissions reduction and a social movement 
around green growth, underpinned by solid environmental and 
industrial economic principles, will lead to a framework for green 
economic growth. Delivering this requires innovative integration of 
technological, regulatory and financial incentives for businesses into 
economic and environmental policy, and significant lifestyle changes for 
individuals to value environmental protection. 
Pollution is the great challenge of the Anthropocene epoch, 
contributing to reduced health and wellbeing, driving climate change, 
biodiversity loss, ocean acidification, and harming the world’s fresh 
water supply. The Lancet Commission on Pollution and Health 
demonstrated that pollution is responsible for 9 million premature 
deaths each year. However, pollution is both preventable and 
recoverable with investment and innovation, and thus there is a clear 
need to develop the business model for green growth or the “business 
of environmental protection”. To achieve continued economic 
prosperity within the sustainable resources of the planet, the global 
economy needs to deliver growth that reflects the true cost of that 
growth. If that is not achieved resources (including the environment) 
are inefficiently allocated. A well-known way of describing these trends 
is the Green Economy, which involves large scale, dramatic changes in 
the way the global economy operates and countries interact to become 
low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive. 
While it is difficult to quantify the current value and scale of the green 
economy, several approaches are emerging. Early efforts by the UK 
government to define ‘Environmental Technologies’ in 2007 were a 
response to the limitations of the UK industry classification system to 
accurately estimate the economic value of environmental protection 
within the UK economy. Building on this, the Low Carbon and 
Environmental Goods and Services Sector (LCEGSS) dataset has been 
developed using a wide range of data types and sources, and a sectoral 
definition that is both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ and was defined to 
reflect efforts to better align the environmental protection, renewable 
energy and resources management sections of the definition with 
Eurostat’s Environmental Goods and Services Sectors (EGSS). Table 1 
shows the first two levels of the main LCEGSS taxonomy, with the third 
level available in the full dataset.







Contaminated land reclamation and remediation
Energy from waste
Environmental consultancy and related services
Environmental monitoring, instrumental and 
analysis
Marine pollution control
Noise and vibration control
Recovery and recycling
Waste management













Renewable energy general consultancy
Wave and tidal
Wind
Table 1: The first two levels of the taxonomy developed to categorise and 
value the global Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and Services 
Sector. From Georgeson & Maslin, 2019).
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Within the UK green economy, Low Carbon is the largest Level 1 
sub-sector and grew 6.9% (sales) between 2014/15 and 2015/16, with 
sales of £3,572 million and 1,172 companies employing 22,888 people. 
Renewable Energy was the second largest Level 1 sub-sector and also 
grew 6.9% (sales) in the same period, with sales amounting to £1,956 
million across 846 companies employing 14,645 people. Environmental 
is the smallest Level 1 sub-sector and grew just 3.5% (Sales) in the 
period, leading to sales of £1,231 million by 380 companies employing 
7,583 people. Despite this, the Committee on Climate Change has 
highlighted both heat and transport as energy demand markets in 
which the UK is failing to make sufficient headway to reduce reliance on 
fossil fuels, e.g., only 1.2% of car sales in 2016 were electric cars but by 
2030 three out of every five new cars sold (60%) need to be electric, and 
the trajectory for reduction in emissions from transport is falling quite a 
long way short of ambitions (-17%).
A key driver of many of the preventable and recoverable pollution 
processes globally, and a clear focus for potential environmental 
solutions, are particles be they natural, anthropogenic or engineered. 
Many particles are harmful to human and environmental health, such 
as the well-known PM10 and PM2.5 air pollution particles and their 
smaller ultrafine fraction, which are are linked with respiratory and 
cardiovascular diseases, as well as neurodegeneration and cancer, with 
air pollution linked to 40,000 deaths/year in the UK and responsible for 
reducing UK life expectancy by 4-6 months. Nearly 300 cities in China 
badly failed air-quality standard measurements in 2015, according to 
data collected by Greenpeace, and more than 1.6 million people per 
year die in China from breathing toxic air. 
Air pollution alone has been estimated to reduce GDP by 6.5 percent 
annually, according to RAND Corp. estimates, mainly driven by lost 
productivity, since factories are shut down on bad air days to avoid the 
dangerous health effects of breathing the dense, toxic air. The visibility 
of air pollution means that it makes headlines, but water and soil 
pollution are equally harmful. Water pollution is exacerbating China’s 
severe water scarcity problems, bringing the overall cost of water scarcity 
to about 1% of GDP.
Another aspect of particles is their capability of transporting other 
species such as viruses and infectious agents, and indeed the correlation 
between air pollution hotspots and Covid hotspots is clear, although 
the underlying mechanisms and whether viruses associated with PM 
remain infectious is still being investigated. Road deposited dust 
particles have also been associated with the transport of other pollutants 
including metals and phosphorus, continuing the re-distribution of 
pollutants between air and water. Because of their particulate nature 
and tendency to aggregate, particles are useful targets for pollution 
remediation themselves as they can be “trapped or caught”, and as a 
result of their high surface area for binding of co-pollutants facilitating 
the capture and remediation of target pollutants. Thus, much of the 
scientific and technological focus of both reduction and mitigation 
of pollution focusses around particle-based solutions, and as this is a 
core expertise area in both UoB and Nankai particle-driven solutions 
were selected as one of the key foci for the scientific and technological 
stands of the UoB-Nankai Joint Institute for Green Growth. Research 
areas span sensor development, evaluation of the health and safety of 
advanced materials, developed of strategies to reduce air pollution, and 
development of particles that are safe and sustainable by design such 
as utilising low carbon source materials, greener synthesis approaches, 
or considering recovery and re-use of constituent components at the 
design stage, so called benign-by-design production. A clear focus 
on design of solutions that are cheap, can be retrofitted easily onto 
existing industrial plants and result in demonstrable improvements to 
environmental quality is central to the Institute’s activities. 
Benign by design (BbD) production and development means that 
considerations of the environment happen much earlier in the 
product/process development approach. At the heart of BbD lies the 
concept of substituting the question “Is it safe/sustainable?” with “Can 
we engineer it to be safe/ sustainable?” These concepts reflect the need 
to reduce reliance on critical non-renewable resources and to move 
away from the single-use culture towards a more circular economy. 
Coupling this approach with technologies for emissions reduction 
across a product/process life cycle will result in dramatically greener 
production approaches and lower environmental pollution and damage. 
However, technical solutions alone are not sufficient to address the 
problems, and thus the core aspect of the UoB-Nankai Joint Research 
Institute for Green Growth is the interweaving of a technological and 
economic focus, including development of a set of tools and interventions 
to support the integration of environmental factors enter into business 
decision making and behaviour, including providing important 
multi-stakeholder perspectives, and leading to co-development of 
new approaches to drive green growth. The foreseen output is the 
development of the reference framework, including policy, economic 
and technological instruments that can be applied in the balancing 
of economic (growth) with environmental (sustainable and pollution 
reduction) needs, utilisable by the Chinese and British authorities to 
make economic and environmental policy decisions. 
The interweaving of a technological (emissions reduction and 
remediation focused environmental science) and economic focus, 
directed through a deepened understanding of both consumer and 
business attitudes to environmental policy, as shown schematically in 
Figure 1, will lead to improvements on three fronts:
(1) a social movement on public health benefits derived from a
clean environment,
(2) an industrial focus on cost-effective emissions reduction coupled to
corporate responsibility and sustainability as selling points, and
(3) a governmental policy framework that maximises incentives for
green growth and provides a roadmap and toolbox of policy
interventions to address specific local, regional and national
environmental and economic challenges.
Key activities include efforts to engage the wider community in  
public debate around who should fund the costs associated with 
remediation and public health projects such as reduction of emissions. 
Development of public-private partnerships to address these issues will 
be a central focus of the “green growth: the business of environmental  
protection” framework.
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The dual challenge of growing populations and rapid urbanisation 
have resulted in enormous challenges to the planet’s ecosystems and 
the essential life-giving services they provide, including access to clean 
water, air and food. Facilitating the economic transformation and 
growth of global south countries whilst maintaining or improving 
the environmental footprints of rapidly developing economies – 
i.e., developing a framework for Green Growth and envisioning
environmental protection as a profitable business enterprise in
itself via the Business of Environmental Protection - is a vital and
multi-dimensional challenge that will be tackled by the UoB-Nankai
Joint Institute of Green Growth through the unique pairing of
environmental sciences, economists, social change actors and a variety
of public, municipal and industrial leaders. Indeed, the dual role
of environmental sciences and economics have been visualised very
effectively by UN Economic Commission for Europe’s mapping of the
environmental relevance to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, with
8 being found to have a strong link, 3 a moderate link and just 6 having
a limited environmental aspect, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the broader approach to integrating 
Environmental Science and Economics/Business to provide  
workable solutions to the growing environmental problems of developing 
countries. The framework is being exemplified initially by China, and  
subsequently being translated and adapted to the needs of other Asian 
and African economies. 
Our working hypothesis is that identifying how the scientific discoveries 
and innovations which will solve environmental challenges can 
influence the behaviour of firms, households and markets will ensure 
that the true cost of environmental degradation is understood and that 
economies respond by the right sort of innovation and response to 
scientific understanding and hence to allocating resources efficiently. 
For example, residents’ consumer preferences (physical health, 
living environment, environment-friendly products or services) and 
further impact their behaviour (willingness to pay for environment, 
consumption demand, choice of employment and residence, 
participation in public policy making, active recycling efforts, etc.). 
The impact of environmental regulation upon corporate performance 
and corporate behaviour (consumption demand, market share, cost, 
industry access requirement (consumers, industry access, location, 
innovation and corporate restructuring, etc.), use of technologies to 
reduce emissions, sustainability practices etc.) in developed (UK) versus 
rapidly developing (China) will lay the foundation for industrial analysis 
and macroeconomic analysis. This is being supplemented with field 
work in key areas including rural-urban gradients to evaluate the air, 
water and soil quality in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Huaihe River Basin 
and other key areas, through collaboration with the environmental 
protection authorities, in order to lay down mid-term and long-term 
evolutionary path and respective policy framework and technology 
interventions for environmental remediation and long-term reduction 
in emissions.
Figure 2: Mapping of the SDGs in terms of their environmental relevance 
and activities undertaken by the Environment subprogramme of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
In summary, we need to find ways of developing the global economy 
without environmental degradation. This means incorporating the 
value of nature into our economic strategies and placing environmental 
protection at the heart of all developments. Unravelling this complex 
issue requires a multi-disciplinary approach, bringing together people 
with a wide range of expertise.
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While greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions have been falling across many 
industrialised nations – for instance, GhG emissions in the UK are now 
43.8% below their 1990 level – more substantive emission reductions are 
needed to stabilise the global climate at 1.5 or 2 degrees of warming. 
This reduction is becoming even more critical since falling emission 
in industrialised nations have been offset by rising emissions in quickly 
industrialising nations. By some estimates, global carbon emissions 
would need to fall by 7.6% each year for the next decade if the goal of 
restricting warming to 1.5 degrees is still to be met.
Decarbonising the economy requires changes in how we produce 
energy and food, how we travel and how we heat our homes and 
manage our cities. There are at least two fundamental reasons why 
relying on voluntary changes in consumer behaviour alone will not be 
enough to bring forth these radical changes. 
The first reason is technology. Even with the restrictions on personal 
freedoms and economic activities put in place during Covid-19 
lockdowns, global GhG emissions have “only” fallen by 6.4% in 2020 
- with more considerable reductions seen in some countries like
the US (12.9%) and EU (7.7%). The economic costs of lockdown
measures have been in the trillions, and the support for them has been
continuously weakening as a result. Further emission reductions will
only find broad support in the population if they are economically
less painful. We need more technologies that break the link between
consumption and emissions. While there is more optimism now, with
several industrialised countries recently displaying decoupling of GDP
from both production- and to a lower degree from consumption-based
CO2 emissions, it is still unclear whether decoupling can happen fast
enough. A central question for climate policies for the coming decades
is therefore how the development of such technologies and their
diffusion can be sped up. Policies that directly support R&D for clean
technologies could supplement other policies that support the diffusion
of cleaner technologies through taxes and subsidies.
The second reasons why voluntary changes in consumer behaviour 
will not be sufficient is engrained in the word “voluntary”. Climate 
change is a global problem that affects billions of people, most of 
whom are not even born yet. A single consumer completely changing 
their consumption habits today would still have a minuscule impact on 
preventing future climate change if acting in isolation. The collective 
action of all consumers is required in this global cooperation problem. 
Our own research shows that the psychological mechanisms that 
typically support cooperation in small groups, such as punishing free-
riders, are not well suited for a setting where groups are large and 
benefits mostly flow to those living in the future. It is therefore not 
surprising that the mean willingness to pay (WTP) for voluntary carbon 
reductions of 1 ton (which is about what the typical European emits 
in 6-8 weeks) found in incentivised settings is as low as $6. This WTP is 
far below even more conservative estimates of the social cost of carbon 
(SCC) which expect the economic cost of emitting an additional ton 
of CO2 now at around $30. Other estimates for the SCC come to much 
higher values ranging from $55 to $90 today and $286-$1700 in 2100. 
In sum, voluntary climate actions are far from enough to reach an 
emissions trajectory that keeps global warming within the limits set by 
the Paris Agreement.
Policymakers have long recognised the need for more stringent policies, 
and pricing carbon emissions through the tax system is becoming more 
common in many industrialised countries. The idea is simple – by 
attaching the same price to all emissions, carbon-intensive activities will 
become relatively more expensive. Increased costs provide an incentive 
to both firms and consumers to replace carbon-intensive, and therefore 
more costly, activities with alternatives that are cheaper and lead to 
lower emissions. A carbon price also helps consumers and firms quickly 
identify climate-friendly actions; complex information about the carbon 
content of single products or production process is boiled down to a 
simple price metric that decision-makers are typically familiar with.
It is not surprising that a panel of leading economists sees pricing 
emissions almost unanimously as the best and cheapest way of achieving 
additional emission reductions. However, this broad support for carbon 
taxes is not shared by the general population. For instance, while 65% 
of US citizens support more decisive efforts to combat climate change, 
only 35% support increasing the gasoline tax by 25ct per litre. 
There are at least two reasons for the low support for carbon taxes.
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First, some of those concerned about climate change are not convinced 
about the effectiveness of a carbon tax. At the heart of this concern 
is the misperception that taxes are merely a means of generating 
government revenue, ignoring the incentive effects that taxes typically 
have. This concern is not entirely unfounded. The price elasticity (i.e., 
the extent to which consumers react to a price change) can be indeed 
low for some relevant goods. For instance, some estimates suggest that 
a 10% increase in price only leads to a 1% reduction in demand for 
fuel. However, not all carbon-intensive goods are that price inelastic. 
For producers, there is even more compelling evidence that carbon 
taxes are not only effective but more effective than their alternatives. A 
comparison of clean energy subsidies in Germany and carbon pricing 
in the UK reveals that the latter approach has led to a 55% drop 
in emissions from energy production within five years. The former 
approach has led to much more modest emission reductions. However, 
one could still argue that subsidies in Germany have accelerated 
research into renewables considerably. 
In sum, policymakers need to provide a more straightforward message 
about how effective environmental taxation can be. This message can 
be supported with several additional policies. Although irrelevant 
to the incentive argument, earmarking some of the tax revenue for 
environmental purposes has proven to be an effective strategy that 
convinces those who doubt the usefulness of environmental taxes. 
Those concerned about climate change may also worry that applying 
environmental taxes at the national level is ineffective as the resulting 
emissions reduction will be offset by higher emissions in other countries 
with lower taxes resulting from the relocation of polluting industries to 
less regulated countries. Besides the fact that these so-called “pollution 
haven” effects are weaker than one would expect in theory, introducing 
border tax adjustments – such as the one recently discussed by the EU 
– on carbon emissions may further calm such fears. Another strategy 
would be to stress the local co-benefits of reducing carbon emissions. 
Reducing carbon emissions by phasing out coal or reducing inner-city 
traffic often have local benefits such as improved air quality and shorter 
commute times. Stressing such co-benefits could be helpful in two 
respects. First, compared to the benefits of cutting carbon emissions, 
they are felt immediately. Second, they help local communities. Our 
own research shows that individuals care about the location where 
public goods are provided even when they do not personally benefit 
from them.
A second reason for citizens to be sceptical of carbon pricing is that 
they do not only overestimate their own burden of environmental taxes, 
but they also rightly anticipate that carbon taxes are often regressive. 
For instance, the Institute of Fiscal Studies finds that an increase in the 
UK fuel duty of 5% would impact the bottom 10% of income earners 
most. Behavioural economists have amassed a large body of evidence 
highlighting people’s aversion to inequalities such as this. Carbon 
pricing would therefore be best accompanied by redistributive measures 
to increase their acceptability. There are multiple policy proposals of 
how a more even distribution of the burden of climate policies can be 
achieved at the national level. Taxing carbon or auctioning off emission 
permits leads to additional government revenue. This revenue can be 
redistributed directly to lower-income households via a carbon dividend, 
or other distortionary taxes, such as income tax, can be lowered in a 
revenue-neutral way.
In addition to carbon pricing, several behavioural interventions could 
be used to “nudge” consumers towards more sustainable lifestyles. The 
first idea would be to recognise that we all suffer from status-quo bias. 
People tend to have an inherent preference for the current state of 
affairs, translating into opposition to any political reforms. Especially 
when thinking about local implementations of carbon pricing, such 
as clean air zones or congestion pricing, trial periods and low initial 
tax rates could overcome status-quo effects. Another area that appears 
promising is digging into the power of social norms. Our research 
shows that individuals are more willing to contribute to voluntary 
climate actions if they believe that others contribute as well. A typical 
application of these insights is in household energy use. Many power 
providers now inform their customers how their energy consumption 
compares to that of their neighbours. Such information is especially 
impactful on those households that consume far more energy than the 
average household. A final area where behavioural interventions may 
complement carbon pricing is information. Not only are consumers 
sometimes inattentive to price changes, poorly informed about energy 
efficiency standards or biased in their information uptake, but they 
may be also deterred from selecting into government subsidy programs 
if the application process is not straightforward. It is in this area 
where governments, from the local to the national level, can invest in 
simplifying online and offline processes using guidance from intelligent 
design principles.
In sum, more significant emission reduction efforts are needed if the 
1.5- or 2-degree target is to be met. Carbon pricing is the key policy that 
can achieve this at the lowest cost. This is no secret and has been the 
consensus among environmental economists for the past thirty years. 
However, sufficiently high carbon taxes need broad acceptance by the 
public. In this paper, I have highlighted a few ways how increasing this 
public acceptance can be achieved. Smart climate policy should not stop 
there. Behavioural science and behavioural economics offer additional 
insights into how we can make carbon pricing more effective on the 
path to carbon neutrality.
Johannes Lohse
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
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elements and the 
green industrial 
revolution
Over the next 5-10 years many of the UK’s large industrial sectors 
(including automotive, aerospace and energy generation) will see 
dramatic changes as we move from a society based on fossil fuels to 
one driven by electricity. Initiatives such as the government’s Ten Point 
Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution are to be welcomed for their 
ambition, but without secure access to the technology-critical metals 
that are the building blocks of the green economy their vision will be 
impossible to realise. 
Technology-critical metals such as rare earths, lithium and cobalt are 
essential for emerging clean-energy technologies including electric 
vehicle batteries, and permanent magnets used in efficient motors 
and generators. Demand for these materials is expected to grow 
exponentially over the next 20 years as a result of the global race 
towards next generation clean-energy technologies. These technology-
critical metals have already been identified by the EU, US and Japan as 
being a serious supply risk.
The Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements and Critical Materials 
(BCSECM) was set up in 2017 to help address this issue, after it became 
clear that the UK’s exit from the European Union meant there was an 
urgent need to develop a national strategy. Working with academics 
and industry partners from around the UK, the team was able to bring 
together experts in mining, materials processing, manufacturing and 
recycling to consider how such a strategy could be developed. A policy 
commission, chaired by Sir John Beddington, was set up to provide 
a focus for this work and published its report Securing Technology-
Critical Metals for Britain in April 2021. This article outlines the 
findings of this report.
Growing demand, precarious supply
The world’s demand for raw materials is expected to double by 2060, 
according to a report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. The requirement for metals is expected to grow even 
faster, with an expansion from 8 to 20 gigatonnes over the same period. 
In volume terms, much of this will be readily available, and easily 
recycled, metals like iron and aluminium – the UK currently exports 
much of this valuable raw material resource owing to a lack of onshore 
metals processing capacity. However, high-technology industries that 
make, for example, batteries and motors for EVs, the generators for 
wind turbines and the jet engines for aircraft are dependent on many 
technology-critical metals. It is predicted that by 2050 the EU will 
require 60 times more lithium, 15 times more cobalt, and ten times the 
amount of rare earths compared to the current supply to the whole EU 
economy. The new industrial strategy for the EU warned that Europe’s 
transition to climate neutrality could replace today’s reliance on fossil 
fuels with one on raw materials, many of which we source from abroad 
and for which global competition is becoming fierce.
The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of many 
supply chains and, as we scramble to shore up existing industries and 
expand into new job-creating sectors, the UK needs to ask itself serious 
questions about how it will access essential raw materials like technology-
critical metals. To put this in perspective, such metals are vital to 7 of 
the top-10 UK export markets, with a value of more than £150 billion 
annually. The Faraday Institution predicted that the transition to 
manufacturing electric vehicles (EVs) could support 220,000 jobs by 
2040. The ability to create and retain these jobs will depend on the UK’s 
access to critical materials for batteries and rare earth magnets for EV 
motors and platinum group metals for the hydrogen economy. 
10105 Finance, business and policy Addressing the climate challenge
Allan Walton, Paul Anderson, Gavin Harper and 
Vicky Mann
Critical materials, strategic elements and the  
green industrial revolution
Fig. 1 – sources of strategically important materials
Developing strategies
Technology-critical metals are often at risk of supply shortage for 
a number of reasons: rapidly expanding markets, geographical 
concentrations in certain parts of the globe (see Fig. 1), political factors 
(such as trade disputes, quotas and taxes), low recycling rates and a lack 
of substitute materials. None of these strategic elements are mined in 
significant quantities in the UK.
Accessing the raw materials is just one piece of the jigsaw. Without the 
processing technologies necessary to convert these technology-critical 
metals into, for example, chemicals, cathodes, alloys or magnets, we 
remain reliant on other countries for the critical components needed 
by our industrial sectors, and in many cases a large bulk of the value 
and jobs are in these parts of the supply chain. Highly skilled jobs, 
which would otherwise provide high-quality employment, are at risk 
if we do not capture more of the value chain in the UK. Some regions 
of the world, especially China, have invested heavily in the processing 
capability to convert these materials into products and, by doing so, now 
control the downstream supply chain.
Recycling or re-using the materials and components at end-of-life or 
from production scrap could provide a significant indigenous supply of 
technology-critical metals. However, there are technological, economic 
and regulatory barriers in some cases, which has meant that many of 
these materials are lost in the system. In fact less than 3% of rare-
earth materials are recycled today worldwide. A UK-based secondary 
supply chain could be developed to re-use, recover and reprocess 
these materials and products, learning lessons from success stories 
with platinum-group metals and aerospace alloys, where world leading 
recycling technologies have been developed in the UK. 
There are also opportunities for primary supply in the UK and by 
making strategic alliances overseas. The UK has major international 
interests in mining, through London registered companies, mine 
finance, equipment supply, consultancy services, and research  
and education.
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Recommendations
The policy commission developed a number of recommendations 
informed by the challenges that end-users in crucial British industries 
have faced, as well as insight from across the supply chain for a number 
of key technology metals. Although the specific challenges around 
different materials vary, overall it is clear the UK urgently needs to 
develop policy responses to the critical materials challenge post Brexit.
1. The UK should create a single body responsible for developing
strategic access to technology-critical metals. This body should link
the primary and secondary markets for technology-critical metals
and maintain an overarching strategy for the UK.
2. We should seek opportunities to diversify our access to primary
resources of technology-critical metals, through resource diplomacy.
This should form part of new trade negotiations.
3. Actively attract and provide support for large-scale strategic private
investments for supply chain development of technology-critical
metals both at home and abroad, and aim to make the UK an
international refining centre for specific technology-critical metals
by 2025.
4. Create individual task forces bridging primary and
secondary materials for targeted technology-
critical metals. These should identify the 
investments that would be required 
to set up primary processing, 
refining and recycling facilities 
for these materials.
5. Introduce incentives to
encourage recycling
refining and processing 
of technology-critical 
metals in the UK, 
particularly for 
processes that 





that seek to develop our
indigenous sources of
technology-critical metal 
(lithium, tungsten), including updating the regulatory environment.
7. Prioritise technology-critical metals in UK Research and Innovation
strategies in areas such as the circular economy, developing
substitute materials and efficient processing techniques for
technology-critical metals.
8. Invest in the skills base in advanced materials processing and
refining of technology-critical metals.
9. Urgently address the lack of data on material flows for technology-
critical metals into and out of the UK economy.
10. Review waste management law with a view to promoting the
recovery of technology-critical metals and ensure that there are no
unnecessary regulatory barriers.
11. Encourage information exchange through the whole supply chain
to ensure the challenges for recyclers are well understood by the
product designers.
12. Consider how appropriate governance structures might ensure
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The UK is currently facing profound governance challenges with the 
conjunction of the deepening housing crisis, climate change and the 
crisis of Covid-19 and the associated lockdowns. Rather than these 
problems being mutually exclusive, they are deeply interwoven with 
Covid-19 exposing and exacerbating housing inequalities. These include 
the vast differences in experiences of lockdown between those living in 
houses with plenty of indoor and outdoor space, often older, owner-
occupiers in rural/semi-rural locations, and those living in apartments, 
often younger renters in city centres or inner cities. Moreover, 
people being largely confined to their locality has demonstrated the 
importance of the 20-minute neighbourhood, or having shops and 
facilities within walking distance of one’s home, which could play a 
significant role in reducing transport and carbon emissions. Household 
energy generation is also a significant contributor to carbon emissions, 
40% in the UK, so the built environment has a key role to play in 
addressing climate change. The central theme of this article is therefore 
that integrated, strategic planning is vitally needed to address these 
pressing, interlocking problems. 
The situation pre-Covid
The causes of England’s housing crisis are complex and contentious 
but it is widely agreed that it centres upon affordability and rising 
house prices which has increasingly priced (younger) people out 
of homeownership and into private rented accommodation which 
tends to be poorer quality stock, has less security of tenure and is 
more expensive. There are arguably a range of causes for high house 
prices, from international/national factors, such as interest rates and 
the financialisation of housing through to locational characteristics, 
such as the quality of transport links, schools and environmental offer. 
The crisis interrelates with the climate change agenda because, with 
land and housing already being so expensive, there are limits on how 
much buyers and housebuilders are willing to spend on a property’s 
sustainability credentials, even after the experience of lockdown. 
Likewise, the ageing nature and often poor quality of housing stock, 
austerity and the lack of incentives or requirements for private 
landlords, social landlords and homeowners to improve the energy 
efficiency of houses, such as insulation, double glazing or solar panels, 
limit the sustainability credentials of existing stock. 
The Green Belt planning policy was introduced in the 1947 Planning 
Act and aims to prevent urban sprawl around England’s largest cities 
and also some historic cities. This policy, alongside the broader 
planning system, is often blamed for exacerbating England’s housing 
crisis by restricting housing development at the rural-urban fringe 
where demand for housing is the highest. In response, it is regularly 
argued that compact cities, dense brownfield development and 
protection of the countryside is vital to sustainability. Indeed, a fierce 
debate rages between those arguing that the Green Belt directs 
development further into the countryside with people then commuting 
back into cities (the ‘leapfrogging’ argument) whilst others argue that 
expanding existing urban areas through urban extensions is inherently 
unsustainable with the lack of public transport and facilities. Arguably 
the Green Belt does exacerbate the housing crisis although the evidence 
is complicated. Nonetheless, this dualism or polarised debate between 
solving the housing crisis and protecting the environment, or ‘economy’ 
versus ‘environment’ arguments, are unhelpful in productively moving 
the debate forwards. They miss the crucial role of planning, especially 
at a strategic, regional/sub-regional level, in addressing climate change. 
Indeed, many issues relating to planning, such as housing, transport, 
flooding and climate change, are inherently larger-than-local and 
strategic. It is also widely agreed that addressing affordability is key 
whilst ensuring sufficient services and facilities alongside development 
is vital to reduce car-dependency. Nonetheless, at the very point that 
planning is needed most, the system is weakend by many years of 
ideological attack, continuous tinkering and deregulation, under-
resourcing and the lack of statutory strategic planning since 2010. 
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The impact of Covid and lockdown 
on housing 
Covid and lockdown has arguably made the debate over the Green Belt 
more complicated and challenging. Most people in urban areas being 
unable to access the Green Belt for their recreational needs for many 
months and the importance of domestic/outside space in housing 
alongside access to local greenspace, has challenged the case for high 
density development in existing urban areas which is needed alongside 
the Green Belt. Indeed, Place Alliance found that the greatest predictor 
of satisfaction during lockdown was access to private greenspace so, 
unsurprisingly, owner-occupiers and those with older property were the 
most satisfied with their homes and private and social tenants alongside 
those living in high-rise buildings the least satisfied. Greenery was the 
most important aspect of one’s neighbourhood with use of greenspace 
and local facilities peaking with a 5-minute walk and reducing 
sharply for longer than a 10-minute walk so Place Alliance actually 
recommended a 5-10-minute neighbourhood. There is now a strong 
case for perhaps more medium density development in existing 
urban areas and certainly for apartments with more domestic space 
and better access to outdoor space with there being rightly calls for 
minimum space standards in new developments, access to greenspace 
standards and a Healthy Homes Act. However, in order to still meet 
the housing needs of cities, lower density development in cities could 
exert more development pressure on the Green Belt, especially in cities 
which are tightly constrained by Green Belt, like Birmingham. Surveys 
suggest that households looking for more domestic, outdoor and local 
greenspace during lockdown have been moving to the countryside and 
rural-urban fringe also putting more pressure on the Green Belt. The 
lockdown has also shown the importance of local shops and services and 
the potential that the 20-minute neighbourhood has to reduce transport 
emissions. Nonetheless, vibrant and viable local centres to some extent 
depend upon density with Place Alliance recommending a minimum 
density of 50 dwellings per hectare (dpa) for all new development yet 
CPRE argue that the average density of developments in the Green Belt 
is currently 15 dwellings per hectare. The issues with ‘leapfrogging’ 
have also become less pressing with the increase in home-working 
andreduced pressure on transport systems in and out of conurbations. 
However, if people, especially families, increasingly move out of urban 
areas, the central challenge remains of the future and function of city 
centres and inner cities and the potential consequences for the many 
people who cannot afford to move out of these areas. To some extent, 
there is tension between what the market or volume housebuilders 
desire, in terms of wanting to build homes with gardens on the rural-
urban fringe, and the outcomes which the planning system tries to 
deliver including development in cities on brownfield land supported 
by adequate services and facilities to reduce carbon emissions. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is the importance of local greenspace, with 
CPRE finding that 46% of adults visited more greenspace since the start 
of lockdown and 67% believing that protection and enhancement of 
greenspace should be a priority. 
Policy responses: the government’s 
response
The Government’s policy response in the post-pandemic recovery 
has involved further liberalisation and flexibility in planning through 
extensions to Permitted Development Rights (PDRs), Class E and the 
Planning White Paper. PDRs allow a building to change in use without 
the need for planning permission if basic conditions are met. There 
have been well-documented issues with PDRs, especially converting 
office buildings into residential use, including the sometimes chronic 
lack of domestic space, windows and natural light in apartments, very 
poor or no greenspace provided alongside development and the 
absence of a requirement to contribute to improving local services or 
facilities - known as ‘planning gain’. In September 2020, the Secretary of 
State for Housing, Robert Jenrick, introduced minimum space standards 
for PDRs for residential projects but PDRs have been extended since 
Covid with Class E allowing commercial, service and retail uses to be 
converted to residential. This has been widely criticised in the built 
environment profession as potentially radically altering local areas 
through losing valuable shops and facilities. Local authorities have lost 
yet more power to manage and improve their local areas whilst facing 
the headwinds of recession and profound economic and changes 
accelerated by Covid. The Planning White Paper proposes radically 
simplifying and digitalising the planning system through dividing up the 
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country into three ‘areas’, growth, protect and renewal, with the Green 
Belt enjoying continued protection. Although housing figures would be 
given directly by central to local Government, the Paper is largely silent 
on strategic planning and lacked firm commitments on climate change. 
Policy responses: recommendations
Given the pressing and fundamental challenges outlined in this article, 
arguably well-resourced, strategic and proactive planning is desperately 
needed. Solving the housing crisis should still be a very important policy 
aspiration but the system needs to move away from being overly focused 
on housing numbers to focus on the type and quality of housing being 
delivered alongside broader issues around climate and environmental 
change. This article therefore proposes recommendations surrounding 
the key spatial scales in planning – national, regional and local: 
1. National:
A national plan is needed to spatially map out the Government’s
economic and transport investment priorities and how it intends to
address climate and environmental change. This national plan would
allocate broad areas of growth and restraint and review the overall
purpose and spatial extent of the Green Belt through a national Green
Belt conversation. The policy’s purpose should move to being more
environmentally-focused with an overall sustainability purpose aiming
to ensure that the Green Belt plays a more positive role in addressing
climate change through river restoration, for example. Alongside this,
there should be a social objective which aims to increase recreation
access to the Green Belt and stipulates that housing development should
serve a ‘social’ purpose, that is, a certain proportion of housing should
be affordable or offer tenures which are particularly needed, like social
housing or housing for the elderly. This would help address the key issue
of the affordability of new homes built in the Green Belt. National space
and environmental standards for new homes could be introduced to
ensure a level playing field across the country.
2. Regional/sub-regional:
A strategic plan could address the key environmental issues related to
climate change, such as flooding, whilst also developing an economic
strategy and allocating locations of restraint and housing growth.
The strategic plan would explore the various spatial blueprints or
growth options available, such as new towns, urban extensions or
urban densification, over a broader spatial canvas than would be
possiblelocally, so could make sustainability-based decisions.
3. Local:
There could be more scope for local authorities to manage non-
strategic decisions, like the design and tenure of housing, alongside
councils becoming more involved in delivering housing themselves.
Local authorities could lead the way and benchmark in terms of
environmental standards for new homes. In larger cities, perhaps
more medium density development is needed to support local services
whilst still permitting access to high quality greenspace. The amount 
of homes suitable for families built in cities should increase, that is, 
larger apartments with more discrete spaces. In Birmingham in 2018, 
for example, 81% of new dwellings were flats, 81% of new dwellings 
built in Birmingham in 2018 were flats, highlighting a lack of diversity 
in the tenures delivered. There should be more local partnership 
working and greater scope for local authorities to manage and shape 
their local centres to encourage more independent retailers and maybe 
the opportunity to introduce out-of-town parking levies etc. to help 
successfully deliver the 20-minute neighbourhood. 
Conclusions
This article has set out some of the contentious and complex challenges 
involved in solving the housing crisis and addressing climate change, 
which have been exacerbated by Covid and lockdown. In many ways, 
climate change and the housing crisis are inherently ‘wicked problems’ 
– difficult to solve, long term and involving numerous policy areas
and actors. However, the article has set out the power and potential of
planning, especially strategic planning, to bring together various actors
and interests in seeking to develop a vision for place. Strategic planning
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cities for children 
and young people
It is estimated that by 2050, ‘two-thirds of all humanity – 6.5 billion 
people – will be urban’ and that before then, in the next decade, 60% 
of those in cities will be children and young people (Arup, 2017). A 
recent report in the Lancet argues that investment is needed to ‘address 
the greatest threats to child health and wellbeing.’ Children aged 
0-17 bear the brunt of the negative environmental impacts associated
with increased urbanisation, with ‘1 in 4 deaths of children under 5
attributed to unhealthy environments’ (WHO, 2017). Air pollution,
energy insecurity, food shortages and water vulnerabilities are critical
threats which face young lives in cities and which are complicated
by cross-cutting social factors like gender, income, disability and
ethnicity. The environmental challenges facing urban children – now
and in the future – are far more complex than we often think and are
compounded by challenges associated with climate change. Creating
better, safer, healthier cities for children and young people, now
and in the future, should be a priority for governments, researchers,
communities, NGOs, businesses and others.
Sharing evidence
Let us be clear on why addressing the environments of cities - and 
especially challenges associated with air, water and energy - matters 
for children and young people. According to the World Health 
Organization, ‘93% of all children live in environments with air 
pollution above WHO guidelines.’ We know that children are more 
vulnerable to air pollutants than adults (WHO, 2018)and as a result 
this is one of the primary causes of death and damage to their health 
and wellbeing(UNICEF 2017). The first 1,000 days of human life is 
critical for development – for those children exposed to high levels of 
pollutants, this can have serious developmental and health implications 
(UNICEF 2017). 
In terms of water, ‘the quality and quantity of water that children 
rely on for survival is under threat… by 2040, 1 in 4 children will 
live in areas with extremely high-water stress’ (UNICEF, 2020). 
International policy frames water as something to be ‘accessed, used 
and controlled’(Hadfield-Hill and Zara 2019). However, research has 
shown that children’s experiences of water go beyond simple questions 
of resource access. Children interact with water (and its absence) in 
a range of ways that may compound existing inequalities and that are 
structured by the values they learn from adults and their understandings 
of climatic events, such as drought or monsoon (Hadfield-Hill and  Zara 
2019). 
Children’s lives should also be at the centre of discussions about 
sustainable and equitable energy. Energy is critical to children’s 
development and wellbeing (UNICEF, 2015) and equitable access to 
energy has a direct impact on poverty reduction. It has been proven, for 
instance, that more reliable street lighting can make urban spaces safer 
for girls, allowing them to access schools and therefore the education 
that can make a difference to their lives. Where that access is unreliable 
- for instance where it is controlled by criminal gangs in informal
settlements - girls’ education and their livelihoods may be at risk.
Critically, discussion about building ‘child-friendly cities’ has, so far, 
tended to focus on less overtly ‘environmental’ factors - looking instead 
at other important issues, such as children’s access to education, or their 
ability to move around or play in urban places. However, it is time to pay 
greater attention to the environmental challenges that affect, and even 
underpin, children’s experiences of cities - and especially the impacts  
of pollution, climate change and access to resources like water 
and energy. The case studies below bring some of these issues and 
complexities to life.
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Case Study: Children living with the monsoon (Hadfield-Hill and Zara, 
2019) (Hadfield-Hill and Zara, 2019)
Here the authors show how researchers and international agencies 
need to think beyond current water discourses, which are often framed 
around access, use and control. Of course, these are vital, but so too are 
a whole host of water challenges which impact young lives. This research 
from India showed how young people lived with water: how it shaped 
what they do, where they go and how it intersected with their play, 
belonging and ultimately lived experiences of inequality. 
On the one hand, the monsoon brings with it relief from the heat and of 
course, for children, opportunities to play (see the photograph above), 
as one participant commented ‘we sometimes drink good water of rivers. 
I and my friends swim… we wash our cows… we go to swim’ (Male, 
11). However, the research shows that the intensity of the monsoon 
rains soon ‘infiltrates… their routines, homes, minds and bodies’ 
perpetuating existing inequalities. Roads wash away, infrastructures 
are cut off, children cannot go to school. The homes people lived in 
impacted on their everyday experience of the monsoon - rain seeped 
into homes, mould grew up walls and young bodies were the most 
vulnerable - with fungal infections common among participants living 
in environments which buckle under the pressure of the rains. This 
research argues for a re-thinking of watery inequalities and urges us 
to ‘think with the weather in uncovering the complexities of young 
people’s entanglements with water.’
Case study: Living with and adapting to socio-environmental challenges in 
Sao Paulo’s periphery (Börner et al., 2020; Börner et al., 2019; Science 
Magazine, 2021)
Research conducted with young people in the urban periphery of Sao 
Paulo has shown that the socio-environmental challenges facing young 
people are complex and often interconnected, impacting on various 
areas of their lives. On top of that, the impacts of climate change with 
more frequent and intense extreme weather events such as flooding, 
storms, and heatwaves exacerbate resource insecurity and produce so-
called “wicked challenges”, particularly affecting families in precarious 
housing conditions. 
Research however has also shown that youth in the urban periphery 
of Sao Paulo possess important everyday knowledge about living with 
resource (in)security. Their stories reflect manifold realities which 
cannot be reduced to a single “one size fits all” portrait of their situation. 
Whereas some youth may point to issues around flooding, access to 
clean drinking water or to healthy food, others named concerns such 
as air pollution or lack of access to greenspace. At the same time, young 
people have developed ways of dialoguing with and adapting to resource 
scarcity through everyday adaptive actions, although these knowledge(s) 
and actions may not be immediately visible at a first glance, and 
therefore remain “hidden”. They shared stories about practices of 
saving water, unplugging electronic devices before storms to avoid 
lightning strikes, creating support networks with family or neighbours, 
or engaging with local food production initiatives. And, despite all the 
challenges they are facing, youth also introduced another view of the 
periphery - a perspective which is one of hope, where nature is (re-)
claiming its space in the midst of precarious urban settlements, with 
secret views, birds and butterflies, and where young people care about 
creating safer and healthy futures for themselves and their families.
Multiple realities in one: between resource scarcity, adaptive action, and 
the unexpected beauty of (peri)urban spaces (source: male, 12 years old)
Moving the public debate forward
It is essential that we address these challenges head-on in planning 
and designing, safer, more inclusive urban environments. As well as 
academics, governments, international agencies and civil society have an 
important role to play in addressing these critical challenges of our time. 
Indeed, this is the ‘decade of action’ for cities (World Cities Report, 
2020). It is time to think differently about children and young people’s 
relationship with cities, and to initiate a debate that focuses on the 
environmental and infrastructural conditions of cities as well as more 
detailed questions about the planning of urban public spaces. We have 
the evidence about the impacts of poor-quality urban environments on 
children and young people’s lives - but action is needed.
Critically, children have a fundamental right to a safe and 
environmentally just city. We need to scale up from neighbourhood- or 
city-level debates - and academic research - to initiate a global debate 
about what makes a city not only child-friendly, but better, safer and 
healthier for children to live and grow up in. We also need to recognise 
that building better cities for children will make cities better for all 
urban residents - now and in the future. This debate needs to be 
genuinely inclusive and to take place in a variety of formats and media 
to answer some difficult questions, as follows. 
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• How can governments, policy-makers, academics, businesses, NGOs
and communities work together to get a grasp of the complex,
intersecting environmental challenges and threats facing children?
• What areas should we prioritise in addressing these complex
challenges in creating child-friendly cities for children, now and in
the future?
• How can priorities for creating a safe and environmentally just city for
children be agreed and shared at a global level but also be sensitive to
local conditions and concerns?
• How can cities (and the children who live in them) not only
genuinely mitigate against but live well with the effects of threats to
climate, air, energy, food and water?
• Placing children at the centre of these debates - listening not only to
their experiences and worries but their aspirations and the solutions
they propose - is imperative if we are serious about addressing these
challenges. Engaging children and young people in debates about th
potentials of urban space is also key to overcoming the stigmatization
of urban peripheries and to creating dialogues of hope rather
than shame. At the same time, while taking youth seriously, youth
engagement also needs to be ‘playful’ to incentivize meaningful




The next step is, then, to initiate an inclusive, global debate about 
how we can build better, safer, healthier cities for children. Below we 
suggest a range of starting points to for those debates, for gathering 
the knowledge we need, and, resulting from those debates for actually 
addressing the challenges which face children’s lives in cities.
There is a need for more systematic co-production of research, 
consultation, policy-making with children (for instance through 
community-based mapping of relevant issues such as areas of 
environmental risk, access to food, provision of greenspaces). There is 
also a need, however, to create a platform to share that research within 
and between countries. 
There could be further and more systematic consideration of the 
technologies to facilitate children’s participation and meaningful 
interaction with policy-makers and other stakeholders (practitioners, 
researchers, youth-to-youth dialogue between activists and other young 
people). These could include bespoke mobile phone apps, social media, 
websites, and other media platforms as well as more ‘traditional’ forums 
for interaction such as workshops and conferences. These approaches 
could also include more experimental formats outside of ‘formal’ 
spaces, such as neighbourhood and city walks led by young people 
themselves to engage practitioners and decision-makers into their 
everyday realities first-hand.
The debate could be moved on by drawing on ways of thinking about 
and visualising the complex interactions of environmental and social 
challenges that urban children face (e.g. ‘nexus approaches’) as well 
as threats posed to resource security by environmental hazards. For 
instance, extreme weather events such as floods can have an impact on 
food security when food items become destroyed by the floods generally 
affecting families living in vulnerable conditions. Moreover, storms can 
negatively impact energy security as power cuts occur more frequently 
during or as a result of these events.
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The debate and any proposed solutions need to seriously address the 
ways children adapt to and dialogue with resource insecurities and 
disaster risk. Yet, the overall approach should be one that helps children 
see not only the challenges and limitations but also the potentials of 
urban spaces and solutions to the environmental challenges they face. 
An approach that empowers children to perceive themselves as having 
ownership and being able to engage with their local environment is 
vital. This also means being hopeful that change is possible; hence, 
engaging with the potentials as well as the limitations of urban space is 
crucial.
We know much about how children experience urban spaces and what 
they want to see. There are also global conventions - such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet those knowledges 
and laws do not always translate into real, systematic action for child-
friendly cities - whether in terms of planning or infrastructural solutions, 
or enshrining children’s needs and voices into local or national laws.
We need to radically re-think city infrastructures to create better, safer, 
healthier environments for children and young people to grow up 
in. How can we reduce the number of childhood deaths attributed to 
unhealthy environments? How can we ensure that the air children are 
breathing in cities is cleaner and less damaging? How can we address the 
threats associated with air pollution, energy insecurity, food shortages 
and water vulnerabilities? It is not easy, our action and infrastructures 
need to be scaled up. Above all, we need interdisciplinary teams of 
engineers, city planners, architects, government officials and children’s 
geographers (to name but a few stakeholders) to work together - we 
need to think and act big to address these critical challenges of our 
time. This also means addressing the impacts of climate change before  
it is too late, if we want to create safe and liveable futures for today’s 
young generations.
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of site and out  
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A 2020 report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) estimated 
that the building sector accounts for a staggering 38% of world-wide 
energy-related CO2 emissions and that the construction industry is 
responsible for nearly 30% of this figure. The report also highlights the 
increasing levels of emissions from the sector with 2019 reaching an  
all-time high of almost 10 GigaTonnes of equivalent CO2. As such,  
the construction industry is, quite rightly, under pressure from the 
UK government to change practices and meet net zero carbon targets 
by 2050.
Organisations such as the UK Green Building Council are at the 
forefront of initiatives to reduce energy use and embedded carbon 
cost across the whole building sector. Understandably, the focus is 
on reducing emissions from the buildings themselves, be it during 
construction or over their whole lifecycle, and the embedded carbon 
cost of the construction materials is a very important part of this 
carbon footprint calculation. Whole-life embedded carbon assessment 
is nothing new and the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) originally 
produced embedded carbon data and calculation guides back in 2011. 
Most major public building projects are now required to calculate the 
“cradle to gate” and/or “cradle to grave” carbon impact as part of the 
design process. This is all good news, and the UK leads the world in 
the integrity and depth of its embedded carbon assessment processes. 
Nevertheless, are we doing enough to reduce carbon impact across the 
sector and are there missing elements to the analysis – a hidden  
cost, say, that is absent from the assessment? We believe there is 
something missing. 
The embedded carbon cost in equivalent kilograms of CO2 emissions 
per kilogram of material kgCO2e/kg) is traditionally calculated for 
specific individual materials (cast concrete, say) but in reality, there 
are a multitude of choices (e.g., different concrete grades). It requires 
complex calculation routes to come up with an overall figure for a 
construction project and it becomes a numbers game (which suits 
engineers) to reduce the carbon footprint against project cost. It is also 
worth noting that profit margins in the construction sector are 2% at 
best and, therefore, reducing the embedded carbon cost on site is not a 
priority to most contractors. 
Ultimately, there has to be some standard process for embedded carbon 
evaluation and good quality evidential information is vital for accurate 
calculations. The material-focused assessment is the best approach we 
have at the moment, but it does not account for the whole carbon cost 
of the development as, normally, the infrastructure systems feeding 
the buildings (water, gas, electricity, drainage, etc.) are not included 
in the life-cycle carbon assessment. Take water supply and drainage 
infrastructure as an example. There are estimated to be over 600,000 
kilometres of buried water, sewage and drainage pipes in the UK that, 
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ultimately, need replacing over a cycle of about 50 years. This is easily 
in the “cradle to grave” lifetime of a building but the carbon cost of 
this supporting infrastructure is not included in the overall carbon 
assessment – we argue it should be.
Modern-day pipes, sewers and water drainage systems are predominantly 
made of plastic, usually high-density polyethylene (HDPE) or 
polyvinylchloride (PVC), ceramic or cast and/or reinforced concrete. 
These materials have a high embedded carbon cost (see Figure 1a) 
but considerable effort is being made by manufacturers to reduce the 
carbon cost of their products. Through the use of 100% recycled plastics 
and reduced carbon concrete mixtures these ‘low-carbon’ alternatives 
have claimed embedded carbon reductions of between 50 to 80%. Good 
news, but the numbers do not tell the full story. By focusing on the 
primary construction material (the pipe in this case), the embedded 
cost of installation, including the excavation of soil and backfilling, is an 
afterthought in the carbon reduction process - essentially out of sight 
and out of mind. Under current pipeline installation standards, fresh 
aggregate materials (usually sand and/or gravel) are required for the 
fill materials around the pipe in order to guarantee installation integrity 
and quality – it is a pipe-soil system that is being provided. As such, there 
is a significant added carbon cost in the excavation and off-site removal 
of the original soils and the import of fresh aggregates to backfill the 
pipe trench and reinstate the surface. 
These ‘virgin’ aggregates have an embedded carbon cost attributed 
to them (see figure 1a again) which is predominantly related to the 
transport cost of delivery to site. However, this is at least a 100 times 
less than the embedded carbon cost of the pipe materials themselves 
(concrete, plastic, etc.) and, consequently, the impact of using virgin 
fill materials is commonly overlooked in the overall carbon budget. The 
real carbon cost needs to take into account the true volume of the pipe 
trench (and therefore the volume of embedment and backfill materials) 
and the carbon cost of removing the excavated ‘as dug’ materials 
from site. A better way to look at the assessment is to take a “whole 
installation” view and define the embedded carbon per unit length 
of pipe installation (per 100m, say). This puts a different perspective 
on the overall carbon cost (see Figure 1b) and for a typical, 300mm 
diameter drainage pipe installation, would mean that the carbon cost 
associated with virgin aggregate use is almost equivalent to that of the 
precast concrete pipe itself. If the estimated 50-80% carbon reduction 
figures stated for low-carbon plastic and concrete pipes can be realised, 
then the highest carbon cost for any new pipe installation is likely 
to be associated with the backfill/embedment materials and trench 
reinstatement – a fact that might surprise some contractors in the 
pipeline sector.
a) Estimated Cradle-To-Gate Embedded Carbon Emission Values Of Common 





















Figure 1. Estimated cradle-to-gate embedded carbon emission values for 
pipeline materials and typical pipeline installation components. 
So, what can be done to meet our net 
carbon goals? 
Obtaining alternative backfill/embedment materials from recycled 
sources is good start but using the excavated ‘as dug’ material from site 
is a better, more sustainable option. The materials will need careful 
sorting and perhaps processing on site, which will increase the monetary 
cost, but transport-related savings should balance this. 
Research being undertaken under the University of Birmingham’s ARLI 
programme (Alternative Raw materials with Low Impact) is already 
investigating how the sector can better use its waste streams (e.g., using 
recycled concrete as the embedment material). More interestingly, 
waste and by-product streams from the non-construction industries 
are also being evaluated including crushed glass, manmade fibres and 
even eggshells. Incorporating these alternative resources into the ‘as-
dug’ materials on site helps condition and modify the physio-chemical 
properties of the excavated soils, ensuring a more even and stable 
backfill for the pipeline. 
Regulations are also a barrier with current standards for pipeline 
installation not readily accommodating recycled embedment materials 
in their scope. Regulation change takes a long time but a working 
group of the Pipeline Industries Guild has been set up to tackle the 
issue head on. Consisting of members from academic groups, including 
the University of Birmingham, industry research centres (e.g., Water 
Research Centre) and highly experienced consultants, the aim is to 
transform pipeline installation practices which will then inform changes 
to current standards (e.g., BS 9295:2020 Guide to the structural design 
of buried pipes) with carbon reduction as the focus. The aim is to cut 
out ‘off-site’ material transport and eliminate the need for bought-
in embedment materials (particularly virgin aggregates). Summed 
up in Figure 2, our initial research indicates that a saving of ~70% in 
embedded carbon could be made with practices transformed by 2030. 
Not quite net zero, but a long way down the road to the 2050 target.
b) Estimated Cradle-To-Gate Total Embedded Carbon Emission 
Values per 100m for a Typical Drainwater Pipe Installation
Pipeline Installation Components
Estimated Equivalent Co2  Cost In 
Kgco2  E/Kg Per 100m Length
Soil Removal and Virgin Aggregate 610
Virgin Aggregate 320
HDPE Pipe Only 3,958
Cast Concrete Pipe Only 636
Reinforced Cast Concrete Pipe Only 1,590
Recycled HDPE Pipe Only 475
Low Carbon Cast Concrete Pipe Only 190
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The pipeline manufacturers are playing their part as well. In a current 
InnovateUK funded research programme, Aquaspira Ltd are working 
with the University of Birmingham to develop almost 100% recycled 
composite steel and HDPE “SmartSense” pipes that can be installed 
with recycled or as-dug embedment materials and embedded sensing 
to autonomously monitor ground conditions. Key to this research 
is developing a better understanding of the detailed physical and 
geotechnical properties of the embedment material and how the whole 
pipeline installation performs when ground loading conditions change 
around the pipe. 
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Figure 2. Reducing embedded carbon cost for pipeline installations – a 
move to using on-site materials and reduced transport. 
Computational technology is helping in this regard with sophisticated 
numerical models being developed to create a digital simulant (or 
‘digital twin’) of full-scale pipe installations. The research is utilising 
the testing capabilities of the new, £27millon UKCRIC National 
Buried Infrastructure Facility (NBIF) located on the University of 
Birmingham’s Edgbaston campus. Full-scale trials will be conducted 
with the SmartSense pipes where ground and performance data will 
be used to develop and optimise the performance of the digital twin 
co-product. The UK is world-leading in the development of national 
digital twin capability and digital simulators will play an important part 
in establishing the baseline data needed to reduce our carbon impact. 
A recently released Royal Society policy briefing on “computing for 
net zero” recognises the contribution that Digital Twins can have 
towards meeting net zero goals; it states, “Digital twins make it possible 
to establish feedback loops to monitor, understand, optimise and 
reduce GHG emissions in many sectors”. The work Aquaspira and the 
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University are undertaking is just part of this digital infrastructure 
revolution with BIM (Building Information modelling) already being 
used to evaluate entire building life-cycle performance and carbon 
budgets from inception and design through to demolition and materials 
reuse. The evolution of BIM into whole-site and even city-scale digital 
twins will transform our long-term management of energy, water and 
waste and provide the underpinning technology to meet the data needs 
for a net zero sector. It is a very exciting time to be part of the buried 
infrastructure engineering community and the goal of net zero by 2050 
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Reducing the negative impacts of climate change requires revolutionary 
changes to urban lifestyles. Decarbonising the urban realm requires the 
alignment of alterations in transport, employment, spatial planning, 
and architecture to encourage and force alterations in social norms and 
related behavioural changes. Behaviour is embedded in deep seated 
expectations and practices. 
The political, policy and academic debate has over-emphasized the 
development of technological solutions and efficiency savings to support 
the creation of low-carbon pathways (the supply side) and neglected a 
focus on why we require and use energy in the first place (the demand 
side). The latter highlights the importance of individual and collective 
actions and localised measures to support people with very diverse 
needs. Decarbonising the urban realm is a process requiring the 
alignment, and rebalancing of technological innovations with lifestyle 
alterations. This requires systemic and revolutionary change. This 
opinion piece identifies the extent of this challenge and, in so doing, 
provides a framework to guide policy development to accelerate global 
action towards the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to climate change: each place needs 
a unique blend of solutions. Climate change mitigation and adaption 
requires coordinated multi-scalar solutions – from households to streets 
and cities to nations. Everything must change including infrastructure 
provision, movement and flows of people, raw materials and products, 
and everyday living. This requires major alterations in approaches to 
planning and managing cities that will disrupt existing lifestyles. The 
built environment must be transformed to support short, medium 
and long-term changes. Different places and population cohorts must 
develop and apply different forms of mitigations and adaptations 
reflecting local circumstances. These include extraordinary global cities 
and more ordinary places including smaller towns and rural areas.
Decarbonising urban lifestyles can therefore only be achieved by 
focusing on process rather than output, a process that includes three 
interlinked activities: 
1) Defining the extent of the challenge by applying a whole-systems
approach to decarbonising urban lifestyles with a focus on systemic
understanding.
2) Highlighting core risks related to behavioural adaptations including
identifying barriers to change including existing norms and
expectations.
3) Setting out a series of policy pathways to facilitate rapid
decarbonisation of urban lifestyles.
Each will be explored in turn. 
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Defining the extent of the challenge and 
applying a whole-systems approach 
In urban areas, climate change requires the creation and application 
of a whole-systems approach to the challenge of decarbonising urban 
lifestyles. This requires appreciation of the complexity and diversity of 
urban ecosystems and in identifying multi-scalar intervention points. 
Such an approach must be applied rapidly and systematically to all loca
contexts. Policy development must focus on the intersections between 
supply and demand informed by a detailed appreciation of different 
forms of urban living with attention given to intersectional challenges 
and blockages stressing socio-economic and spatial inequalities. This 
includes identifying energy-intensive lifestyles (and the ways in which 
these are produced, incentivised, normalised), infrastructure systems 
and production systems. 
Consumption patterns differ between places and cohorts resulting in 
different degrees of carbon-intensive lifestyle. The most vulnerable 
cohorts tend to have less carbon-intensive lifestyles and it is these 
groups that will be most exposed to the negative impacts of climate 
change. A core challenge is identifying and understanding different 
urban lifestyles and the extent to which they reflect different 
forms of carbon intensity. This is about awareness, learning and 
developing understanding as well as being about responsibilities and 
communication. Culture is important in this context. Celebrity lifestyle
for example, are extremely carbon-intensive and play an important role
in encouraging aspirational carbon-intensive lifestyles. 
The application of a whole-systems approach to decarbonizing urban 
lifestyles must focus on:
1) Identifying and redesigning existing urban infrastructures
(for example the utilities and mobility/connectivity related
infrastructures) that underpin carbon-intensive urban living.
2) Identifying manufacturing systems that support and underpin
carbon-intensive lifestyles including product design, packaging, and
logistics with related approaches to recycling.
3) Develop a household informed understanding of the carbon-
intensity of different approaches to urban living.
4) Promoting individual and collective ethical responsibilities and
awareness to gather altruist momentum and a sense of ownership in




Barriers to adaptation and 
decarbonising urban lifestyles
All places are in a continual state of becoming, as individuals, groups 
and organisations adapt to processes of change and transformation 
occurring at different speeds and rhythms. The recent pandemic 
has highlighted the importance of temporary and more permanent 
adaptations for places and people. These processes of adaptation are 
place specific, even idiosyncratic, as decisions that have been made in 
the past influence and, in many cases, determine current investments. 
All cities are the outcome of path-dependent layers of decisions. This 
path dependency provides place-based distinctiveness as processes of 
ongoing incremental decision-making shape the physical, social and 
economic environments of place, but in turn creates barriers to change 
given the established intersections between supply and demand. 
Urban lifestyles are based upon conventions that have been created 
locally, nationally, and culturally. A convention is a constraint on action. 
These conventions, norms, or regularities are incorporated into routines 
that create specific forms of urban living. In urban areas, conventions 
include approaches to infrastructure provision, spatial planning, the 
design of residential units, consumption, approaches to mobility, and 
the everyday enactment of urban lifestyles. 
Existing conventions and routines represent core barriers to adaptation 
and mitigation to climate change and to decarbonising urban lifestyles. 
Existing carbon-intensive urban lifestyles are the outcome of bundles of 
carbon-intensive routines that have formed to support specific cohorts’ 
expectations and attitudes to urban living. They sit within wider systems, 
typically neo-liberal planning and the financialization of cities which 
tend to privilege speed and density to the detriment of people and 
places. A whole systems approach must be applied to identifying and 
understanding these bundles of routines that underpin carbon-intensive 
urban lifestyles and how they are grounded in wider approaches to the 
urban which in turn needs to be challenged.
Existing approaches to managing urban economies highlight the 
importance of ‘growth’ combined with ‘productivity’. Both these are 
conventions that drive carbon-intensive lifestyles. Growth is driven 
by consumption and decisions made at the level of the household 
regarding expenditure. Every household expenditure decision creates 
and sustains employment, but also creates environmental pollution. 
These decisions must rapidly focus on developing carbon-light urban 
lifestyles. This requires informed consumer decision-making reflecting 
an appreciation of the relationship between consumer decisions and 
climate change as well as behavioural change. In the Netherlands, the 
Dutch government’s ambition is to create gas free neighbourhoods, but 
homeowners have autonomy regarding the implementation of measures 
to decarbonise residential heating/cooling. This process requires 
carbon-intensive consumption options to be priced-out of the market 
through regulation and taxation. Currently, the expectation is that 
urban living will continue with limited adaptations. A good example  
is the replacement of the internal combustion engine (ICE) with 
carbon-light alternatives as the premise is that highly mobile urban 
lifestyles can continue. 
A key barrier is found in incumbent technology. In the UK, the failure 
to develop a viable commercial alternative to the gas boiler will hold 
back decarbonisation. A gas boiler ban is being imposed from 2025 on 
installations in new residential units. Nevertheless, 85% of UK homes 
are heated by gas and a ban on all carbon-intensive heating appliances 
needs to be applied urgently. One challenge is the impact that this 
would have on incumbent manufacturers. Similarly, the shift towards 
e-commerce, the Internet-of-things (IoT) and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) is reliant on carbon intensive server farms; zero carbon new
technologies must only be adopted. This highlights the tensions
between a range of priorities which are underpinned by political choices
and agendas.
National and local policy must acknowledge that the continuation of 
existing urban lifestyles is impossible and that new approaches to urban 
living must develop. The challenge is that these alterations require 
radical and immediate change. COVID-19 has highlighted that rapid 
adaptation to a major societal crisis is possible. The danger is that the 
post-pandemic city will reflect attempts to return to pre-pandemic 
approaches to urban living. This is to be expected; existing conventions 
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1) Invest in research focusing on identifying key intervention points
including understanding the drivers and facilitators of carbon-
intensive urban lifestyles.
2) Apply a whole-systems approach to encourage and compel urban
lifestyle adaptation. Carbon-intensive products, and related
production processes, must be identified, replaced, or removed.
3) Major alterations to approaches to spatial or urban planning are
required. Cities have been planned and developed to support and
encourage carbon-intensive lifestyles. Spatial planning must be
revised to facilitate the decarbonisation of urban living.
4) Prioritising flexibility over permanence and placing temporary
urbanism at the forefront of new approaches to planning and
managing cities focusing on the quality of decarbonised
urban lifestyles.
5) A return to living locally must be at the basis of the development
of new decarbonised lifestyles. This includes applying planning
to encourage the formation of 20-minute neighbourhoods and
promoting the circular city. Everyday living should be based on
walking, cycling and carbon neutral forms of mobility with an
emphasis placed on ensuring that most household everyday needs
are available within a 20-minute return walk. This requires the
application of holistic approaches to urban planning.
6) To reduce resource dependency, and the ecological footprint of
cities, the flows of resources (input–throughput–output) of different
urban functions (housing, industry, transport, etc.) should be
analysed, and policies developed to force the reuse of resources,
through principles of cascading (the subsequent use of resources for 
different functions based on the quality of the resource needed for 
the functions). This would require new approaches towards urban 
infrastructure governance. 
7) The policy emphasis on levelling-up the most vulnerable must also
focus on levelling-down carbon-intensive lifestyles.
8) Environmental justice must be central to the decarbonising urban
lifestyles agenda. This includes acknowledging the importance of
local solutions identified by local communities. All governments
should encourage and facilitate processes of alternative-substitute
place-making that represent a form of citizen-led place making but
with a focus on decarbonising urban lifestyles.
9) Approaches that have been developed in the Global South should
be identified and acknowledged as providing opportunities for
informing new approaches to planning and living in cities. There
is a tendency to assume that the best ideas come from the
Global North.
The COP26 policy challenge and 
decarbonising lifestyles
The policy focus must focus on coupling supply and demand-side 
interventions. At the moment it is difficult for consumers to decarbonise 
their lifestyles – the structures, including societal norms and 
expectations, underpinning lifestyles incentivise high-carbon practices. 
These are hard to change, however we can start with more knowledge 
of the problem and our individual carbon footprints. All products and 
services must come with a mandated grading of their relative carbon-intensity. 
This must be based on an agreed methodology for calculating total carbon-
intensity. Consumers would be able to make informed choices based 
on embedded carbon – this is not all of the story, but it is an important 
part of it. Governments would be able to introduce carbon-intensity 
sales taxes to encourage demand- and supply-side adaptations. The first 
government to introduce this approach will be the first to take Climate 
Change seriously. 
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and routines will encourage households to return to pre-pandemic 
forms of consumption. A good example is the emphasis that is being 
placed on supporting and encouraging tourism including the return of 
air travel; only a small proportion of people fly, and an even smaller 
proportion are frequent flyers. The emphasis that is being placed on 
‘building back better’ must include the decarbonisation of all urban 
lifestyles and radical alterations in demand. Here political commitment 
at all levels is key along with political leadership. This involves the 
introduction of radical deterrents; taxation must be targeted at the 
small proportion of high-income earners with carbon-intensive lifestyles. 
Pathways to decarbonizing urban 
lifestyles – levelling up and  
levelling down 
A critical barrier to decarbonisation of urban lifestyles is the absence 
of a highly visible and on-going debate on the need to make radical 
alterations to demand that would be reflected in urban lifestyle 
transformation. The existing approach assumes adaptation is possible 
based on incremental change; radical changes are required in which the 
outcome must be near to carbon-neutral urban lifestyles. Decarbonising 
urban lifestyles must be grounded in a concern for environmental 
justice. The danger is that policy will be influenced by the advantaged 
and will result in interventions that exacerbate existing forms  
of disadvantage, exclusion, and vulnerability within urban landscapes. 
The most advantaged will need to make the most radical  
lifestyle adjustments.
Developing new policy pathways to facilitate rapid decarbonisation of 
urban lifestyles requires the following actions to be taken by  
all governments: 
Cities, the built environment, climate change  
and decarbonising urban lifestyles 
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The amenity 
value of the 
climate
Enormous research effort has gone into determining the effect of 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions on the global climate, figuring out 
the impacts of climate change on the natural world and estimating 
the costs of abating GHGs. By contrast, much less effort has gone into 
valuing in monetary terms the impacts of climate change. In particular, 
there is in the climate change literature surprisingly little discussion 
about the direct impact of climate change on households. Although 
some of the impact of climate change on households might be felt 
through changes in incomes or changes in the prices of goods and 
services, the direct impact on households deserves far more attention. 
Why might households prefer particular 
sorts of climate? 
Why might households prefer particular sorts of climate (and hence 
care about climate change)? Put differently, why does climate have 
an amenity value? The reason is that households have basic needs for 
warmth, shelter, clothing, and nutrition. But whilst these needs can 
certainly be met by purchasing goods and services they are nonetheless 
influenced by the climate. Households inhabiting certain climates 
may find that they need to spend more than others. The most obvious 
example concerns households’ need for warmth. Households can 
modify indoor temperature by heating or cooling neither of which is 
essential in milder climates. Households inhabiting such climates can 
use their income for other things. Likewise, climate alters people’s 
calorific requirements and different types of climate necessitate 
different types of clothing. 
The observation that basic needs are met in part by the climate has 
several consequences. First, it is likely that households inhabiting 
different climates exhibit different expenditure patterns even if they are 
confronted by the same prices and the same income. Second, it is likely 
that those households that are already poor might find themselves more 
vulnerable to a deleterious change in the climate (and more benefitted 
by a favourable change). Poorer households have a lot at stake from 
climate change.
The climate of the Mediterranean is often regarded as optimal probably 
because the cost of living is lower. How much would your household 
be willing to pay to inhabit the sort of climate that that the city of Nice 
currently enjoys is not a silly question; neither is the question of how 
much households in Nice are willing to accept as compensation for 
a change in their climate to one less pleasant. But despite it being 
difficult if not impossible to answer such a question directly nevertheless 
households are already implicitly valuing climates. Their implicit 
valuations reveal a lot about how households in different locations 
might be directly impacted by climate change. 
A look at the different sorts of evidence
Empirical evidence exists that households indeed possess preferences 
over climate that can be measured in terms of monetary values. First, 
theory suggests that preferences for climate result in regional variations 
in house prices and wage rates. The price of properties in areas 
characterised by a more desirable climate is bid upwards whilst for wage 
rates the opposite happens. Remarkably empirical studies are able to 
provide estimates of the compensating price differential for marginal 
changes in climate variables i.e., the implicit value of an additional 1ºC 
or 1mm of precipitation. 
One problem with such studies is the assumption that individuals are 
willing to move considerable distances to eliminate the net benefits 
of different locations. This is problematic because climate variables 
differ only at considerable distances. A second problem is it may not be 
possible to use the same approach in small countries where the climate 
is homogeneous. It is for this reason that studies confine themselves 
examining the evidence for those countries that contain different 
climates e.g., the US or Italy. 
Other evidence suggests that households inhabiting particular sorts of 
climates do indeed purchase different patterns of goods and services. 
This is of course consistent with the story concerning the influence of 
climate on households’ needs. Analysing differences in consumption 
patterns is routinely undertaken to calculate household equivalence 
scales. These convey information about how much more money 
households with e.g., an extra adult or child require as a one-person 
reference household. Here however, the approach is used to calculate 
climatic equivalence scales i.e., how much extra money do households 
inhabiting a particular climate require to achieve the same utility level 
as another household living in some reference climate. 
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A third valuation technique asks households about the minimum 
income required for them to achieve a particular level of welfare 
eg, “subsistence only” or “good” or “very good” given the specific 
circumstances of the household. This approach also confirms that 
households inhabiting particular climates require very different 
amounts of income to achieve the same welfare level. The technique 
assumes that all households share the same understanding of different 
labels for describing various welfare levels. The most compelling way 
of finding the implicit value that households place on climate variables 
however is to ask households in different locations how happy or 
satisfied they are.
Studies connecting happiness or life 
satisfaction and climate
Many national statistical agencies conduct yearly surveys on happiness 
or life satisfaction / subjective wellbeing. These survey data are usually 
supplemented by information gathered on the precise socioeconomic 
conditions of the individual and information on their local 
environment. These data studies investigate the effects of the personal 
circumstances, macroeconomic conditions, and environmental quality 
on subjective wellbeing. Although most studies involve  
individual countries a few surveys are for multiple countries using the 
same questionnaire. 
To better appreciate what such an approach entails, respondents 
to such surveys are typically confronted by a question such as the 
following one, which is taken from the World Values Survey: All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 
Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” 
and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your 
satisfaction with your life as a whole? 
Using data from multi-country surveys, researchers have attempted 
to explain why people in some countries are less satisfied with their 
lives than those living elsewhere. Many variables have been touted as 
potential explanations, most often income as well as political and press 
freedom. Other important variables include macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation and unemployment, both of which are known to make
individuals unhappy. 
Over recent years researchers have also used these data to investigate 
the importance of climate to subjective wellbeing. This is achieved by 
comparing subjective wellbeing in countries characterised by different 
climates. There appears a remarkable relationship between climate and
subjective wellbeing – survey respondents consistently report higher 
subjective wellbeing if they inhabit particular sorts of climates. Of 
course, some countries that have miserable climates such as Denmark 
(sorry Denmark) consistently report high levels of subjective wellbeing. 
But that is because Denmark also has a very high GDP per capita 
whereas the appropriate comparison is between countries where GDP 
per capita and everything else is held constant. 
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The sorts of climates that do most to promote happiness and life 
satisfaction appear to be climates not associated with extremes. Some 
papers find that countries reporting the highest subjective wellbeing are 
those remaining close to a mean temperature of 65ºF all year round. 
Others find that higher temperatures in the warmest month reduce 
subjective wellbeing whilst higher temperatures in the coldest month 
increase subjective wellbeing. Such findings resemble the findings from 
the other approaches outlined above as what sort of climates households 
prefer. It is also possible to derive from these studies estimates of 
the implicit value of climate variables by asking what change in GDP 
per capita would be necessary to hold subjective wellbeing constant 
for a unit change in any climate variable. These amounts suggest 
that differences in climate go a long way to explaining cross-country 
variations in subjective wellbeing. 
These such studies seek a relationship between measures of subjective 
wellbeing and climate not weather. Although there does appear to be 
a relationship between weather and measures of subjective wellbeing 
it is not appropriate to use such evidence to predict the impacts of 
climate change. The reason is that if what is currently unusual weather 
eventually becomes the norm households will adapt. What matters for 
climate change are differences in subjective wellbeing as evaluated by 
individuals that have already adapted.  
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Problems that remain to be solved
The evidence suggesting that households have preferences for 
particular sorts of climate needs to be improved. For example, 
investigators have hitherto investigate the amenity value of only 
a limited number of climate variables, typically temperature. 
Other variables such as days of sunshine are less often included. 
Even temperature can be measured in different ways e.g., average 
temperature or maximum daytime temperature. Other studies use the 
concept of heating and cooling degree days employing 65ºF as a base. 
This diversity matters because different ways of representing the climate 
frustrate attempts at comparing the results of different studies.
Another problem is that for many studies looking at subjective wellbeing 
and the climate the data is only available at the level of the country and 
not the respondent. This might be acceptable if all countries were as 
small as Malta. However, if one is including large countries such as the 
US then it becomes necessary to average the climates over the main 
population centres – hardly ideal. But that climate variables should 
still show up so strongly despite such problems simply serves to further 
confirm their importance. 
It is also important to point out that not only do techniques identify 
the direct impact of climate on households they might also pick up 
some indirect impacts. More specifically, certain sorts of climate also 
support particular sorts of fauna and flora. Accordingly, it is impossible 
to determine the extent to which observed preferences for climate are 
in in fact preferences over different sorts of fauna and flora. This may 
not matter, but if the speed of climate change prevents fauna and flora 
adjusting things might start to look different. 
Lastly, notice that the approaches outlined above are in 
effect using existing differences over space as an 
analogue for future climate change. This 
however might not be entirely adequate 
insofar as we are using the results of 
these studies to make predictions 
about the impact of climate 
change on future generations. 
Future technology and 
growth in incomes might 
mean that climate change 
is evaluated differently by 
future households.
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Implications of the literature
Many studies referred to above report the amenity value of climate 
variables ie, the monetary amount that the average individual or 
household would be willing to pay to obtain / avoid eg, a 1ºC rise 
in mean temperature or an additional 1mm of precipitation. These 
amounts might be positive or negative depending on the baseline 
climate and according to household income. Some researchers have 
actually combined these estimates with actual predictions about how 
climate is forecast to change in order to get an overall monetary 
valuation (although it is always necessary to be mindful of the fact that 
the direct impact of climate change on households is not the only way 
climate change might impact households). These calculations point to 
significant gains for households in some locations and significant losses 
in others. Climate change is certainly not a one-way street. 
Valuing these the impacts of climate change in monetary terms may 
seem an arcane pursuit. However, demonstrating how much households 
in some countries stand to lose (and in some instances gain) might 
have a salutary effect on Governments in upcoming COP discussions for 
whom the question whether voters are willing to pay for costly measures 
intended to cut GHG emissions looms large. More generally, better 
estimates of the impacts of climate change expressed in monetary terms 
are likely to be of interest to anyone engaged in the sort of cost benefit 
analyses undertaken in the Stern Review.  
Conclusions
It seems difficult to argue that climate change will not have a profound 
direct impact on households. Furthermore, households living in 
different locations will probably have a very different view of climate 
change. Households implicitly reveal their preferences for particular 
sorts of climate in a variety of ways. Greater use of this evidence, ideally 
expressed in terms of monetary values, will help to focus minds as the 
world decides how aggressively to limit GHG emissions. 
David Maddison
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
11906 Cities and built environment Addressing the climate challenge
William Bloss, Suzanne Bartington and John Bryson The Air We Breathe and Clean Air Day
The air we
breathe
Thursday 17 June 2021 was Clean Air Day and came as the Birmingham 
Clean Air Zone (CAZ) started to tackle road-transport related air 
pollution. Around 125 years ago, one environmental challenge was 
horse manure in the streets – with up to 100,000 horses in the largest 
cities, this was a highly visible issue. The West Midlands is known for the 
development of the motorcar, which alleviated this problem, but caused 
traffic jams and a less visible challenge – the fight for clean air. 
The CAZ came into effect on 1 June, with charges for higher polluting 
vehicles entering the city centre. It is designed to target roadside 
pollution – nitrogen dioxide, primarily from vehicles with older 
diesels being major emitters. This is a local challenge: most of the NO2 
breathed in Birmingham is emitted within the city, so local actions reap 
local health benefits (eg, Covid lockdown falls in NO2) – although care 
is needed to provide viable sustainable transport alternatives, and avoid 
displacing emissions outside the city and into other, potentially more 
vulnerable, backyards. As vehicle fleets modernise, emissions of NO2 
should fall, while increasing numbers of electric vehicles – ahead of the 
national ban on sale of most petrol and diesel vehicles in 2030 – will 
help mitigate the NO2 challenge. 
The other challenge is fine particles: PM2.5, which are small enough 
to penetrate deep into our lungs and bloodstream. Particulates come 
from sources such as combustion, agriculture and transport, and affect 
people across the region – requiring more coordinated approaches 
regionally and nationally. The UK’s air quality legislation sets an 
objective for PM2.5 concentrations of 25 ug m-3 (annual mean, outside 
Scotland) while the WHO health-based guideline is 10 ug m-3. The 
latest science shows any reductions deliver health benefits. Exposure to 
PM2.5 and NO2 leads to 28,000 – 36,000 premature deaths in the UK 
each year, while the CBI calculated that meeting the WHO guidelines 
for air quality could bring an annual £1.6bn economic benefit. These 
guidelines – set in 2005 – are due to be reviewed, and will likely 
strengthen in response to growing evidence of the health impacts of air 
pollution. The UK Government will shortly update PM targets within the 
new Environment Bill – a key opportunity to set the level of ambition for 
cleaner air over the coming decades.
Setting a target is one thing, but getting there is another. It will require 
changes in how we move around, heat our homes, power our cities and 
our industry. However, many of the changes needed have links (co-
benefits) with actions to tackle climate change. Carbon emissions spread 
around the world and have global effects: CO2 levels in Birmingham 
are similar to those in Beijing and Bermuda, requiring concerted 
international action. Conversely, most air pollutants are removed by 
atmospheric processes in hours or days – so local actions bring local 
health benefits: Birmingham can enjoy the benefits of cleaner air, 
irrespective of what happens elsewhere. 
Many disadvantaged communities suffer the poorest air quality, and 
are most vulnerable to its impacts, so prioritisation of measures can 
help reduce regional health and social inequalities. A careful balance is 
needed between addressing the areas with the worst absolute air quality, 
and reducing exposure across the whole population. Provision of air 
quality data to those affected – making the invisible challenge visible – is 
vital.
Urban environmental quality impacts on human health and happiness 
but also economic growth. Cities that are delightful places to live 
and are perceived to have desirable residential amenities attract and 
retain talented individuals and this then is reflected in high new firm 
formation rates, economic growth and job creation. Clean Air Day plays 
an important role in reminding us that the air we breathe across the 
West Midlands impacts on liveability and livelihoods across the region.
The WM-Air project at the University of Birmingham is measuring the 
sources of air pollutants, quantifying the air quality co-benefits from Net 
Zero actions, and working to evaluate air pollution health and economic 
effects across local communities – providing the science to enable policy 
choices which maximise the benefits from cleaner air.
This article was originally published in the Birmingham Brief.
William Bloss, 
Suzanne Bartington 
and John Bryson 
Contact publicaffairs@contacts.
bham.ac.uk if you would like more 
information about this article.
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We are today perilously close to tipping 
points that, once passed, will send global
temperatures spiralling catastrophically 
higher. If we continue on our current 
path, we will face the collapse of 
everything that gives us our security: 
food production, access to fresh water, 
habitable ambient temperature and 
ocean food chains. And if the natural 
world can no longer support the most 
basic of our needs, then much of the rest 
of civilisation will quickly break down.’ 
 
(David Attenborough, February 2021)
While climate change is already ravaging many parts of the world, with 
its most devastating impacts on the poor and vulnerable, the spectre of 
climate catastrophe haunts children and young people everywhere. 
As States’ climate commitments and concrete actions are shown to be 
inadequate to avert the reaching of the irreversible tipping points that 
David Attenborough warns about, the prospect of a world in which 
more and more forests turn into deserts, cities drown, animals perish, 
and human devastation, violence and conflict escalate has led many 
children and young people to experience a phenomenon referred to 
as  ‘climate anxiety’. 
Those experiencing climate anxiety endure constant feelings of 
fear, anguish and powerlessness regarding their own and their loved 
ones’ well-being, as well as more generalised, prolonged anxiety and 
uncertainty about the current state and future of the planet. The 
phenomenon of climate anxiety contributes to both current and 
prospective suffering. As highlighted in a relevant scientific study, 
‘chronic stress from the acute and ongoing impacts of climate change 
may alter biological stress response systems and make growing children 
more at risk for developing mental health conditions later in life, such 
as anxiety, depression, and other clinically diagnosable disorders’.
The circumstances that children and young people facing the 
catastrophic consequences of climate change within their lifetimes find 
themselves in have led many to highlight the profound 
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intergenerational injustice inflicted on younger generations by those 
that currently hold the key to averting the worst of climate change. The 
inequities at issue are stark: children, young people and their offspring 
are condemned to bear the brunt of climate change in spite of being 
blameless and often lacking the political agency to effect change. 
What I want to argue in the remainder of this piece is that what is 
currently being inflicted on children and young people through State 
(in)action on climate change can also be understood as amounting to 
ill-treatment, in contravention of one of the most fundamental norms 
of human rights law: the right not to be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, 
States are subjecting children and young people to inhuman and 
degrading treatment on account of the escalating suffering and real 
risk of catastrophic and irreparable harm to which State (in)actions are 
exposing them. 
In a case currently pending before the European Court of Human 
Rights, six Portuguese children and young adults (aged 8 to 21) 
are arguing that 33 Member States of the Council of Europe (all 27 
EU Member States as well as Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine and the United Kingdom) are violating their rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Agostinho and 
others v Portugal and others will have already caused substantial disquiet 
for the respondent States, which have been invited by the Court to 
address whether the applicants are victims of violations of the right to 
life (Article 2 ECHR), the right not to be subjected to torture or ill-
treatment (Article 3 ECHR), and/or the right to private and family life 
(Article 8 ECHR), taken individually or in combination with the right 
not to be discriminated against (Article 14 ECHR). The European Court 
of Human Rights raised the Article 3 question of its own motion, and I 
believe it was right to do so. While there is increasing acknowledgement 
of the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on the 
right to life and the right to private and family life – as in the landmark 
2019 Dutch Supreme Court judgment in Urgenda, for example – there 
is as yet little recognition of the way in which environmental harm 
dehumanises and degrades persons in a way fundamentally 
incompatible with the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-
treatment.
Whether an act, omission or situation amounts to proscribed ill-
treatment is assessed in a context-sensitive way to determine whether 
it reaches a certain ‘minimum level of severity’ (Ireland v UK, para 162). 
Treatment causing ‘intense physical or mental suffering’ (Bouyid v 
Belgium, para 87) is often found to be inhuman. Treatment 
that ‘humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, 
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or diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and 
physical resistance’ (Pretty v UK, para 52) or ‘inducing desperation’ 
(MSS v Belgium and Greece, para 263) may be found to be degrading, 
even in the absence of serious physical or mental suffering (Bouyid v 
Belgium, para 87). More specifically, the European Court of Human 
Rights has associated inhuman and/or degrading treatment with 
‘feelings of fear, anxiety and powerlessness’ (Volodina v Russia, para 
75), ‘feeling afraid, depressed and hopeless’ (Premininy v Russia, 
para 81), ‘intense fear and apprehension’ (Akkoç v Turkey, para 116), 
‘constant mental anxiety’ (Rodić v Bosnia and Herzegovina, para 73), 
and ‘prolonged uncertainty’ (MSS v Belgium and Greece, para 263). 
The Court pays close attention to any vulnerability experienced by 
the (alleged) victim. A distressing situation is more likely to cross the 
threshold of severity when endured by a person whose vulnerability is 
pronounced, as is the case with children (Bouyid v Belgium, paras 109-
110). In determining severity, the European Court of Human Rights 
pays attention to the cumulative gravity of the particular circumstances 
experienced, and has recognised that if a person's circumstances disclose 
‘no prospect of an improvement in the situation’, this compounds the 
gravity of the suffering endured (Clasens v Belgium, para 36). 
The applicants’ experience of climate change, like that of many 
children and young people around the world, corresponds in many 
respects to the dynamics of inhumanity and degradation described 
above: they are currently enduring prolonged and escalating fear, 
anguish and intense mental suffering emerging from climate change 
and its consequences – such as deadly forest fires occurring in their 
neighbourhoods – and facing the real prospect of catastrophic harm 
and further suffering befalling themselves and their loved ones. Given 
that they are effectively powerless to alleviate the phenomenon to which 
their fear attaches, they experience hopelessness and a sense of 
inferiority that is capable of breaking their spirit. It is not surprising, 
then, that a psychologist who specialises on climate anxiety in children 
and young people recently described climate anxiety to me as 
comparable to the death row phenomenon. 
An even more powerful parallel may be drawn between the applicants’ 
situation and that of individuals facing refoulement. It is firmly 
established as a matter of human rights law that forcibly removing 
someone to a place where there are substantial grounds for believing 
they face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
violates their right not to be subjected to torture or ill-treatment. The 
obligation against refoulement under the right not to be subjected to 
torture or ill-treatment is absolute, and reflects the broader principle 
that authorities must 
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refrain from forcibly placing someone in a situation where they face a 
real risk of grave suffering or distress (for example, placing a vulnerabl
person in solitary confinement). While bodies such as the European 
Court of Human Rights were initially hesitant to pronounce on 
prospective breaches of human rights, the rationale for doing so in case
of refoulement was the need to protect persons from irreparable harm. 
Although the circumstances may appear quite distinct on the surface, 
States contributing to climate change are similarly subjecting children 
and young people to a future that is guaranteed to involve real risks 
of irreparable harm which they are themselves powerless to avert. The 
prospective crossing of irreversible tipping points means that today’s 
children and young people are facing real risks of loss of life and seriou
a) adopting 'deep and urgent' reductions of the emissions on their
territory and on the other territories over which they have
jurisdiction;
b) prohibiting the export of fossil fuels;
c) compensating for their emissions arising from the import of goods;
and
d) limiting the contributions of multinational companies to global 
emissions through their activities abroad,
with a view to limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C in comparison with  
pre-industrial levels, it being understood that this would significantly 




bodily harm as well as loss of their homes, livelihoods and access to basic 
resources through extreme weather events, natural disasters, infectious 
diseases and other ‘sudden-onset’ impacts of climate change and the 
psychological trauma and mental health deterioration emanating 
from such events, as well as escalating physical and psychological harm 
arising out of the ‘slow-onset’ impacts of climate change, including 
increased heat, drought, sea-level rise, water scarcity, food insecurity 
and air pollution, and ultimately the prospect of widespread violence, 
conflict and forced displacement in an increasingly inhospitable planet. 
The future is a foreign country, one might say: a dystopian place to 
which younger generations are currently being propelled through the 
collective (in)actions of those with the power to shape the course of 
climate change. States’ (in)action is therefore subjecting children and young 
people to (a real risk of) inhumanity and degradation, in breach of the right 
not to be subjected to such ill-treatment.
What is being argued in Agostinho is that the respondent States are not 
complying with their positive obligations under the relevant rights – 
including Article 3 ECHR – read in light of their commitments under 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, which emerged out of COP21. The Paris 
Agreement can be taken to form the basis for delineating the measures 
States are duty-bound to undertake – including, as the applicants in 
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What is happening instead is that the escalating distress faced by the 
applicants in Agostinho and other children and young people around 
the world towards a situation that they are powerless to prevent, and 
which only the application of the most robust individual and collective 
regulatory State action can mitigate, is being met and compounded by 
official failings at best, and indifference or callous disregard at worst. 
An attitude of indifference or disregard by State authorities towards 
a powerless person’s serious and/or potentially irreparable suffering 
that the State is aware of and in a position to alleviate violates the right 
not to be subjected to ill-treatment. Such an approach by State 
authorities is also fundamentally at odds with States’ duty under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in all actions concerning 
children, to accord primacy to and act in accordance with the best 
interests of the child.
The right not to be subjected to torture or ill-treatment is absolute as 
a matter of international human rights law, and that means that the 
obligations flowing from it are non-displaceable and non-negotiable. 
The application of this right in the context of climate change entails 
that States must take all reasonable steps within their power to stem the 
tide of climate change and avert the real risk of irreparable harm to 
which they are currently subjecting younger generations. The absolute 
right against torture and ill-treatment leaves no room for States to 
bypass these obligations.
The future that younger generations and their offspring face can seem 
alien and distant, the true scope of the climate catastrophe currently 
being unleashed upon them almost unfathomable or, perhaps, 
too uncomfortable for us to process. Yet it is being shaped by the 
governments of today, and it constitutes a human rights violation of 
epic proportions. Taking all necessary steps to reverse it is a non-
negotiable obligation of all States at COP26.
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life’: the role 




When politicians and generals talk about winning ‘hearts and minds’, 
it is hard not to be cynical. The phrase seems to mask with good 
intentions a desire to dominate. But in the fight to stop climate change 
and the degradation of the natural world we need to win over the 
hearts and minds of the global population if we are to stand a chance of 
victory. As the survival of ourselves and countless of the other creatures 
with which we share our planet depends upon our success, this could 
not be more vital. 
To be moved to act, whether as a leader or a citizen, you first need to 
be moved. People need to feel for themselves that they have a stake 
in the transition to a new and sustainable society; to know what they, 
personally, will love and lose if we do not make this happen; and to 
believe that with an act of collective will, we can. If we are to reach a 
sustainable future, we first need to be able to imagine it, not merely 
practically, economically, technologically but as human beings. 
Science is essential to this process, but it cannot achieve the transition 
we need on its own. It will need the help of both the arts and the 
humanities. Climate science and ecology tell us the risks we are facing 
but we need art and stories, television and film, music and poetry to 
help us feel for ourselves the impact of the loss of animals, plants  
and environments. 
The arts offer hope and motivate us to act where graphs and diagrams 
remain remote and impersonal. Scientific data and discourses can be 
exclusive or obscure, while climate change, pollution and deforestation 
are all too often invisible. They are happening at a distance for many of 
us, incrementally, and even as individual disasters mount up and spread, 
it is hard to get over the cognitive dissonance caused by the wish for 
this not to be true, combined with the fair-to-moderate weather outside 
our own windows. The arts can make climate change vividly present 
and salient within our everyday lives. They can speak to a broad range 
of people of all ages and backgrounds in accessible and inclusive ways, 
and they engage us as communities, not just as individuals. After all, we 
can only solve the ecological crisis together. As the galvanising effect of 
music and theatre within the activist group Extinction Rebellion shows, 
the shared experience of art can help to sustain hope and motivate 
collective action.
If the arts can win over hearts, the humanities can help win over 
minds. Technological innovation will surely play a key part in slowing 
and potentially reversing climate change and in developing new and 
more sustainable infrastructures, but historical research and literary 
scholarship are vital too, to recover the voices of the people who saw 
before the rest of us the impact humanity was having on the natural 
world. We can still learn today from their observations and solutions. 
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In February 1872, in the second lecture from his series The Eagle’s Nest, 
the Victorian prophet and social critic John Ruskin told an audience in 
Oxford that ‘our ingenuity in the vindication, or the denial, of species, 
will be disregarded in the face of the fact that we destroyed, in civilized 
Europe, every rare bird and secluded flower’. It is almost one hundred 
and fifty years to the day since Ruskin alerted us to anthropogenic 
extinction. Not much more than a decade later, in 1884, he warned 
of anthropogenic climate change in his lecture The Storm-Cloud of the 
Nineteenth Century. In tackling these problems, we could do worse than 
start by adopting the remedy Ruskin himself proposed some years 
earlier in his trenchant critique of capitalism, Unto this Last, summed 
up in the phrase ‘wise consumption’. If Ruskin’s voice speaks to us 
from the early decades of rampant industrialisation and rapacious 
extraction, contemporary history comes together with oral tradition and 
indigenous knowledge in the voices of the Kogi people of the Sierra 
Nevada de Santa Marta in Columbia. Their BBC documentary From the 
Heart of the World: The Elder Brothers’ Warning, now thirty years old, is a 
stark reminder of lessons we might have learned then and still need 
to learn now about how to live in harmony with the rest of the natural 
world and of the need to consider all human cultures and traditions in 
looking for solutions to the ecological crisis. 
Science is our best guide to understanding the world as it is, but 
literature has the most to offer us in teaching us what it might be. In 
their different ways, poetry, myth, science fiction and fantasy all break 
open our narrow assumptions of what is possible, showing that we can 
indeed imagine new and different ways of living. For the Romantic 
poet Percy Shelley, poets were, as he gloriously put it in his ‘Defence of 
Poetry’, ‘the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors 
of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present’. 
In her acceptance speech for a National Book Award Medal for 
Distinguished Contribution to American Letters in 2014, Ursula K. Le 
Guin echoed Shelley when she praised her fellow science-fiction and 
fantasy authors as ‘Poets, visionaries, the realists of a larger reality’. 
Where ‘so-called realists’ risk entrenching the social order of the day, 
taking its intellectual limitations to be the actual limits of the world, the 
visionary imagination can throw off the shackles of prejudice and enable 
us to conceive of new worlds, including ones in which human beings 
sustain a less self-centred and self-destructive relationship with nature.
If this seems utopian, remember that we live our daily lives inside 
multiple and demonstrable unrealities – limitless economic growth, 
endless consumerism, anthropocentrism – fictions which are disguised 
as fixed natural laws or mere facts of life. 
Close attention to literature gives us the critical distance we need from 
these contingent and transitory modes of being in the world. By reading 
and studying science fiction and fantasy, not to mention the diverse 
literatures of other cultures, times and places, we can help ourselves 
and each other to enter imaginatively into attractive and sustainable 
alternatives to the social, political and cultural systems we currently live 
in. Literature, then, no less that science, has a key role in bringing about 
the ‘futurity’ we need. 
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Finally, science needs the arts and humanities to show us the 
importance of values, not just costs. The policies and commitments 
made and thus far unmet at COP after COP have been predicated upon 
what is achievable within current models of economic growth, obsessive 
as they are over GDP. Ruskin’s famous adage ‘There is No Wealth but 
Life’ should be blazoned on every wall of every meeting room at COP26 
as a reminder that wealth as we have been pursuing it since around the 
time of his birth, two hundred years ago, has been at the expense of life, 
and that our very future – indeed the future flourishing of life itself, at 
least as we know it – depends upon us finding other ways to conceive 
of value. The reason we must act now cannot be reduced to economic 
ends nor the method to economic means, not only because of the moral 
imperative to respect and care for life at large and unborn generations 
but also because economics itself should serve the ends of life, not the 
other way round.
The arts, together with humanities disciplines such as history, literature 
and ethics are as integral to solving the ecological crisis as the sciences. 
To mobilise them we need to pursue not just dialogue but active 
collaboration between artists, humanities academics, scientists and 
civil society. At Birmingham, we have been developing two projects 
which point a way for these collaborations. Working with Mount Allison 
University in New Brunswick and several museums worldwide, we 
have launched the Symbiosis network to promote and enhance the 
role of the arts and humanities within natural history museums and 
collections. Symbiosis has enabled us to think globally. We have devised 
projects with colleagues in Europe and Canada and shared practice 
and expertise with museums from Paris and Portugal to Pittsburgh and 
Brazil through an online conference attended by delegates from over 20 
countries across four continents. 
Acting more locally, our closest and most far-reaching collaboration to 
date has been with the Oxford University Museum of Natural History. 
Founded in the 1850s, the museum was designed by the Irish architect 
Benjamin Woodward, working hand in glove with Ruskin and the 
Pre-Raphaelites and the scientists at Oxford University. They aimed to 
use the arts to celebrate nature and teach science. Since 2016, we have 
been working with the museum to revive that legacy under the banner 
Visions of Nature. Art exhibitions and commissions have drawn new 
audiences to the museum and helped them to apprehend the impact of 
environmental changes from the decline of British bees to the melting 
of the Arctic ice. Poets in residence have brought these changes home 
and helped visitors to fathom their own sense of loss and their hopes 
and to express them in poetry themselves. Following Ruskin’s lead, the 
museum has embraced activism alongside public education, opening its 
doors in September 2019 to Extinction Rebellion for an ‘Arts/Science 
Extravaganza’ that saw 6000 people attend the museum in a single day. 
More recently, literature scholars at Birmingham have begun working 
with Ruskin Land in the Wyre Forest as part of an interdisciplinary 
doctoral programme funded by the Leverhulme Trust at the 
Birmingham Institute of Forest Research. One project in particular 
aims to explore the imaginary forests found in fantasy literature to 
consider how they might enable us to think about woodlands in less 
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anthropocentric and instrumental ways and how we can mobilise 
them to enrich public engagement with actual forests. Forests are 
home to most of the Earth’s terrestrial biodiversity and are vital 
in our fight against climate change. Yet, all around the world – 
including in Britain – forests continue to face very real threats. 
Just 7% of all Britain’s native woodlands are currently in good 
ecological condition, according to the Woodland Trust’s State of 
the UK’s Woods and Trees Report (2021). The popularity of fantasy 
literature makes it a valuable resource for shaping public opinion. 
We will be running a series of experiments in Ruskin Land – itself 
John Ruskin’s historical experiment to revitalise working people’s 
connection to nature – using fantasy literature by William Morris, J. 
R. R. Tolkien and Le Guin. Through reading walks and discussions 
in the Dragon’s Nest, fantasy readers and environmentalists will be 
brought together and stimulated to reflect on and reimagine our 
past, present and future relationship with forests.
These projects show how the arts and humanities can make a direct 
contribution to winning over hearts and broadening minds in the 
struggle to halt climate change and reverse the destruction of the 
natural world. In his 1872 lecture, Ruskin told his audience: 
we shall be remembered in history 
as the most cruel, and therefore 
the most unwise, generation 
of men that ever yet troubled 
the earth: – the most cruel in 
proportion to their sensibility, – the 
most unwise in proportion to their 
science. No people, understanding 
pain, ever inflicted so much: no people,
understanding facts, ever acted on  
them so little.’
If these words don’t resonate with our own moment and our own 
failings, then we have not heard them clearly enough. There is no doubt 
left about the facts and we must act on them in full. In the words of 
Ruskin’s fellow Victorian, Alfred Tennyson, speaking as the Greek  
hero Ulysses, 
’Tis not too late to seek a newer world’.
If we seek it together, pooling the knowledge of science and the know-
how of technology with the inspiration of the arts and the wisdom of the 
humanities, then we stand a decent chance of finding it. 
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teach us about 
tackling climate 
change
The IPCC Report of 2018 called for “rapid, far-reaching and 
unprecedented change in all aspects of society” in order to keep global 
warming to below 1.5°C (Gabbatiss 2018). For this to happen, I’d argue 
environmental reform must be as much a bottom-up approach as a top-
down one; it must start with individuals asking what “aspects of society” 
they have the power to change. As an environmental poet, I approach 
climate change not just as a political and scientific crisis but as a
communications crisis as well. A year ago, I began researching the 
history of words (etymology) to see what insight they might provide for 
us today. Here are six things I have learned so far:
1. We need to talk about it.
The word ‘bear’ comes from the Proto-Germanic *bero, but that may not 
have been its original name. Some ancient tribes are believed to have 
ritually switched from using the word arktos to *bero (which means 
“brown”) out of fear that saying the creature’s real name might summon 
it. However, through the northern constellations Ursa Major and Ursa 
Minor (“the great bear” and “the little bear”), the word arktos
ultimately survived in the words “arctic” and “antarctic” (Harper 2021). 
Recently I spoke to the poet Katie Hale, who had just returned from 
an exhibition in Antarctica. The scientists she travelled with, who were 
recording the effects of climate change in the region, urged her to 
address the rapid disappearance of sea ice in her work. They knew 
that the more we talk about the arktos, the more chance we have of 
summoning it back.
2. Language reminds us what we have
lost and are losing.
The nature writer Robert Macfarlane wrote “as a species, we will not 
save what we do not love, and we rarely love what we cannot name” 
(Hamilton, 2021). The etymology of the word “penguin” provides an 
example of this. “Penguin” originally referred to a now-extinct species of 
bird, closely related to the puffin, that existed throughout the Northern 
Hemisphere as recently as 200 years ago. These penguins
(also known as “great auks”) looked so similar to the penguins of 
Antarctica that they were referred to interchangeably. Consequentially, 
when the original bearers of that name went extinct, they also all but 
disappeared from public memory (Pavid 2021).
In 2007, dozens of nature words (“otter”, “acorn”, “wren”) were 
removed from The Oxford Junior Dictionary and replaced with words 
like “broadband” and “voicemail.” Macfarlane collaborated with the 
poet Jackie Kay to produce a collection of acrostic poems, The Lost 
Words (2017), which aimed to rekindle interest in the replaced
entries. Since its publication, The Lost Words has been adapted into 
theatre, film, music, card games, and puzzles. It has been used as an 
aid in classrooms and dementia hospices, and become the inspiration 
of a tree-planting campaign (‘The Lost Woods’). Through grassroots 
fundraising efforts, there is now a copy of The Lost Words in every 
primary, secondary and special school in Scotland, as well as
many counties throughout Wales and England. In short, this simple 
reminder of the names of natural things has become a rallying point for 
their celebration and protection (Hamilton 2021).
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3. The wrong words can be violent.
The right representation is vital.
The right whale gained its name because it was the ‘right’ kind of whale 
to be harpooned. Its name marked it as a target, and it was almost 
hunted to extinction before international whaling laws were brought 
into place (National Geographic 2021). Other whales such a the Minke 
whale and the Bryde whale were named after prominent whalers, which 
again reflects and perhaps contributed to the instrumentalist attitude 
humans have historically taken towards these species. I mention this 
because the words we use matter: ‘Global warming’ or ‘climate
breakdown’, ‘habitat’ or ‘timber’, ‘activist’ or ‘terrorist’ - how we name 
things affects how we act towards them.
Global attitudes towards whaling shifted dramatically after the release of 
the album Song of the Humpback Whale in 1970, which arguably spawned 
the ‘Save The Whales’ movement. It enabled humans to stop seeing 
whales as distant natural resources but instead as beautiful, intelligent 
creatures capable of culture (Lewis 2020). Humpback whales are one 
of several species in this article associated with Antarctica. In including 
them, I am conscious that environmental communicators
have often focused on the impact of climate change on such species 
instead of its impact on humans in the Global South. To me, however, 
the story of the humpback whale is an argument to buck that trend. 
Having good representation of the voices of those humans worst 
affected by climate change is vital for achieving climate justice.
4. The earth is our home.
In her speech at the 2019 World Economic Forum, Greta Thunberg 
used the metaphor “our house is on fire” to describe the ongoing 
climate crisis (Thunberg 2019). The metaphor reminded me that the 
root word for “eco” is the Greek oikos, which means “house” (Harper 
2021). Eco is short for ecology; a field of study that highlights the 
importance of the natural world for our continued survival. Take for
example plankton, which provide over half the oxygen in our 
atmosphere as well as serving as the foundation of our food chains and 
as a carbon sink. Our planet wouldn’t be the place it is today without 
them, which is why it is so fitting that the word “plankton” is related to 
the word “planet” through the greek planetes, which means “wanderer” 
(Harper 2021).
Today, ocean acidification caused by increasing CO2 levels threatens 
many species of plankton. It is this kind of ecological catastrophe 
Thunberg’s metaphor is meant to make us panic about. However, too 
much panic can cause problems. Activists often experience “burnout” 
from imagining themselves in a burning house for too long (Khan 
2021). Psychologists are now talking about “eco-anxiety”, which comes 
from the words oikos and the Latin angere, “house choked” (Fawbert 
2019). This brings me to my next point.
5. We need panic, but we need hope
as well.
In the same speech, Thunberg also said “I don’t want you to hope. I 
want you to panic.” Panic is the core emotion of the climate movement 
in the same way pride is for the gay rights movement. The word “panic” 
comes from the name of the Greek nature god Pan, who whenever 
nature was under threat, would produce a sound so powerful it would 
scare the enemies of the natural world back into hiding (Atsma
2017, Harper 2021). In her speech, it might be argued that Thunberg 
tries to do the same thing.
Idealistic hope for a utopian future is certainly dangerous if it leads 
to political complacency. “Utopia” is a term coined by Thomas More 
in a book of the same name, in which he described his perfect world 
(More 1516). However, More’s book was never meant to be a blueprint 
but a provocation. “Utopia”, after all, is a pun; constructed from the 
Greek terms for both “good place” and “no place.” I’d argue prosperity is 
created not from the expectation of future utopias but from the pursuit 
of hope (“prosperity” comes from the latin pro and spes which together 
mean “towards hope” (Harper 2021)). Panic inspires action, but is 
difficult to sustain; Pan, after all is the only god in Greek mythology 
who dies (Plutarch ~70CE). Just as a future sustainable world must be 
powered by both wind and solar, perhaps we need both panic and hope 
to power us to get to it.
6. Individuals can make a difference.
My research into the roots of language is “radical” in the term’s original 
meaning of “rooted” (hence “radish” (Harper 2021)). Arguably, it is 
also in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “rhizome,” a 
mass of roots that establishes “connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, 
and social structures” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). However, I would
also see it as radical in the activist sense of making change at the 
grassroots, in trying to make a difference yourself. 
Stephen Fry has noted that one interpretation of the etymology of 
“democracy” is “mob rule”, an idea I’m interested in because of the links 
between “mob” and “mobilisation” (Fry 2015; Harper 2021). While the 
history of democracy is often tied to Athens, democracy also developed 
independently in Iceland in 930CE. The Icelandic Parliament is the 
oldest existing parliament in the world and formed grassroots-style at 
Thingvellir, a gap between two tectonic plates (Wallenfeldt 2021).
“Thingvellir” means “valley of the Thing” because thing (the root of the 
modern homonym) is the Viking word for “parliament” (Harper 2021). 
Real democracy, I would argue, the kind born from inside the earth, 
contains within it a philosophy of individual agency we desperately need 
to embrace now.
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Hard times are coming, when we’ll be 
wanting the voices of writers who can 
see alternatives to how we live now, can 
see through our fear-stricken society and 
its obsessive technologies to other ways of 
being, and even imagine real grounds 
for hope. We’ll need writers 
who can remember 
freedom – poets, 
visionaries – 
realists of a 
larger reality.’
~Ursula K. Le Guin, 
2014
‘Climate change’ feels 
like an amorphous 




includes global emissions 
increasing thus heating up 
the atmosphere; land being lost 
to rising sea levels; biodiversity 
and habitats being destroyed 
and freakish, improbable weather 
occurring more in parts of the world - destroying livelihoods and lands 
which feed communities. We are struggling with ecological disasters 
due to widespread apathy and unsustainable practices. Companies 
responsible for over 71% of pollution are not motivated enough to 
change their environmentally damaging methods of production. There 
aren’t policies demanding accountability and our consumer culture 
encourages rapid production rates. We have relied on science alone for 
too long to aid us in this dire climate crisis. 
We need the mobilisation of people at all levels of society from big 
corporations and policymakers to individuals. The summation of our 
efforts is what can help tackle climate change. It is hard to visualise 
the attack on nature because some of us are living in a ‘post-nature’ 
world due to urbanisation and the legacy of industrialisation. Science 
alone has failed to generate a societal transformation. We need a way 
to imagine a culture focused on sustainability, conscious consumerism, 
and exploration of new ideas that can tackle this issue. How do we bring 
Climate change closer to us?
In Deep Iyer’s social change ecosystem chart she recognises the 
importance of the storyteller as an effector of change. Writers are 
crucial in helping us imagine a voice for what is too easily reduced to 
just ‘climate’ or ‘environment’ or ‘the planet’. Not only do we need 
people who can translate the gravity of our situation but we need writers 
to do what they do best- to give voice to the voiceless- as Richard Powers 
does in his story The Overstory; to translate the language of the earth, 
to create empathy for our world and help construct a culture where 
we are connected meaningfully to this thing we call ‘nature’. Siobhan 
Adcock, author of The Completionist, recognises literature’s ability ‘to 
generate radical empathy, to enlarge our understanding of ourselves 
and our world, through people and stories that dramatise what a climate 
report or news story can’t’. Literature works on our senses to make us 
feel - our brains are engaged as we read vivid imagery. As Helen Phillips, 
author of Some Possible Solutions, says ‘fiction can make the threats 
of climate change visceral, not merely statistical. Fiction forces us to 
imagine it, to live it, at least for a time.’ Literature will help imagine new 
solutions, make people care, and help us reimage our relationship with 
the natural world.
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Literature can help scientists, policymakers and readers. What has been 
missing from the climate discourse is a humanistic approach to policy by 
helping leaders understand human cultures and our ecosystems. Those 
who dominate the climate change discourse aren’t in close proximity 
to those who have struggled in the face of ecological disaster. Writers 
become vessels to tell the story of those who have suffered including 
nature. By reading their story brings the problem closer to those in 
conference rooms who are making policies. In N.K. Jesmin’s science 
fiction trilogy The Broken Earth series the injustices that govern our 
world play a part in the fictional continent of the ‘Stillness’. The novels 
show how institutions can perpetuate injustices, particularly towards 
marginalised communities. This is chillingly close to our world. The 
death of 8-year-old Ella Kissi-Debrah in 2013 due to acute respiratory 
failure, severe asthma, and air pollution shows how dire the climate 
crisis is. It is devastating that the loss of a young child is the moment 
of crisis when we should be working vehemently to prevent this from 
happening in the first place. We need to look at climate change from 
a humanitarian perspective- remembering that there are lives at stake, 
we need the tool of empathy as much as we need the quantitative and 
analytical tools of science. The government is advised by scientists, 
statisticians but what about writers who lend their voices to the world 
- who speak for the ‘subaltern’, who have imagined worlds beyond our
own? The novel is an experiment, testing and trialing ideas much like
that of a scientist. The writer’s findings can be valuable contributions
to decisions on environmental policy. Individual bodies must be aware
that climate change is a method of extermination for the biosphere
including its inhabitants - us. We are seeing the rise of climate migrants.
The Climate and Migration Coalition has estimated that roughly
24 million people have been displaced due to weather-related issues
in a single year. It shows us that we cannot compartmentalise climate
change- it is an intricate network of injustice against people, the
environment and animals.
Fiction can be used to affect policymakers but also readers. In an NPR 
article professor, Judith Curry describes it as ‘an untapped way ... of 
smuggling some serious topics into the consciousness of readers.’ 
The word ‘smuggle’ may carry connotations of illicit behaviour but it 
describes one of the virtues of the novel. It manages to show us not 
tell us important things. A didactic message often falls on death ears- 
no reader wants to be preached to so learning through a story is an 
organic way to impart information. Ecocritic Antonia Mehnert says 
climate fiction ‘gives insight into the ethical and social ramifications 
of this unparalleled environmental crisis, reflects on current political 
conditions that impede action on climate change, explores how 
risk materializes and affects society, and finally plays an active part 
in shaping our conception of climate change.’ Literature can help 
us picture potential futures and focus us on subjects we had never 
thought about. The Better Worlds project by The Verge is an example 
of literature and arts instilling hope and optimism in the face of the 
current crisis. In ‘Monsters Come Howling in Their Season’ by Cadwell 
Turnbull, the usage of AI is explored to help in climate disasters. 
‘Common’ is a democratic AI database that does things like keeping an 
inventory of resources, provide ‘regular clean-up efforts and forwards 
help requests’ and ‘notify first responders in time of emergency. 
Turnbull says he modeled this futuristic technology on popular voice 
assistant speakers like the Alexa or Google home device. Not only is 
the writer engaging with technological solutions but he also looks at 
How can literature tackle climate change?
ways societies can be remodeled in his interview. He is emphatic on 
a ‘cooperative effort to save us’ and how community ownership can 
protect towns and villages from disaster capitalism if they have aftermath 
plans and are in control of the rebuilding of their homes. Turnbull’s 
story also considers the ethical issues of such technologies. The story is 
incredibly perceptive in its approach to climate disaster. It reminds us 
that we need to learn how to cultivate a relationship with the natural 
world. This job is for everyone - the public, the government, company 
stakeholders, etc. We must distribute and delegate according to scale. 
We must understand that this job is not ‘to save the planet’ it is to  
save ourselves.
All proposed solutions come with their limitations. We must interrogate 
who reads? Who reads climate fiction? Who needs to read it and how 
can we get them reading it? Journalist Dan Bloom speaks optimistically 
of cli-fi as ‘a fiction genre that might help wake people up and serve 
as an alarm bell’ - this can even mobilise people to care but we need 
infrastructure in place to spread these ideas organically. We need to 
get people thinking about how to reckon with the vastness of climate 
change. Broadening the readership demographic can get ideas into the 
hands of future humanitarians, scientists, policymakers, educators, etc
Literature as a solution may be critiqued as too optimistic or intangible 
for a situation that is so dire but we have tried science alone and 
it has not stopped us from continuing on the fast track to meeting 
and potentially exceeding the 1.5°C global warming increase target. 
Literature has a multiplier effect, ideas spread quickly and more fluidly 
than pdf reports, charts and figures. The fuel for change is hope and 
literature can provide this. It has taken years for the climate to get like 
this thus we can expect the reversal to be long and arduous, we need 
to sustain our efforts to reverse climate change. We must be quick 
to imagine new solutions when current ones fail. Writers who are 
producing this content need to be nurtured and need their stories to be 
read- and to have their story worlds materialise outside of the page. We 
must encourage the dissemination of climate fiction and ecocriticism 
in schools and higher education institutions- to cultivate thinkers and 
future problem solvers- we must make it our vocation to save ourselves 
by saving the environment. When people are informed they can 
demand legislation that is effective and targets those responsible. In her 
article, climate activist - Samia Dumbuya summarises the importance of 
a global effort ‘to create collective impact and change, with something 
that is beyond our individualistic nature.’ Stories are meant to be 
shared, they encourage everyone to immerse themself in the narrative, 
they make us think and feel. We need to be fully involved with our 
brains and our hearts- to tackle climate change. 
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